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We undertake a programme of tactic synthesis. We first formalize the notion of
a tactic as a rewrite rule, then give a correctness criterion for this by means of a
reflection mechanism in the constructive type theory OYSTER. We further formalize
the notion of a tactic specification, given as a synthesis goal and a decidability
goal. We use a proof planner. CIAM. to guide the search for inductive proofs
of these, and are able to successfully synthesize several tactics in this fashion.
This involves two extensions to existing methods: context-sensitive rewriting and
higher-order wave rules. Further, we show that from a proof of the decidability
goal one may compile to a Prolog program a pseudo- tactic which may be run to
efficiently simulate the input/output behaviour of the synthetic tactic.
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1.1 Aims and Motivation
A tactic is a program which performs a theorem proving task, usually of a spe¬
cific, intended kind, for example applying an inference rule or rewriting a subterm
(Gordon e.t. al 1979). This concept is explained in detail in section 2.2. Our aim
in this thesis is to set up a framework and develop techniques whereby we are able
to use a theorem prover and formal proof system to synthesize tactics, and to par¬
tially automate this. Our original motivation for this arose from the proof planner
we will later use: CL*M. developed by the Maths Reasoning Group (MRG) at
Edinburgh University (vanHarmelen et. al 1993). The philosophy behind CLAM.
which is explained in more detail in appendix A, is that the search problem in
theorem proving is best tackled by reasoning in a similar way to humans: develop
tactics which are specific to a given class of problem and use meta-level informa¬
tion about the goal and about the tactics themselves to apply these appropriately.
CIAM does this by using methods, where one may write:
method = tactic + specification
Thus, our original aim was to automate the synthesis of the tactic part of a method
given its specification. At present the tactic parts of CTWs methods are written
by hand, to cany out in the object logic what is promised in specification.
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However, tactic verification and synthesis is not only useful with respect to CLAM
methods: some consider it an essential step if we are ever to use theorem provers
for real world problems. (Knoblock &: Constable, 1986) have the following to say
about tactics in the NuPRL (Constable e.t aL 1986) proof environment:
Tactics raise the level of reasoning in the system, and for that they are
vital. But if tactics must be executed, producing explicit primitive-
level proofs, it becomes impossibly costly to raise the level of reasoning
very far.... And yet we may know that if run they will succeed. In this
case one approach is to determine analytic conditions that guarantee
success of a tactic and then prove formally in the. system that it works
when the conditions are met. If the conditions can be easily checked
or proved, then great computational savings are possible. Such an
approach will allow the system to achieve high levels of abstraction.
[My italics.]
The last point can be illustrated by considering what kind of knowledge we can
represent in a proof system. We usually think of stating formally such things as
definitions and theorems and their proofs, but the theorem prover or tactics we
used to produce the latter, while formal parts of the system, are not part of the
object-level. Thus, while we can state and use knowledge which can be expressed
in the form of definitions and theorems, we can only give a sketchy, informal
idea of knowledge which must be expressed in the writing of a tactic or the¬
orem prover. By formalising a partial meta- theory as proposed by Constable and
Knoblock we greatly enhance our ability to represent and use this "deeper know¬
ledge". A good example of these different types of knowledge is the following: at
the object-level we may prove theorems such as the associativity, commntativity
and idempotence of the connective <->. In the meta-theory we can state the fact,
and with a suitable reflection mechanism prove, that: if each distinct preposi¬
tional variable occurs an even number of times in an expression built only with *->
(the analytic precondition), then it is a theorem. This example can be found in
(Weyhrauch, 1980)[p. 146].
The reason for using a theorem prover in an attempt to partially automate tactic
synthesis is succinctly put by Boyer and Moore in (Boyer &: Strother Moore. 1981):
If it is not practical to prove the correctness of new procedures with
the tools provided then... the extensibility is either unusable or unsafe
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because the users will add axioms stating the correctness of the new
procedures.
We turn tactic synthesis into a theorem proving task by use of constructive type
theory. In this setting, by proving a goal of the form
b Vx : input..3y : output.spec(x.y) (1-1)
we may extract a program which satisfies the specification spec. CIAM method
specifications are broken up, as in (Knoblock &: Constable, 1986), into a precon¬
dition and effect. Thus our synthesis theorems typically have the form:
I- Vx : input.By : out.put.precond(x) —> effect(x. y)
and it is proof of these theorems which we are principally interested in automating.
We also attempt to prove theorems asserting the decidability of the pre-conditions,
i.e.:
b Vx : input,.precond(x) V ->precond(x)
With these proofs one may transform using the tactics embodied in the synthesis
theorems into simply evaluating the pre-conditions (see chapters 4 and 5).
Of course, program synthesis, and tactic synthesis in particular, is a very hard
problem. To talk meaningfully about this we must first say what programming
language we are using, what language a specification is written in. and what it
means for a program to meet a specification. These topics are discussed in detail
in chapter 2, but under some very humble assumptions the problem of program
synthesis is seen to be non-computable.
The correctness of a program is sometimes split into two parts: partial correctness
given that it terminates, the program meets its specification and termination
that it eventually halts returning an answer. Assume that our programming
language is rich enough to express any general recursive function and that our
specification language is sufficient to assert that for a given input an (encoding
of a) program terminates and that two (encodings of) programs have the same
4
input/output behaviour1. Turing showed with the halting problem (Turing. 1936)
that even the termination part of program verification is in general undecidable.
But the problem of program synthesis subsumes that of verification in the follow¬
ing sense. For all (encodings of) specifications speifinput,, output), an algorithm
for program synthesis would decide whether there existed a program, (with en¬
coding) P(x). meeting spec and if so produce P. To verify that a given P met a
given specification spec we would apply the program synthesis algorithm to the
specification
spec'(i.o) = specfi.o) A P(i) = o
If the algorithm synthesized a program P' we would know that P met spec: if it
indicated that no such P' existed we would know that P did not meet spec since
otherwise P itself would contradict the non-existence.
In the more specific setting of OYSTER type theory we say that an algorithm solves
the program synthesis problem if it can decide (and prove in the affirmative case)
all conjectures of form (1.1). An algorithm is said to solve the program verification
problem if it can decide (and prove in the affirmative case), for all well-typed
functions / : input, —» output, all conjectures of the form:
h Mr,: output.spec,fx. f(x))
An algorithm for the program verification problem can be reduced to one for the
synthesis problem by putting
spetfx, y) = y = f(x) in output A spec,fx. y)
If there is no general solution to the problem of tactic synthesis, how ambi¬
tious should our programme be? The state-of-the-art in inductive theorem prov¬
ing is generally taken to be the Boyer and Moore theorem prover. NQTHM
(Boyer & Moore. 1979). In (Boyer & Strother Moore. 1981), they were able to
'OYSTER (Horn, 1988) and NuPRL (Constable ft al. 1986) have both these
properties.
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verify a procedure for cancelling addition across an equation after stating and
proving three intermediate lemmas (see section 6.2). We should therefore have
achieved something significant if we reach a similar level of user-assistance in syn¬
thesis proofs. Boyer and Moore summarize:
But we do not see extensibility as a panacea for the current lack of
theorem-proving power. It is a solution to a relatively simple problem:
how to obtain insurance against unsoundness. The truly hard intel¬
lectual problem remains: the discoveiy of harmoniously cooperating
heuristics for marshalling a very large number of facts and construct¬
ing difficult proofs.
We now outline our programme which constitutes the major part this thesis. Be¬
fore we can begin to synthesize tactics we have the following prerequisites:
a formalization of the notion of tactic Before we can do anything else we
must say in a rigorous way exactly what is meant by "tactic".
a formal means of specifying tactics We need a language sufficiently express¬
ive that one can represent and reason about such objects as terms, proofs
and tactics, and into which we can naturally translate our specifications.
formalized a notion of correctness As well as meeting a specification, we need
a means of ensuring that our synthetic tactics behaved soundly with respect
to our object logic.
a theorem prover and techniques for carrying out the synthesis proofs
As Boyer and Moore note above, without some tools to help in the synthesis,
a formalization in any system is unusable. Using the CZdM proof planner
for this purpose is the major contribution of this thesis.
a means of using the synthesized tactic efficiently Automated theorem prov¬
ing is a particularly pragmatic discipline; our work is of little benefit if it is
of no practical use.
Wo. have chosen to formalize tactics in a fashion well known in the literature
(Boyer &; Strother Moore, 1981; Howe, 1988a): a partial reflection mechanism.
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This allows us to give a strict notion of correctness in terms of preserving the
meaning of a term. In order to bring the resulting synthesis proofs within the
scope of CIAM we have made a number of simplifications as to what constitutes
a tactic in our formalism. The first simplification arises from our use of the con¬
structive type theory OYSTER (Horn, 1988) as the object logic. The tactics are
derived from the extracts of the synthesis proofs and are therefore totak they may
fail, in the same way some programming languages allow exceptions to be raised,
but will always terminate. The second simplification arises from the generality of
tactics tactics can be written to perform any algorithmically definable deriva¬
tion and would therefore require a full description of the object logic, for example
a complete reflection mechanism, to supply a notion of correctness. A much sim¬
pler partial reflection mechanism gives an immediate notion of correctness if we
require that the input and output of a tactic have the same meaning, but for this
definition to be applicable we require that a tactic have exactly one output, i.e.
that it be a rewrite tactic. Our third simplification is in restricting the class of
terms we attempt to rewrite to contain function symbols whose arity is at most 2
and that these are over the domain of natural numbers. We show that this imposes
no theoretical loss of generality and is still useful in practice.
So. in essence we equate tactics with functions which operate on the meta- level
provided by our partial reflection mechanism. How are these of use in practice and
why use them at all? To motivate this we again quote Knoblock and Constable:
This has two key advantages. We can prove in NuPRL itself that a
meta-function will produce the desired proof: so it may not be neces¬
sary to explicitly produce the proof (unless it is needed for computa¬
tion). This leads to a more efficient application of the tactic method .
Second, it eliminates the need to express meta-theoretic concepts in
a distinct language. Thus there is only one language to learn, the
NuPRL theory.
Thus the motivation is to compile object-level proof obligations into a once-only
correctness proof (as part of the synthesis), leaving only the "analytic conditions"
2in the same way that cutting in an already-proven lemma does not require its re¬
proving.
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to be shown, each time the tactic is used. This exemplifies half the approach of
CLAM: the specification part of a method. Of course, CLAM has to run a "real"
tactic to meet its object-level proof obligations. Synthesized tactics, on the other
hand, can be used without further proof. Because of this we concentrate on tactics
where the ratio of object-level cost/meta-level cost is large. In the case where this
is not so we show how to make formal tactics informal by compiling them to a
language such as Prolog or ML.
Since tactics are. by their nature, recursive (in the non-logical sense) functions,
any non-trivial synthesis proof will require a degree of inductive reasoning. It is
this aspect of automation which interests us most, and for this reason we use as
our theorem prover CLAM itself. We show that, by means of various extensions
to the existing set of methods for general purpose inductive theorem proving, we
are able to apply CLAM to tactic synthesis and give a coherent "rippling story"
as an overall, controlling proof plan (see chapter 4). Our extensions/additions in¬
clude: the partial reflection mechanism implemented in OYSTER (chapter 3): higher-
order wave rules (section 4.8); context-sensitive rewriting (section 4.7): decidability
proofs (section 4.6): compilation of synthesized tactic to Prolog and ML (chapter
5): guidance using the correctness goal (section ??): and load-time simulation of
CLAM (section 3.5).
We shall assess in chapter 7 how far we have come to meeting the goals outlined
above. As the ability of automatic provers, and CLAM in particular, increases, so
will the sophistication of the tactics we shall be able to synthesize automatically.
We give here some of the implications of automating tactic synthesis as posited:
Ordinary use We have the immediate benefit of not having to hand-write tactics
to meet meta-level specifications. We also know that the synthesized tactics
will always work.
Reflective use We have the additional benefits of efficiency where work is largely
at the meta-level. This will become increasingly important as deeper know¬
ledge representation becomes important in automated theorem proving.
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Bootstrapping The circularity of the above programme, whereby a theorem
prover proves theorems which add to its theorem proving ability, is exempli¬
fied in an existing system (Boyer & Strother Moore. 1981).
Methodology We hope that the need to rigorously formalize the notion of tactic
will lead to a better understanding of how best to provide a formal metalan¬
guage for this purpose, and to the systematic use of that language.
Abstract planners Proof planners like CLAM should be (almost) independent
of particular proof systems. By limiting the amount of machinery that needs
to be ported in order to use the proof planner, i.e. by implementing at the
object level via a reflection mechanism a large proportion of the tactics we
use. we come closer to that ideal.
1.2 Formal vs informal
Before concluding, we briefly explain our reasons for eschewing what may seem a
much more obvious and simple solution to our goal.
A CLW method consists of two parts: a meta-level description, or specification,
of the behaviour of the method, and a tactic to realise this behaviour at the object-
level. Our goal was, given only the first part of a method, to (semi-)aut.omatically
synthesize a suitable tactic. Let us give an example. A method called eval_fief /2
(all CLAM terminology is explained in the appendix A) has the job of checking
whether an expression in the goal is an instance of a definition which can be
unfolded. We give a simplified version here ignoring such features as quantification
and meta variables in the goal: A method, as in this example, has six slots; the
specification part is given by slots 1 5 and the tactic by slot 6. The first slot gives
the method's name here eval_def/2. with arguments for the position within the
goal of the subterm to be unfolded (Pos) and the name of the theorem embodying












Figure 1—1: A simplified method
embodied in the theorem plus2:
I- V:r, y : pnat.plus(s(z), y) — s(plus(x, y)) in pnat
The second slot is an input, template matching the goal. Since OYSTER is a sequent-
based logic this consists of a hypothesis list (H) and a conclusion (G). Third is a
list of preconditions. These are runnable Prolog goals all of which must succeed
if the method is to be deemed applicable to the goal. Here, every subexpression
(Exp) of the goal is tested to see whether it is an instance of the left-hand side
of some definition. When a method is called by the planner it is usually done so
with uninstantiated arguments. Execution of the preconditions typically results in
their instantiation, in this case completely so; internal variables may also become
instantiated. The fourth slot, the effects, is another list of runnable Prolog goals.
These cany out the actions necessary to construct any new subgoals and determine
any remaining variables; all effects should succeed if the method is applicable. The
fifth slot, the output is a list of subgoals. in this example a single sequent consisting
of the original goal with the definition instance replaced by its unfolding.
The sixth slot is the name of a tactic which should implement at the object-level,
i.e. in OYSTER, the behaviour described at the meta-level in slots 1 5. That is;
slot 6 should name a tactic in the form of a runnable Prolog goal (which is how
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tactics are implemented in OYSTER) which applied to a goal identical to the input
(slot 2) results in subgoals identical to those in the output (slot 5).3 In our simple
example the tactic could consist, for instance, of cutting in the theorem called
Rule, suitably instantiating it to give a new hypothesis of the form
New = Ne.wExp
and using this to justify an application of OYSTeR's substitution rule primitive.
From our description of how a method is used at the meta-level by a planner and
its tactic part executed at the object-level, it can be seen there is no formal (in the
sense of an OYSTER proof) connection between slots 1 5 and slot 6. When a CLAM
user comes to write a new method (s)he is responsible for ensuring that the tactic
of slot 6 fulfills the promise made in slots 1 5 in the same way that a programmer
is responsible for ensuring that a piece of code meets a client's specifications. This
is an onerous and tedious task where mistakes are common, especially in a domain
as complicated as proofs. Computer scientists believe that formal methods offer
the best hope for building correct software. A CLAM method might already be
said to give a rigorous, rather than a formal, specification of the required tactic;
can we not use this to eliminate the need to write tactics by hand?
There appear to be two distinct routes to achieving this, which we shall call the
formal approach and the informal approach. We describe the latter first.
The new subgoals of slot 5 are constructed by the effects slot of the method.
With each predicate of the meta-language we could associate a tactic to carry out
an analogous operation at the object-level. In our example one might associate
a substitution tactic with replace_at/4. By suitably combining the associated
tactics one may be alrle to realise a tactic satisfying the method. For example we
might have:
3Note: there is no name clash between the method eval_def/2 and the tactic
eval^def/2 since the method is implemented as the six-part, data structure described
above and used by the planner; the method is not itself a Prolog predicate. The same











replace (Pos .NewExp.G ,NewG) , '/.Run the effects. .
apply ( .. ,subst_tac( ...)...) . '/.Apply substitution tactic
'/.associated with replace_at/4.
However, there are several problems with this approach. First, as its name sug¬
gests. it is informal. We may have a correctness proof for some algorithm on
paper, but there is no way to exploit this internally in OYSTER we can never
prove in OYSTER that this tactic satisfies slots 1 5. Second, it is not clear how to
"suitably combine" the various tactics associated with each of the effects to give
the full tactic. Effects are linked by logical variables to each other and to all the
other slots, and often these variables don't correspond to well-formed object-level
objects, e.g. in the example above Exp and NewExp are terms but not propositions.
Third, the approach appears difficult to modularize or scale up. Each predicate of
the method language would need a complicated, description which would depend
on all the other descriptions and where the simple logical semantics is lost. This
approach also suffers from fourth problem, in common with the formal approach,
that any annotation used by the method must somehow lie accommodated trans¬
parently at the object level. For example, if wave annotation (see glossary) were
used by the method, we would have to represent it at the object-level in such a
way as to leave the meaning of any sequent unchanged.
Alternatively there is what we have called the formal approach. First, a reflection
mechanism (see chapter 3) is used to formalize the object-level, or part of it. inside
itself. Using this, a formal, object-level definition of the predicates of the method
language is given. In this setting theorems can be proved, for example, asserting
the existence, given a suitable input, of a suitable subgoal in essence a tactic.
One might prove the theorem:
h Vfl, exp. ne.x.p : metaterm. pos : posn. ride : name.
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expji.t.(g, pos, exp) A funcjdefeqn(exp, ride, ne.xp) —»
3ng : m.etaterm.replaceait(pos, nexp. g. ng) A g ~ ng
The expression g ~ ng is part of the reflection mechanism and ensures that the
original goal and the snbgoal "mean" the same tiling, that the original goal follows
from the new one. Such a theorem can be used as a tactic when the proof is carried
out in a constructive logic such as OYSTER. By instantiating with suitable terms
and proving the pre-conditions, one can extract entirely automatically a term ng
and a proof that g ~ ng. The latter can be used to replace the original goal g
with the subgoal ng.
This approach, too. has problems, apart from the common problem mentioned
above of representing any annotation used by the methods. Whereas in the in¬
formal approach we tried to treat formal objects (tactics) informally, here we
attempt to treat informal objects (the method language) formally. Setting up a
reflection mechanism and formal definitions of each of the method language predic¬
ates is. like writing methods, a delicate and time-consuming task: unlike method
writing, it only needs to be done once. There is also a better prospect for the
formal approach: it is possible, and indeed quite practicable, to move a large part
of the informal aspects of a proof environment over to the object-level (see chapter
6 for examples). There is little point, however, in a proof system with informal
tactics. Should we wish to recover a stand-alone tactic from a proof, one which can
be used in the absence of the reflection mechanism and thus is no longer formally
correct, we show in chapter 5 that this is still possible.
We have chosen in this thesis to take the formal approach. This necessitates
that we first choose an appropriate means of specification and representation.
These choices and design decisions are discussed in chapters 2 and 3. The use
of a reflection mechanism and the representation of the method language at the
object-level give rise to long and intricate proof obligations. Fortunately, much of
the work is of a kind ideally suited to automation via a mechanical theorem prover
as we see in chapter 4.
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1.3 Structure of Thesis
The thesis is comprised of seven chapters of which we now give a short overview.
Chapter 1 introduced the ideas propounded in the rest, of the thesis, explaining
the goals of and motivation for the work.
Chapter 2 examines the program specification methodologies representative of the
current state-of-the-art. These are analysed with regard to their usefulness and
amenability to our programme. Such a survey is required to justify our eventual
choice of constructive type theory. We describe at the end of chapter 2 the proof
system (OYSTER) and proof planner (CLAM) used in the sequel.
Chapter 3 makes concrete our use of type theory as constituted in the OYSTER
system. In it we describe how we go about representing in type theory the data
and functional objects commonly used when programming tactics. The motivation
for such a representation is a partial reflection mechanism giving rise to a precise
notion of tactic correctness.
In chapter 4 we explore the use of the CLAM proof planner in tactic synthesis.
We divide the process into synthesis of atomic tactics from their specifications,
and the putting together of existing tactics to form super tactics. In order to do
this we have introduced several new techniques into CLAM in particular the use
of context sensitive rewriting and higher-order wave rules.
Besides the use of the reflection mechanism of chapter 3 in "running" the syn¬
thesized tactics we also examine, in chapter 5. the "compilation" of synthesized
tactics into traditional programming languages (ML and Prolog). With our use of
the notion of decidability to simulate logic programs this is of interest in its own
right, but may also lead to substantial speed-ups in some cases.
The thesis is concluded by a chapter describing related work and comparing it to
ours (chapter 6). and conclusions in chapter 7: how far we have gone to meeting
our original goals, what the outlook is for our programme and what interesting
research problems remain.
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Source code and OYSTER and C ISM objects referred to in the text are gathered
into appendices. We have implemented to a greater or less extent all program¬
ming mentioned in this thesis. However, in some cases the implementation is
only partial, carried out sufficiently far to show feasibility. While the reflection
mechanism of chapter 3 and the tactic compilation algorithm in its limited form
(chapter 5) are completely implemented for example, only some of the methods
and submethods required for a full CLWimplementation employing the ideas of
chapter 4 have been written: some of the example plans and proofs in chapter 4





As ha.s already been pointed out. tactics are a special kind of program, ones which
manipulate proofs. We define what is meant formally by the term tactic in section
2.2. Later in this section we give an looser, intuitive idea of what a tactic is. how
they are used, and what minimal properties we believe they should possess. Our
main goal is to verify and synthesize these special programs, and in order to do this
we first need a way of describing a program's behaviour: a specification. In verify¬
ing a given program we must show that it satisfies a given specification; program
synthesis requires that we satisfy a given specification by explicitly producing a
program which does so. In this chapter we survey and summarize some of the
existing methods of program specification and their concomitant methods of pro¬
gram development, examining them in relation to a number of criteria important
to our goal, and justifying the method we finally choose.
There are two properties which we consider it essential that a tactic possess. These
relate to its use as a pseudo-inference rule in proofs, where it maps a conclusion
to premises (a backward rule) From the dictum that "we recognize a proof when
we see one" (Sundholm. 1983. p. 156), it follows that all proof rules should be
decidable and that the premises of a rule should be uniquely determined by its
16
conclusion and possible side arguments. Thus, a proof rule, and therefore a tactic-
should be total and deterministic. In practice tactics in existing systems have
no such restrictions and may involve search where these properties do not hold.
For example, a tactic which implements a complete resolution theorem prover for
first-order predicate logic can never be more than semi-computable. However, we
will assume that our tactics are incomplete but "useful" in a particular domain
and that, if unsuccessful, they terminate with an indication of failure rather that
not at all. Assuming such properties greatly simplifies the machinery required
to specify and reason about tactics. Note that circumscribing tactics in this way
does not restrict them to being merely rule macros: tactics may use meta-level
information and their behaviour may depend in a complicated way on the form
of the goal. A good example of this is the tactic mentioned in chapter 1 which
simplified <-»-expressions. Having said that tactics can terminate with failure we
shall therefore need to be able to specify this kind of behaviour also.
The above analysis examined the properties that an individual tactic should pos¬
sess. We also need to think about how tactics will be used together and allow
for future changes and improvements to different parts of the system. These are
the so-called programming-in-the-large aspects of this work. There are two ap¬
proaches to this, sometimes termed "black box" and "glass box" development. In
the former, as the separate modules of a program are developed the only assump¬
tions that one module may make of another are those given by the specification.
In the glass box approach, as well as the information provided by the specifica¬
tion. one may also use the implementational details, for example that an abstract
data structure has a certain concrete representation. This latter approach, while
possibly resulting in terser code, carries with it the danger that as different parts
of the system are changed, the whole may no longer work. This re-usability aspect
is important in our work since, as CUM updates arrive, so we may choose to
re-synthesize a whole suite of tactics. If the latter is to continue to work we must
stipulate a block box development process.
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2.2 Tactics, tacticals and conversions
As was noted in chapter 1. one of our prerequisites is a formalization of the notion
of tactic. Before examining the means available for doing this it is necessary
that we first say exactly what is meant by the term "tactic" and how they are
implemented in existing systems. For a more detailed explanation the reader is
referred to the literature cited.
Tactics arose out of the need, encountered during the course of developing a proof
system for the PPA logic, for a "framework in which a user can both design his own
partial proof strategies and execute single steps of proof" (Gordon e.t al 1977a).
The result of this work was the proof system LCF with its own metalanguage.
ML. for programming tactics and more generally manipulating the object logic.
In discussing the requirements of a tactic language (Gordon e.t al. 1977a) say:
The principal aims in designing ML were to make it impossible
to prove non-theorems yet easy to program strategies for performing
proofs. A strategy or recipe for proof could be something like
"induction on f and g. followed by assuming antecedents and doing
case analysis, all interleaved with simplification." ... The point is that
such strategies appear to be built from simpler ones (which we call
tactics) by a number of general operations in fairly regular ways: we
call these operations tacticals ...
For programming tactics and tacticals ... the following ingredients
in ML were soon found to be expedient (almost necessary): the ability
to handle higher-order functions, a rigorous but flexible type structure,
a mechanism for generating and trapping failures, and an abstract
representation of the object language.
As will be explained later in chapter 3, we have met these needs with respectively
the A-calculus of OYSTER, its type theory, the use of the union type ?t. and a re¬
flection mechanism. We first describe, in some detail, how tactics are implemented
in the NuPRL system (Constable e.t al. 1986). most of which is a specialization of
the LCF concept (Gordon e.t al 1977b).
The original implementors of LCF took an abstract view of the process of proving
theorems by defining a goal type, a member of which was ae.hie.ned by a suitable
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member of fhe shot type. A tactic was a program used to accomplish backwards
proof by breaking a goal into a list of subgoals and providing a validation map¬
ping shots achieving the subgoals to a shot achieving the goal. Thus we have the
declarations:
lettype validation = shot list -> shot;;
lettype tactic = goal -> goal list # validation;;
The types goal and shot are ready-defined ML abstract types. Implementing an
object logic, entails defining a notion of goal, and a notion of inference encoded
in shot this is the interface at which the object logic and ML meet. By
allowing the user access to all the representation (destructor) functions of the shot
type, so that he may analyse theorems syntactically, but allowing access to the
abstracting (constructor) functions only via encodings of the primitive inference
rules, soundness is ensured. If an illegal instance of the latter is invoked the result
is an ML failure, trap; this can either be caught and acted on or result in a top-level
failure.
NuPRL is an instance of this approach. Both goal and shot here become the
type proof of partial proofs. Members of proof consist of a sequent, a refinement
and a list of subproofs of the children of the refinement. The latter two may be
missing in some leaf nodes of an incomplete proof. A member of proof achieves
itself, with a partial proof considered complete when all its leaf nodes are childless.
As described above, soundness is ensured by having only one1 primitive function
in ML that constructs new proof objects: refine, of type rule -> tactic.
Tactics are used in practice like derived inference rules, in the following way2.
According to (Constable e.t al. 1986): at a particular point in a proof the ML vari¬
able prlgoal is associated with the current node, a member of proof; the named
1 This substantiates the criticism of (Knoblock & Constable, 1986) quoted in chapter
1 that all proofs must ultimately be carried out* at the primitive level.
There are actually two kinds of tactic used in NuPRL: refinement, tactics described
here, and transformation ta.cti.es which we. shall not discuss.
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tactic is applied to prlgoal, producing a (possibly) empty list of subgoals and a
validation: the validation is applied to the snbgoals: the tactic name is installed as
the name of the refinement rule for the current node: and the subgoals become the
children of the current, node. From this description it should be clear that tactics
are used in a functional side-effect.-free manner, though they may make extensive
use of global data such as other tactics and already proven theorems.
A user is able to define his own tactics by writing the appropriate ML programs.
An example is the identity tactic, IDTAC:
let IDTAC (g:proof) = [g],hd;;
This returns the original goal. g. as the sole subgoal and uses hd as a validation
to access whatever proof is eventually supplied for this. Low-level tactics may be
defined in this way, from first principles, by using the refine function to access
primitive rides. Tactics may also be defined by composing previously defined
tactics using higher-order functions called tact.ic.als. with the advantage that tactic
libraries may be built up in a modular, re-usable fashion. Tacticals typically take
tactics (and possibly some additional arguments) and return a tactic. Tactics built
in this way often have explicitly recursive (i.e. letrec) definitions or are defined in
terms of recursive tacticals such as REPEAT below and its relatives recursion is
typically on subgoals and subterms. The failure mechanism is also made extensive
use of in this context. Some of the more common tacticals are3:
THEN : tactic -> tactic -> tactic This is used in infix form to compose two
tactics. In applying f THEN g. first f is applied. If it fails then the whole
fails. If not, g is applied to the resulting subgoals.
QRELSE : tactic -> tactic -> tactic This allows alternation of tactics. In
applying f QRELSE g. f is first applied. If this succeeds then the whole
succeeds with the same result. Otherwise the result is that of applying g.
•'These aren't quite the definitions used in NuP[iT,. where non-progress is treated as
failure. We shall overlook this and use the definitions given.
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TRY: tactic -> tactic In applying TRY f. f is applied. If this succeeds the
whole succeeds with the same result. Otherwise the result is the original
goal. This is equivalent to f QRELSE IDTAC.
REPEAT : tactic -> tactic REPEAT repeatedly applies its argument until it fails.
It can be defined in terms of the tacticals above as:
letrec REPEAT tac = (tac THEN (REPEAT tac)) ORELSE IDTAC;;
The termination of REPEAT f requires that f fail at some point. Thus its totality is
not implied by the totality of f. This presents us with a problem since it contradicts
the totality dictum of section 2.1. We show in chapter 4 how we overcome this by
using the Prolog/ML level and the reflection mechanism simultaneously, confining,
as it were, all non-total behaviour to the former.
Although any function of the right type may be classed as a tactic, is it neces¬
sarily useful? (Gordon e.t. al, 1977b) define a tactic as valid if its validation does
indeed map shots achieving the snhgoals to a shot achieving the goal. This is the
minimum requirement for a tactic, to be considered useful. In (Paulson. 1983b)
a tactic is described as conservative, if its subgoals are achievable whenever its
input goal is. Whereas validity is a property of how an inference is implemented,
conservativeness is a property of the inference it itself. It is not always desirable;
for example, rules like V- and 3-intro which require that a choice be made are
usually not conservative. (Gordon e.t al, 1977b) define a tactic as strongly valid
when it is both valid and conservative. We shall see in chapter 3 that our tactics
are. if we regard their preconditions (q.v.) as subgoals. always valid. They are not
in general conservative, but, since the precondition will usually be decidable, and
therefore treated more like a side condition, they are as good as.
Similarly, a tactical is said to be valid (conservative) when it preserves the validity
(conservativeness) of its arguments. Validity is again a minimum requirement to
be considered useful. All the tacticals we discuss will be valid and conservative.
Many theorem provers, and of especial interest to us, CIAM. rely heavily on
rewriting in the course of a proof. (Paulson. 1983a) shows how one can construct
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a library of rewriting functions in a manner analogous to that described previously
for ordinary tactics. He defines conversions as:
lettype conv = term -> (term # tactic);;
The idea is that a subterm. t. of the goal. Ti h Q. we wish to rewrite is mapped by
a conversion to a pair (u. tac), where tac should prove the goal H I- t. = u in T (or
H b t. <-> u where appropriate). This in turn can be used to perform the rewriting
using the primitive substitution rule (or simple logical reasoning). Paulson shows
how conversions can be combined using analogues of the traditional tacticals. This
is of particular interest to us since we shall later limit ourselves (see chapter 3) to
synthesizing rewrite tactics.
Most of what was said above holds in the case of the OYSTER re-implementation
of NuPRL. translating ML functions to Prolog predicates (Horn, 1988). Proofs
are not passed explicitly as input and output by predicates; instead proof occurs
as a side-effect of execution, the interface provided by a fixed set of interface
predicates. Principal among these are goal/1, which returns the conclusion of the
current goal. hyp_list/l. which returns the hypothesis list of the current goal,
and apply/1. which applies a refinement to the current goal. The use here of side-
effects does not contradict our assertion above that the tactic language should be
side-effect-free: for the purpose of reasoning about them the OYSTER tactics and
tacticals behave like functions since they are only ever applied via apply/1 which
behaves like a functional interpreter.
To summarize: it appears that in order to specify tactics we shall need: a typed
metalanguage, functional rather than procedural, allowing higher-order functions,
possessing a mechanism for handling failure, supporting an abstract representation
of the object logic, and with good support for recursion.
To avoid later confusion we note here that the word "tactic"' is used in three distinct
senses in this thesis. The traditional sense is that described above (e.g. particular
programs of the USSIER metalanguage) and to avoid confusion will sometimes be
written "OYSTER tactic" etc. We also refer to the functions (terms of the OYSTER
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logic) we synthesize as tactics; for clarity, "synthesized tactics". The third type of
tactic is described in chapter 5 and is called throughout a psendo-tactic.
2.3 Methods of specification
There are several different methodologies being used at present for formal program
specification. There are also several ways of classifying these, e.g. procedural vs
data abstraction, or model- vs property-oriented. Several classes take for granted
the use of traditional procedural programming languages and are thus poor choices
for specifying tactics. We shall include in the survey below so-called declarative
languages which are in a sense executable specifications. We do not attempt broad
categorizations, instead merely describing and appraising each approach according
to: its aims and methodology, and its advantages and disadvantages, from the
point of view of tactic synthesis.
Methods of specification and programming language semantics are necessarily
closely related. Both attempt to supply meaning, but whereas with a semantics
the intention is to give a precise meaning to a language, to all its constructs and
syntactic categories, specifications are intended to give perspicuous meaning to a
particular instance of the syntactic category programs. However, the distinction
is blurred. An example where the same notion can be used for both is the use of
Hoare-style logic as both a specification language and as the means of giving the
programming language semantics (Hoare &: Wirth. 1973).
It should be remembered that most of the methods given below were originally
intended for verifying exi.st.ing programs or circumscribing implementational de¬
cisions so that only correct programs result. With a few exceptions they were
also intended primarily for human use. In these two respects they are not ideal
tools with which to carry out automated program synthesis such use gives
rise to large, non goal-directed search "spaces. Another problem, common to the
automation of any approach, is the perennial trade-off between the expressiveness
and the tractability of the formalism used a good example is the complexity
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of unification algorithms, where first-order unification is of limited expressiveness
but has linear complexity and a most general unifier, in contrast to higher-order
unification, which although very expressive is undecidable and may result in an
infinite set of independent unifiers (Hnet, 1977). A partial answer to both these
problems is to direct search using meta-level planning and guidance. This will be
covered in later chapters.
Below we list five existing methods by which specifications are given and programs
satisfying a specification developed, using a common example to give the flavour of
each. We use the factorial function as our example since it is well-known and. like
tactics, is side-effect-free and recursive. Some of the methods necessarily overlap
Z evolved from extensive use of the Floyd-Hoare method, for example, and
the Curry-Howard isomorphism can be seen as the conjunction of both types of
declarative programming but we shall treat each distinctly as do most sources.
For a more extensive survey see, e.g., (Harel. 1980).
In (Sannella, 1988). Sannella lists some questions which one should be able to an¬
swer for any proposed specification method. These are oriented towards methods
which rely on stepwise refinement, but are useful more generally. We list these
here, modified slightly for our needs:
1. What is the specification language (SL)?
2. What specification-building (horizontal composition) operations are avail¬
able in SL?
3. What is the programming language (PL)?
4. What is the relationship between PL and SL? In particular, is there a reflec¬
tion mechanism?
5. What does "refinement" (vertical composition) mean and under what cir¬
cumstances is a refinement step correct?
6. How is the transition between SL and PL made?
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7. What is the relationship between refinement and decomposition?
8. Does refinement of programs P P' make sense? What is the relation
between this and refinement of specifications SP 5/"?
9. Does the refinement process itself have the status of a formal object subject
to analysis and manipulation?
Sannella also gives a list of questions pertinent to the partial automation of the
program development process:
1. What methods are available for proving the correctness of the refinement of
steps?
2. Where do refinement steps come from?
3. What tools are available for assisting with which aspects of program devel¬
opment?
4. What level of sophistication is required of the user of such tools?
5. Which aspects of the program development process can be fully automated?
6. Does the approach require specifications to be "complete" in any sense? Does
it provide a way of checking completeness of a specification or identifying
areas of incompleteness?
7. Does the approach provide ways of deriving programs which are optimal (or
at least adequate) with respect to some performance measure?
8. Does the approach provide a formal way of comparing pros and cons of
different implementations which meet a specification.
9. What are the complexity properties of the approach: for example, what
happens to the size of proofs of correctness as specifications grow in size?
We have attempted to answer these questions for each of the methodologies below.
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2.3.1 Floyd-Hoare style specification
The Floyd-Hoare style (Floyd. 1967; Hoare. 1969) of specification typifies the in¬
put/output specification paradigm. This relies on there being an execution state
and a flow of control which moves around a program's source code as execution
proceeds. In (Floyd, 1967) this was a flowchart; (Hoare, 1969) formalized the idea
by applying it directly to a program's abstract syntax. For this reason the Floyd-
Hoare method is often classed as syntax-directed (vs data-directed, see section
2.3.3). Specification consists in writing an assertion of the form:
{P}rrog{Q}
This has the meaning "if proposition P is true of the state when control enters
the (sub)program Prog, then, upon termination, Q is true of the resulting state."
The state is referred to by identifying the program variables and logical variables.
P and Q are assertions in a suitable logic, e.g. first-order predicate logic, allowing
one to reason in the normal way about relationships between the before and after
states. Due to the "upon termination" clause, this form of assertion specifies
only partial correctness. Termination is usually proved separately by considering
for each loop in the program some quantity, expressed in terms of the program
variables, which is shown to decrease in some well-founded order on each iteration
(Floyd. 1967). For this reason a stronger theory is used to account for reasoning
about the specific data types over which a program operates, e.g. PA for natural
numbers. There are Hoare logics for specifying total correctness but these are much
more complicated, typically requiring second order quantification (Apt. 1978).
Each programming construct has a corresponding inference rule in the logic. Fig¬
ures 2 1 and 2 2 give those for assignment and while. The consequence rule (fig¬
ure 2 3) is used to link deductions in the underlying logic to those in the Hoare
logic. Each programming construct gives rise to a verification condition: the pro¬
gram is verified (partially correct) when the verification conditions for each con¬
struct in it have been proved in the logic. For example the verification condition for
{P}x:=t{Q} is P\t,/x\ —> Q. This form of specification, for imperative languages
at least, is still the most widespread in real world use (Goguen. 1986). It usu-
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{V\t/x]}x: =t{V}
Figure 2—1: The assignment rule
{IAB}L{I}
{J}while B do L{I A nB}
Figure 2-2: The while rule
ally appears in a much extended form, such as Z (see below), or a special-purpose
programming logic (Harel, 1984; Apt. 1978) of which an early example is the inter¬
mittent assertion method of Burstall (Burstall, 1974: Manna &: Waldinger, 1978)
Floyd, in his early paper (Floyd, 1967). hints at the possibility of automating much
of the work of program verification. This involves the programmer in providing
an overall input/output specification as well as (at least) one invariant asser¬
tion for each cycle in the program flowchart. An invariant is a property that
is preserved between the input and output states by a program. Discovering a
suitable invariant typically requires some insight into how the program works4.
X is an invariant of L in figure 2 2. A theorem prover would then be used to
show that verification conditions hold between adjacent sub-programs. The over¬
all input/output specification is propagated throughout the program by means
of weakest pre-condition/strongest-post conditions (de Bakker. 1980), and inside
loops via the given loop invariants. An implementation of such a system is given
in (Gordon. 1988).
4Tt is theoretically impossible to generate sufficient, loop invariants automatically,
since this would allow one to solve the halting problem (Harel. 1988). However, the pro¬
cess can be pa.rtially automated (Chadha h Plaist.ed. 1993). completely so for theories
with finite first-order axiomatizations (not, PA).
V - Q {Q}L{72} Q - 5
{V}L{S}B}
Figure 2-3: The consequence rule
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We give an example of how one would specify a program. Prog, to calculate the
factorial (in the variable y) of the input variable x. Variables are assumed to range






One would give the specification {x = a}Prog{y = a!}. This uses the common
trick of connecting the before and after states through variables (here a) which
don't appear in the program. The program above can be verified using the three
Hoare rules given. Below we have used the loop invariant x\y = a!. The same







{x\y = n! A i > 0}
y:=y*x;
{x\y = a\x A x > 0}
x:=x-l
{(x + 1)!?/ = a\(x + 1)}
{x\y = a!}
od
{xh/ = a! A x < 0}
{y = a!}
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We could prove termination by showing that the value of x strictly decreases
each time execution passes round the loop y:=y*x ; x:=x-l. Since the natural
numbers are well-founded, this process must eventually terminate. We have thus
shown that the program is totally correct with respect to the given pre- and post¬
conditions.
Despite its widespread use the method has several drawbacks which we quote from
(Goguen, 1986):
• Expressing complex specifications in first-order logic, or any of the usual
simple logical languages, yields veiy complex sentences, which are consequently
often wrong.
• It is impossible to give a complete set of Hoare-style rules for programming
languages as rich as the ones usually used in computer science.
• We do not know how to give simple Hoare-style rules for some common
features of today's programming languages.
• It is, in general, necessary for the user to supply so-called invariants in order
to prove the correctness of programs with iteration or recursion.
• It is often veiy difficult to prove the hypotheses which are generated by
the verification condition generator, and consequently it is veiy difficult to
believe any proofs which may be offered.
• In order for this standard paradigm to be rigorously correct for a given
programming language, one should have a formal definition and a correctness
proof for the verification condition generator used for that language.
• One should also have some independent check of the correctness of the Hoare-
style rules, such as a proof that they are valid in some model, and are
therefore also consistent.
The second and third points above are made explicit in. respectively, (Clarke, 1979;
O'Donnell. 1982). The former shows that it is impossible to obtain a sound and
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complete (in the sense of (Cook. 1978)) system of Hoare axioms for a program¬
ming language which allows; procedures as parameters of procedure calls, recur¬
sion, static scoping, global variables and internal procedures. As the introductory
discussion makes clear, these are all desirable features of a tactic programming lan¬
guage. Since soundness and completeness are minimal requirements for a "good"
specification language this presents a serious obstacle. The second paper, though
not providing a non-existence proof, indicates that a simple and elegant Hoare rule
for a construct as simple as function definition appears unlikely. This is due to
the fact that defined functions bring together the previously independent notions
of partial correctness and termination in such a way that is no longer convenient
to separate them, with the conclusion that for reasoning about defined functions
total correctness logics are best used. The inference from these papers is that while
Hoare logic is useful and elegant for reasoning about simple languages, its exten¬
sion to the features found in modern programming languages results in unnatural
rules which are difficult to reason with.
Since these criticisms apply a fortiori to tactic programming languages we feel
that Floyd-Hoare style specification, and the input/output paradigm in general,
to be ill-suited to specifying tactics. The case is even worse when one considers
program synthesis; being syntax-directed is a serious disadvantage when talking
about a non-existent program. Hoare-style specifications resulting in very large
and poorly-directed search.
2.3.2 Z
The Z specification language (Spivey. 1988b). similar in style to the Vienna De¬
velopment Method (VDM), uses a weakly typed version of Zermelo-Fraenke] set
theory to specify program behaviour. The intention with Z is to allow the flexible
expression of extremely abstract and high-level initial specifications and to then
introduce successive refinements until, eventually, a machine-implementable form
is reached, e.g. a program in a traditional programming language. In this way a Z
30
specification provides an "intellectual handle" for a programmer or programming
team.
However, unlike the other means of specification described in this chapter, Z is
less concerned with providing a particular mathematical foundation in which to
set program specification than with laying down a set of rules for consistently
using such a foundation. Thus, Z is more methodology than method.
A Z specification takes the form of a linear script. The principal construct of Z is
the schema, a declaration constrained by a predicate, which has the genera] form
Name.[Xi X„,]=«i : Ti a„ : T„ • Pred
The X, are generic variables (variables which will be instantiated with sets) and
the Tj are types (sets of a particular form) given in terms of these, primitive types
and types defined previously. Pred. is a formula of the first order theory of ZF all
of whose free variables are amongst the X, and aj. This should be read as: "given
sets there exist respectively elements ax <i„ of type 7)..... 7),
such that Pred is true." Thus a schema corresponds to the more usual notion
of module. Spivey provides a metacircular semantics for Z in (Spivey. 1988a)
a very basic, more obviously acceptable, version of Z is used to specify the full¬
blown Z. A powerful feature of Z is the schema calculus which allows schemas to
be combined to form new schemas. A typical example is the forming of a robust
specification from those for normal and erroneous operation:
Robust.Op—(Norm.alOp A OK) V Error
Here the declarations of all the schemas are combined in the new schema and the
predicates are joined using the logical connectives shown. Note that, no direction
is given as to how variables are to behave in the new schema, for example whether
identical variables are to be renamed.
Because of the intended use of Z mentioned above, our common example is not a
good one in this case. Nevertheless:
Fact=fac : N —> N • fac(0) = 1 A Vz : N.fac(x + 1) = (x + 1) * fac(x)
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This schema might appear as a single line in a much larger Z specification. It
states that a function called fac satisfies the properties given.
It is precisely the reasons that make Z a good specification language for human
use that make it ill-suited for use in automatic program synthesis. Specifically:
• Z's very abstract and conceptual approach provides poor guidance for a
theorem prover. For example, functions and relations are given in terms of
their graphs, and the weak typing available does not explicitly distinguish
between various forms of these.
• Z is inherently biased towards procedural programming languages. Itera¬
tion is the usual form of looping. In implementing tactics we are almost
exclusively interested in recursion.
• To ease use, the notation involves much implicit and hidden information.
For example, the typing used is very weak, most of the notation adding
implicitly to the predicate part of a schema. There is also the convention of
decorating variables according to their use, e.g. xt. y\. z. z' for respectively
input, output, before and after. This is a form of binding quite alien to
traditional logic.
• There is no formal link, as for instance there is in the case of the Curry-
Howard isomorphism, between a Z specification and an implementation. The
final refinement may be so concrete that the required program fragment is
obvious. However, to be completely formal we would have to fully specify
some programming language in Z and take it on trust that this was satisfied
by the implementation used.
• As mentioned above the schema calculus depends on a common understand¬
ing of bound variables depending purely on name. Thus, there is an uneasy
mix between syntax and semantics. This leads to instances where referen¬
tial transparency breaks down. Such behaviour is particularly undesirable
in the context of theorem proving where one expects the usual properties of
equality to hold.
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• In addition to the above, there are also problems with the semantics of Z
which are examined in (Spivey. 1988a).
For these reasons we fee] that Z is unsuitable for the task of specifying tactics.0
2.3.3 Algebraic specification
Tlie proponents of algebraic specification argue the primacy of the basic data
types employed when constructing a program. The choice of these types and
the operations defined upon them crucially affects the later design stages, even
the algorithmic structure of a program. For this reason algebraic specification is
classed as a data-directed method. For a thorough treatment we refer the reader
to (Wirsing. 1990; Ehrig & Mahr. 1985).
An algebraic specification consists of the description of one or more abstract, data
types by giving the names of sorts and the names and characteristics of the basic
functions defined on the sorts. The first two comprise the signature of a specific¬
ation and the last the axioms. From these can be determined the semantics of a
specification. The semantics is described in terms of those structures which are
models of the specification, i.e. the many-sorted algebras (in the usual mathem¬
atical sense) which satisfy the specification . There are three main approaches to
providing the semantics. The loose approach considers all possible models (analog¬
ous to the model theory of validity in FOPL). This can be viewed as working with
an unfinished specification which is tightened up as more axioms are added. One
has achieved a complete specification when only one model remains a mono-
morphir. specification. A second approach is to consider a particular model called
the initial algebra, where it exists. This has the appeal of corresponding to the in¬
tuitive notion of the quotient of the term algebra (see e.g. (Ehrig & Mahr, 1985)).
'Tactic specification via Z has. however, been attempted elsewhere: (?, 1992).
flTn fact,, the models are taken to be the isomorphism classes of these algebras. This
is indicated by the use of the prefix abstract
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Such an approach is desirable when one wishes to associate with each specifica¬
tion an explicit model. Initial algebra specifications also have the advantage that
they result in true (conditional) equational specifications in situations where the
loose approach requires inequalities (see the example below). A third approach
is the dual of the previous: use of the terminal algebra. The initial (respectively
terminal) algebra semantics can be characterized as the model in which only those
objects are equal (respectively distinct) which can be proved equal (respectively
distinct) by the axioms.
Although no mention was made above of how the characteristics of an operation are
described, most work to date has been concentrated in the setting of first-order
equations or conditional equations. This restriction results in many desirable
properties (e.g. sound and complete deductive systems), but at the same time
hinders the writing of more natural specifications: an example of the trade-off
between expressiveness and tractability.





0 : —> nat
fact, siicc : nat —» nat













The loose semantics of this specification admits non-standard models as well as
the standard model of arithmetic. By considering only generated or no "junk"
algebras, i.e. those where all elements of the carrier sets denote some ground
term, the same specification becomes monomorphic. having as its sole model the
standard one. However, it will Vie noted that this is still at the expense of using
an inequality. By considering only the initial algebras, we may drop the first two
axioms, giving a purely equational specification.
Besides allowing us to analyse data types in the ways outlined above, algebraic
specification methods are largely concerned with providing for structured specific¬
ation and validation. The former will be of little interest to us. allowing as it does
the building of hierarchical and parameterized specifications: the tactics we shall
be considering are not large enough to warrant the use of such techniques. Valida¬
tion is a point touched on in each of these sections. Formally validated tactics, via
some form of reflection mechanism, may be used directly, obviating the need for
full execution of a tactic or compilation to a separate tactic language (see chapter
3) (Goguen &: Winkler. 1988). Validation is carried out in one of two ways: use
of a specification language which supports direct interpretation/compilation of a
specification: or the technique of successive refinement, where at each stage a spe¬
cification is implemented in terms of a more concrete one. eventually arriving at
an executable specification.
From this brief description it will be seen that the algebraic method of specification
is not well suited to our needs:
• The emphasis is wrong: algebraic specification is data- and model-oriented.
We shall be using a small number of given data types which, in themselves,
are of no interest. Similarly, we are not interested in how loose a specification
is but in finding a program that satisfies this.
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• Mosf, current techniques are limited to first-order conditional equational
specifications. Whilst this is theoretically sufficiently expressive, it is awk¬
ward in practice. An example is the problem of specifying erroneous opera¬
tions (Goguen e.t. al 1978). where changes made to one sort must propagated
across the whole specification. We also need a higher-order language to spe¬
cify tacticals.
• While the reasoning used in tactic synthesis will in the main part be algeb¬
raic. i.e. consist of the use of first- and higher-order conditional rewrite rules,
the way in which such reasoning is directed does not follow the refinement
paradigm mentioned above.
For these reasons we choose not to use typical algebraic specification methods for
tactic synthesis. However, all syntheses will use much algebraic reasoning and this
aspect will be subsumed by the method we eventually choose.
2.3.4 Declarative languages
"Declarative" is the term coined to describe programming languages whose pro¬
grams in some sense "declare" their meanings. Rather than describe exactly how to
perform a calculation, as in the While program above for calculating the factorial,
programs simply specify the properties of a function or relation. It is up to the lan¬
guage designer to make such specifications executable. There are two main camps
in declarative programming: logic (or relational) programming and functional (or
equational) programming. An example of the former is Prolog, where a program
consists of logical assertions about various predicates. ML, where functions are
specified by equations between terms of the simply-typed A-calculus. is an example
of the latter.
Tn order to keep things tractable, programs are restricted to forms to which a pro¬
cedural interpretation can be given: Horn clauses in the case of Prolog, where the
interpretation is SLDNF resolution (see, e.g., (Lloyd, 1987)); first-order patterns
for the left-hand sides of equations and a static typing regime in the case of ML.
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where the interpretation is call-by-value reduction. In idealized versions of these
languages (logic programming and functional programming respectively) there is
a simple mathematical semantics, viz., for Prolog query Q and ML ground term
T of base type:
Q succeeds with instantiation 0 => Comp(Prog) j= Q9
Q succeeds with instantiation 9' < 9 <= Com.p(Prog) (= Q9
T evaluates to t =S> Progi-^T = t,
T evaluates to t <= Progbx&T = t and f is normal
Here |= is the usual semantic turnstile of first-order predicate logic, Comp(Prog)
refers to the Clark completion of a logic program (Clark, 1978), and 9' < 9 means
that 9 is an instantiation of 91: refers to the theory of typed /J-equality (see
(Hindley Seldin, 1986)). In practice, only the left-to-right implications (sound¬
ness) hold since programs in either language need not necessarily terminate. The
right-to-left implications hold if one employs a "fair" notion of execution in the
case of Prolog, one where all the non-deterministic paths in an execution have the
same precedence, and in the ML if the evaluation terminates. We have considered
only a very small subset of ML here, ignoring exceptions, references, assignments,
and even simple features such as type constructors other than —We have simil¬
arly not considered the non-logical features of Prolog such as input/out and use of
the cut (!) operator. As one takes into account more of the practical limitations
of a declarative language, its semantics becomes more complex accordingly.
We continue with the common example, first in Prolog:
fac(0,s(0)).
fac(s(N),X):-fac(N,XX),times(s(N),XX,X) .
Assuming that we have a simple theory PNat, for the naturals and the predicates
plus and times, we can prove comp(PNat. + Fnr.Prog) h fac(X. A'!), where we
may define the factorial function ! in any manner convenient in the logic. Since K
the proof-theoretic turnstile for the first-order predicate calculus, is sound for [=,
we will have shown that (at least one of) the answer(s) to such a query is correct.
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In ML we have:
let fac(O) = s(O) I
fac(s(n)) = s(n)*fac(n);;
Under the similar assumptions we can prove PNat.' + FacProcf fac(n) = n\.
Using a declarative language for tactic specification seems very attractive:
• These are the languages that present-day tactics are written in. The two
mentioned, Prolog and ML. have explicit notions of failure.
• These programs are, in comparison to procedural languages, easy to reason
about. We can use traditional theorem proving techniques.
• We have available a reflection mechanism in the form of meta-programming
(Giunchiglia & Traverso. 1990).
However, there are some problems. These languages are general purpose and pro¬
grams written in them are not inherently total. At the same time the restrictions
used to give a procedural interpretation limit expressiveness it is difficult to
express negative and disjunctive information in both Prolog and ML. It is also
not obvious at what point a declarative program becomes executable. By using
the method of the next section we hope to retain the good points of a declarative
language whilst avoiding the bad.
2.3.5 The Curry-Howard Isomorphism
The Curry-Howard isomorphism gives an exact correspondence between the lo¬
gical and functional aspects of computation a proposition is true iff it is
inhabited; a term is a proof of the proposition it inhabits. In analogy with
the Floyd-Hoare method one could say that a proposition is like an invariant
of the inhabiting term and that the type regime ensures termination. Heyting
(Heyting, 1956) and Kolmogorov (Kolmogorov. 1932) were the first to note the
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isomorphism, Howard (Howard, 1980) made it, precise, and today it is implemen¬
ted in various intuitionistic type theories (Martin-LSf. 1984: Constable et. aL 1986:
Coquand & Huet,. 1988; J.-Y. Girard & Taylor, 1989). More precisely, we have
the correspondence:
Proposition Type Canonical inhabitant(s)
false void
AAB A#B < a, b >
A^B A-*B Ax.b
,4 V B A\B inl(a) or inr(h)
Vx:A.B(x) nx:A.B(x) Ax.b
3x:A.B(x) Ex:A.B(x) < x.b >
In proving a theorem in type theory we implicitly construct a A-calcnlus term (in
NuPRL this is untyped, in the Calculus of Constructions (CC) typed). It is these
terms which are both the elements of the types and constitute the programming
language of type theory. For example, by proving a theorem of the form V.r :
A.3y : B.spec(x.y) in one of the type theories mentioned, we can extract from
it a term t such that for any canonical term a of type A. t.(a) reduces to a term
< profi(a). P >. where P is a proof that spec(a. prog(a)). Execution in the lambda
calculus is via a given reduction strategy . and all well-typed terms (which includes
the extracts of proved theorems) normalize to a canonical form. Thus, we are
guaranteed total programs. This is how synthesis is achieved using the Curry-
Howard isomorphism. Conversely, we can accomplish verification by showing that
V.x : A.spec(x.prog(x)).
Of special interest to us is the way recursion arises in type theory. Each primitive,
recursive type, e.g. pnat, A list, has an associated elimination rule. This is
what is more commonly known as the primitive induction rule for that type. For
pnat this is:
x : pnat h T[0/x] x : pnat. p : pnat. v : T\p/x\ h T[s(p)/x]
clim(x)
x : pnat b T
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The extract from such an inference step is p_ind(i; hyp, v.s) where b and s are
respectively the extracts from the base and step cases. Although such recursion is
always primitive, it can take place at any type T: so. for instance, it is easy to define
Ackermann's function by primitive recursion at a functional type. User-defined
recursive types (rectypes) have similar induction rides and recursion constructors.
In this way there is a duality between induction schemas and the recursion schemas
of their extracts. In addition, since NuPRL has type universes, one is able to prove
and use as lemmas customized induction schemas rather than repeatedly proving
from first principles.
We now apply the Curry-Howard synthesis paradigm to our example. By proving
the theorem
h Vz : pnat.Bi/ : pnat.factorialp(x, y).
where factorialp is axiomatized as in the Prolog example above, we are able to
extract the program
prog = Ax.p_ind(:r; < s(0) >; trO, ul.spread(ul; y, v2. < times(s(i;0). y).... >))
and so set
f ac = An.fst (prog n).
There are three other advantages which follow directly from the use of type theoiy.
Firstly, synthesis is theorem proving. Since we are dealing with propositions in
a logical language there is a greater degree of goal-directedness with this method
than with any of those above. This allows us to apply a large number of existing
techniques to this apparently novel domain; in particular, we shall be using the
proof planner CIdM. Secondly, as the work of (Howe. 1988a) shows, we can
implement an elegant partial reflection mechanism. Third is the self-reference: we
are synthesizing tactics to prove theorems in the system which we are using for
the synthesis. In this way we can "bootstrap" our theorem prover.
As can be seen from the simple example above, the program extracted in general
contains much computationally redundant structure signified there by "..." and
requiring the use of the projection function fst in the resulting program. Much
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work has been done on avoiding this redundancy. This includes the use of subset
types (Constable c.t aL 1986), the acc type (Nordstrom & Smith, 1990) and no¬
tions of realizabilily (Paulin-Mohring. 1989). Deliverables (Burstall & McKinna, 1991)
start from the idea that a program and its correctness proof should always be kept
apart. More will be said of this problem in chapter 5. There is also the more
general problem that having tactics written in the language of type theory means
that execution is at least one level of interpretation removed from that at which
tactics are traditionally run. However, it should be noted that the slow-down is
by a constant factor, there is nothing inherently inefficient about type theoretic
languages, and that such trade-offs are usually when choosing a formal language
over a machine-oriented one.
Work has previously been done on using type theory to specify tactics. By using a
partial reflection mechanism and developing a meta- theory of tactics (see chapter
3) Howe (Howe. 1988a. chap. 5) was able to use NuPRL to verify tactics which
could then be used in proving theorems in NuPRL itself. We discuss this and
other reflection mechanisms in chapter 6.
For the stated reasons, we have chosen to specify tactics in the type theory of
OYSTER.
2.4 Conclusions
The objective of this work is to automate the synthesis of tactics. Thus, besides
criteria such as naturalness, expressiveness, flexibility and tractability which one
usually considers when looking at methods for specifying and verifying programs,
one has additionally to consider the question of how amenable a particular method
is to automation, especially with regard to synthesis.
From this perspective we believe that the best medium in which to carry out tactic
synthesis is constructive type theory, for the following reasons:
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Subsumption Type theory is seen by many (Martin-Lof, 1984; Constable e.t al, 1986:
Coquand & Huet. 1988) as a foundation for constructive mathematics. Its
open-endedness allows it be used relatively naturally as a medium in which
to build other formalisms. Thus, type theory can subsume many of the
concepts and formalisms of differing methods (Kreitz, 1993), whereas the
converse is not true.
Constructivity We needn't be concerned about explicitly writing a tactic. By
proving that a specification formula is true we implicitly construct a (possibly
very inefficient) tactic. If necessary, the proof can later be transformed to
render it more efficient (Madden, 1991; Goad. 1980).
Totality In a constructive type theory all extracts from completed proofs termin¬
ate under normal-order reduction. Thus, we are guaranteed total programs'.
(We distinguish non-termination from failure, a mechanism for which is eas¬
ily developed.) This maybe seen as a weakness of choosing type theory since
one may want to define a tactic for a generally undecidable problem, typ¬
ically one involving search. As mentioned in the introduction, however, we
are content to restrict tactics to being total.
Automation In synthesizing a function in type theoiy we prove the correspond¬
ing specification theorem. So already we are proving a theorem in a familiar
logic, where the usual rules of inference apply, instead of. say. tiying to first
synthesize and then verify a program using Hoare-logic, where things such
as assignment must be reasoned about.
Induction The recursive structure of tactics will be of prime importance in guid¬
ing synthesis proofs. Type theoiy makes any induction and its dual recursion
explicit.
One should not pretend that setting our specifications in type theory is a pan¬
acea for the problems of program synthesis. It does give us a precise formalism,
7Tn fact,, this is the starting point of constructive type theory (Martin-bof. 1979).
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clear semantics and flexible medium with which to carry out tactic synthesis. We
summarize our decision below.
The foregoing survey convinced lis that the tool best-suited to our needs was the
Curry-Howard isomorphism in the form of an intuitionistic type theory such as
OYSTER. We can characterize the various methods according to: to what extent
their intended usage matches ours; their means of and usefulness for program
synthesis: their amenability to automation and existing fools for them, such as
theorem provers: and the possibility of using a reflection mechanism. The results
are summarized below.
The Floyd-Hoare methodology, due mainly to its concentration on the assignment
rule, is limited to work with imperative languages and hence unsuitable for work
with the tactics we are interested in. It also constitutes a veiy poor candidate for
program synthesis which takes the form of eureka steps plus post hoc verification.
Although some work on automating the production of verification conditions and
loop invariants has been carried out (Gordon, 1988) there are few software tools
available for work in this area. It is hard to see how a reflection mechanism could
be naturally constructed in this setting.
Z is intended to formalize the design and implementation of large software pro¬
jects. Its bias towards human perspicuity is clear in its large and rich number of
constructs. Synthesis is limited to stepwise refinement, making it a poor candid
ate for program synthesis. However, there is a large array of software tools for
carrying out verification proofs in Z (Jones, 1992: Bowen & Gordon, 1994). The
author is aware of (at least) one attempt at constructing a reflection mechanism
in Z.
Algebraic specification is useful in bringing a rigorous semantics and structure-
enforcing framework to functional programming. However, in its usual form its re¬
striction to plain or simple conditional equations can lead to somewhat convoluted
specifications. Offering stepwise refinement and direct interpretation as meth¬
ods for program synthesis, it is a relatively good candidate for program synthesis
work. Since reasoning is for the most part equational. automation is promising and
there are a number of systems in existence (Goguen. 1989: Futatsugi e.t aL 1985:
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Burstall Si Goguen, 1977). One of these systems includes a reflection mechanism
(Goguen Si Winkler, 1988).
Declarative languages too hold promise for work in the area of tactic synthesis.
While having a formal semantics, they are more computationally biased and are in
general immediately executable, providing a good candidate for program synthesis.
The latter achieved via transformation, compilation and meta-programming. There
is much existingwork on automatic program synthesis and transformation (Boyer Si Moore. 1'
Wadler, 1990: Burstall & Darlington. 1977) and some on reflection mechanisms
(Boyer Si Strother Moore. 1981).
Type theory, in its role as a foundational theory, subsumes all of the above
(Constable et. ai 1986: Kreitz. 1993). The Curry-Howard isomorphism provides a
direct link between logic (where we may use theorem proving tools such as OYSTER
and ClflM) and computation (programs we may use as tactics), and is therefore
an excellent candidate for program synthesis. Work at Cornell has shown how






In the previous chapter it was argued that the best setting in which to carry out
tactic synthesis was constructive type theory, using the Curry-Howard isomorph¬
ism to realise actual tactics. It was not made clear, however, exactly how this was
to be done. In this chapter we give a concrete formalism for specifying tactics and
all the other notions that this requires. These two aspects, the means of specifica¬
tion and the representation used, are almost orthogonal: the representation given
below could equally well have been constructed using one of the other specification
methods mentioned in the previous chapter.
Guiding the choice of representation has been the possibility of using a reflec¬
tion mechanism, which would allow us to use the extract of a synthesis proof
directly. The kind of tactics we hope to synthesize, those with a cheap meta-
level/expensive object-level bias, favour the efficient use of reflection. However,
the representation arising from the mechanism is not limited to its use here alone:
we shall see in chapter 5 that an extract can be translated into a traditional
tactic in a language such as ML or Prolog. Two canonical examples of a re¬
flection mechanism of the type given below are Boyer and Moore's use of meta-
functions (Boyer &; Strother Moore. 1981), and Howe's partial reflection mechan-
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ism (Howe, 1988a). We draw heavily on the laUer for the reflection mechanism
exhibited below. A comparison with their work is given in chapter 6.
Whenever we wish to study something using a formal system we first have to be
able to represent it in that system. So it is with tactics. Tactics are programs which
construct proofs, which themselves contain formulas and terms. Thus, if we are
to reason about tactics we must at least be able to represent, such objects. Proofs
and formulas are complicated objects, requiring notions of derivability and bind¬
ing respectively. As Knoblockand Constable show (Knoblock & Constable, 1986),
representing the proof theory of a formal system can become very complicated.
(This approach was later abandoned due to its impracticability.) Boyer and Moore
(Boyer & Strother Moore, 1981) show us that we need not consider the whole sys¬
tem. and may concentrate instead on its underlying notion of meaning: Howe
calls this semantic reflection. This allows us to use the original proof system
to show that certain functions preserve this meaning. Howe (Howe, 1988a) is
able to combine this idea with Paulson's of modularly building rewriting tactics
(Paulson. 1983a). It is a gross simplification of Howe's work which has been im¬
plemented here and is described below.
As our principle interest is the automation aspect of tactic synthesis and not the
reflection mechanism itself, we have simplified the mechanism as far as possible.
But we have retained enough functionality so that one can see immediately how
to scale up our methods for tactic synthesis to a system such as Howe's. The
simplifications we have made with respect to Howe's system are that we consider
terms of only one type (this could be an arbitrary type but we choose pnat). and
therefore can dispense with type environments and much of the special machinery
for rewriting propositions: and we restrict terms to be at most binary branching
(see below).
In the sequel we shall often print nodes from various OYSTER proofs. These are
used either to show a proof in progress or. more often, to illustrate the definition
of an object as a term_of that theorem. The full library listing for the reflection
mechanism is given in appendix D. To avoid confusion we use the term "OYSTER
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tactic" to mean a tactic in the usual sense as distinct from the objects we wish to
synthesize.
3.2 Representing Terms
Like other existing implementations of semantic reflection we shall restrict our
attention to the first-order structure of our object language. This means that our
synthetic tactics will not be aware of or able to manipulate any binding structures
present in a language. However, as the existing implementations show, interesting
and useful tactics are still expressible. In general, when we consider first-order
terms, we see them as freely generated trees, having variables for leaves and nodes
labelled with function symbols and an arity. This is what we mimic in our repres¬
entation.
Without loss of generality we restrict our term trees to at most binary branching.
Whereas a restriction to at most unary branching would have a significant effect
(e.g. classical predicate logic restricted to at most unary predicate symbols is
decidable (Church, 1951)). we can map. if necessary, an arbitrary term tree to a
binary tree. For example, suppose we had the ternary function symbol f. We
could map the term f (tl,t2,t3) to g(tl*, h(t2*,t3*)). where g and h are new
binary function symbols. All terms in the image of this map, t*. can be mapped
uniquely back to the original term.
Restricting our term trees to at most binary branching affords us another advant¬
age besides simplicity. It clearly separates the various cases that occur when we
do induction over terms. The variable case is interesting since this is the place
at which unification and the like takes place; constants and unary functions in¬
troduce the usual base and step cases; and the binary case covers "the rest". As
mentioned above, the introduction of binary function symbols constitutes a major
step up in computational complexity, and there is little more twbe learned from
allowing ternary and symbols of greater arity. Thus we can expect the binary case
to contain most of the interesting part of any proof where induction over terms is
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involved, for example, the joining of two separate unifiers. If we had used a rep¬
resentation employing, for example, lists to give branches of arbitrary arity as in
(Howe, 1988a), while admittedly more elegant, the resulting inductions over lists
would interfere with and obscure the behaviour of the term inductions.
To represent terms we introduce the inductive type metaterm. in Ul, defined by:
metaterm == rec(z.(atomlatom)I((atom#z)|(atom#z#z))).
This will be more familiar if rewritten in pseudo-ML code:
type metaterm == var of atom | con of atom I una of atom*metaterm
I bin of atom*metaterm*metaterm;;
For ease of use we define the four canonical injections into it:
tvar(u) = inl(inl(w))
tcon(c) = inl{inr(e))
tuna(/.n) = inr(inl(< /. a >))
tbin(f.a. b) = inr(inr(< /. < n.,b »))
To elucidate the idea we give an example. The object level term
f(x,c).
where c is a constant and x a variable, would have the meta level representation
inrfinr(<"f",<inl(inl("x")),inl(inr("c"))>)).
or marginally more perspicuously,
tbin("f",tvar("x"),tcon("c")).







Figure 3—1: The reflection mechanism
3.3 The reflection mechanism
The basic idea is that we demonstrate the soundness of a meta-operation by show¬
ing that it preserves equality at the object level. This is done in the following way.
Suppose we have a goal of the form
where ,s is a sub term of type pnat, and we wish to substitute £ for .1. At the object
level this is justified by a primitive substitution rule which obliges us to show that
Although the form of £ may be immediately evident from that of s, for example
in a normal forming operation, the proof that both terms are equal may be very
expensive to construct. When such an operation is to be performed repeatedly,
as it might be by a tactic, we would ordinarily "compile out" these subproofs
by proving a lemma once and using this 011 all further occasions. However, at
the object level we are not able to talk about terms intensionally. and so cannot
express such "theorems" as:
"a term (s) consisting of a string of + operations = the same term with all +'s
associated_to the right (t) in pnat."
The reflection mechanism allows us to express, prove and use such theorems inside
our original system. It does this by allowing us to express and prove the equality
H h G\s)
... 1- s = t in pnat
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represented by the topmost arrow of fig. 3 1. and by using the. proof system's
own evaluation mechanism to prove the equalities represented by the two vertical
arrows. The transitivity of equality gives us the equality between s and t.
In order to prove the top line we must first give it a meaning and this, along
with the vertical lines, is provided by lifting and its converse evaluation. We lift
a term of type pnat by constructing a term which represents purely its syntactic
form. An example of this was given above for the term f (x,c). We give meaning
to the lifted term by supplying an evaluator for metaterms. the function eval.
Since we may chose to lift a term at an arbitrary point in a proof and in the
context of an arbitrary theory, eval must be parameterized over both. Context
within a proof is given by declarations in the hypothesis list. We expect the
meaning of tvarC'x") to be the variable x and so forth. These variable bindings
are provided by a parameter to eval of type env. i.e. atom —> pnat. Context
within a theory is provided by the definition of functions/constants appearing in a
goal. These definitions are supplied to eval by a second parameter of type f _env.
i.e. (atom —> pnat)#(atom —» pnat —> pnat)#(atom —♦ pnat —> pnat —» pnat),
respectively the meanings for miliary, unary and binary function symbols. Hence,
eval is defined in:
eval: complete
b metaterm —> env —> f_env —> pnat
Extract:
The syntactic sugar eval(m, e ,f ) will be used from now on. Since the env supplied
to eval is dependent on the goal we are tiying to prove it is built at reflect-time
by the predicate lift_term/4. This takes an object term, and returns a member
ofmetaterm representing it and an accompanying member of (atom#pnat) list.
The latter is an association list which, along with the OYSTER function list_to_env
defined in
list_to_env: complete
h (atom#pnat) list —> env
Extract:
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is used to provide the corresponding env for eval at reflect-time. If lift_term
arrives at a subterm which it is unable to decompose any further, it is lifted en
bloc and given a label of the form refN (see example, p. 53).
The f_env will usually be constant inside a given theory, so we expect the user to
supply this at reflect-time. In the examples below we use the f_env basic defined
in basic_f_env. This supplies the following mappings:
<g. . >-* 0
's' ' h-> \x.s(x)
'
+ ' ' e-t \x, )/.plus(x. y
1 * 1 1 e-» Xx. y.times(x.
wh' ' e-> Ax.x
wf' • i-> Xx.x
Thus, basic supplies meanings to the metaterms of Peano arithmetic, as well as
allowing us to use annotation in our metaterms analogous to the wave-front and
wave-hole annotation of CIAM (see appendix A). In all examples from now on.
we assume that the function environment and lifting tactic include at least these
definitions.
Having thus defined eval, and obtained appropriate env's and f_env's. e and f.
for the goal at hand, we derive the vertical arrows of fig. 3 1 by showing that
eval(V,e,/) = s in pnat and eval("t",e,/) — t in pnat. These object level
proof obligations are typically carried out by evaluating both sides to give an
identity.
In order to, derive the horizontal arrow of fig. 3 1, the correctness goal, we must





used to rewrite "s" to "t", preserves meaning. This has been done by defining the
subset type
simp: complete
l~ f _env —» U1
Extract: A}.{z : rewrite|Vm : metaterm.Ve : env.
eval(m, e. f) = eval(z(m). e. f) in pnat}
parameterized over f_env's. and showing that the meta-operation is also a mem¬
ber of simp(/). Typically, a rewrite R will have a corresponding correctness the¬
orem called R_wff stating h R in simp(F) for a given f_env F. This operation is
summed up in the main lemma embodying the reflection mechanism:
reflect: complete
h V/ : f_env.Vs : simp(/).Vt : pnat.Vm : metaterm.Ve : env.
t = eval(m, e, f) in pnat —» t. = eval(.s(m), e, /) in pnat
These three operations have been combined into an Oyster tactic, ref lect_tac/4.
taking as arguments the simplifier to employ, the f_env to use, the position of the
subterm to lift, and an Oyster tactic which will be used to attempt to prove the
correctness goal ref_wfftac/0 is provided for the case mentioned above where
there is a corresponding correctness theorem. Since we obtain t. only by evaluating
eval("t", e. /), and since fully evaluating this typically unfolds definition instances
we would like to retain, t, is calculated from H" by the routine unlif t_term/3 using
the previously derived a-list,.
In synthesis proofs we shall want to explicitly assert the correctness of a basic
rewrite in all env's. For this we define the shorthand relating the input term i to
the output term o:
i ~ o <-» Ve : env.eval(t. e, basic) = eval(o. e. basic) in pnat
Note that ~ is a congruence relation.
It should be noted that the reflection mechanism is constructed completely within
OYSTeR's object theory no new inference rules have been added and no :lbe-
caused" lemmas used and is therefore a definitional extension of OYSTER, i.e.
52
no theorems can be proved using the mechanism which could not be proved pre¬
viously. Problems may arise when the lifting and evaluation operations are not
inverses (ideally we should parameterize both over a common representation of
the theoiy to ensure a match), but whilst a mismatch may result in the inability
to derive the equalities represented by the vertical arrows, it cannot result in a
non-theorem.
In summary, using the reflection mechanism described above, we regard a tactic as
a member of rewrite, which additionally is a member of simp(F) for a some f _env
F. These are the two types of goal we shall need to prove in order to synthesize
tactics.
We list the logical objects (definitions, theorems, etc.) which comprise the reflec¬
tion mechanism described above in appendix D. Many of the latter theorems there
appear only implicitly, e.g. those used by OYSTER tactics.
3.3.1 Concrete example
To illustrate the general case we now show how the reflection mechanism can
be used to help prove a typical theorem in OYSTER. In this example we use the
simplifier term_of (assoc_simp) which right associates the top-level plus's in a
metaterm, and for which we have the theorem:
assoc_simp_wff: complete
h term_of(assoc_simp) in simp(basic)
This allows us to use the ref_wfftac to solve the correctness goal as described
above. Suppose that we arrive at the following point in a proof:
example: [1,1,1] incomplete autotactic(idtac)
x : pnat. y : pnat, z : pnat
t- double(plus(plus(:r, ?/). double(z))) = double(plus(i. plus(ji/. double(z)))) in pna'
by _
We can see that the left- and right-hand sides are identical but for the associ¬
ation of the plus's. We can therefore use our simplifier to rewrite the left-hand
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side, resulting in an identity which is easily handled by the autotactic (which is
switched off here). We apply ref lect_tac with the arguments shown below. The
object term is abstracted to the variable ?;0. and its meta-representation to ul.
Hypotheses v2, v4 and 1)3 show respectively the original object term, its lifted rep¬
resentation (including the label ref4 for the subterm double(z) and the rewritten
object term.
example: [1,1,1] complete autotactic(idtac)
x : pnat. y : pnat, z : pnat




1)2 : vO = plus(plus(x, y). double(z)) in pnat.
v 1 : metaterm.
v4 : ul = tbin(' + ', tbin(' + '. tvar( 'x'). tvar( 'y')). tvar( 'ref4')) in metaterm.
1)3 : ?)0 = plus(r, plus(i/, doublejz))) in pnat
I- double(plus(x. plusfi/, donble(r)))) = double(plns(x. plus(iy. double(r)))) in pnat
In (Howe. 1988a) it was noted that one of the main obstacles to everyday use
of such a reflection mechanism was the time taken to continually reprove well-
formedness subgoals. By abstracting the terms involved to variables, and by using
the OYSTER rule
h : a = b in t. h a in /
by hyp(h)
which is not present in NuPR.L. we need prove the well-formedness goals only once.
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3.4 Extensions to the mechanism
The above constitutes a "bare-bones" reflection mechanism. It is restricted in
real use in several ways: only unfailing rewrites are considered: it is not clear
how we can to use rewrites outside their explicitly given f_env. In adding the
following extensions to overcome these limitations we are guided by the intention
of using CLAM in the resulting setting. Thus, to facilitate CIAM's algebraic
style of reasoning, the formalism should be as simple, transparent, natural and
uniform as possible. To make CLWs task as simple as possible the emphasis is
on "compiling out", as far as possible, object-level technicalities, to arrive at as
simple an algebra of tactics as possible wherever something doesn't have, to be
done at synthesis time we have compiled out into a definition, lemma etc. The
overall result of this is that the set of wave-rules CUM must reason with satisfy
the above criteria.
3.4.1 Failure
For the simple mechanism it was stated that tactics were members of the type
metaterm —» metaterm. Thus all tactics would "do" something, even though it
might be returning a term unchanged. Usually, however, proof systems implement¬
ing tactics have a well-defined notion of tactic failure in the case of NuPRL.
ML's exception mechanism is used: in OYSTER, the underlying Prolog's notion of
success/failure is employed. Failure is an important means of passing information
in its own right and a prerequisite if we are to build tactics in a modular fashion
using tacticals.
We implement failure in the same manner as (Howe. 1988a). If we have a partial
function, / : a. —> h. we encode this in type theory as a function in a —> ?b where
7 is defined as the extract of
partial: complete
t- U1 -» U1
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Extract: At.(t| atom)
A success is now returned as a left injection of the result, a failure as a right injec¬
tion of an error message in atom. We use the syntactic sugar ok(r),
failwith(hnessage') and fail below. Like Howe, we provide further sugared
functions for manipulating "partial" functions and types (see appendix).
Using this notion of failure, a tactic is now a member of metaterm —> ?metaterm.
We can lift tactics of the old type using the functional total.
3.4.2 Monotonicity and decidability
One of the biggest problems to overcome in synthesizing tactics formally is the
localized nature of a synthesis theorem vs the global applicability of a tactic, i.e.
a theorem has a theory as a context, whereas (most) tactics can be used in an
arbitrary theory. This shows up in our case where we have a tactic in simp(F).
We should at least expect this tactic to be applicable to all extensions of F. i.e.
tactics should be monotonia.
A large part of (Howe. 1988a) is devoted to showing the monotonicity of relevant
notions, and "respect for environment extensions will be built into the definition
of correctness of inference procedure." We take a more simple-minded, limited
approach. Since we are mainly interested in tactics which manipulate wave an¬
notation. and where other function symbols go mostly uninterpreted, most of our
tactics will be in simp(basic). When we come to apply such tactics in the con¬
text of a particular f_env F. we give as the tactic argument to reflect_tac/4
(see above) ref_wfftac_using/l. This will expect to find a theorem stating the
inclusion
(- x : simp(F) —> x in simp(basic)
In practice this approach should not present a problem. One could even add
invisibly a mechanism which extends F and updates such a theorem each time a
definition is loaded/defined.
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Besides the "globality" of the object logic in a proof system, we must also consider
that of the tactic system itself NuPRL contains many global variables and
CIAM has a large data base of wave-rules etc. Again, we choose a simple-minded
solution. We encode a CL4M-like data base by providing decidability theorems
for the relevant predicates. We distinguish decidability by giving it an explicit
definition:
decidable: complete
I- U1 —» U1
Extract: Ap.(p V (~<p))
Now. to encode a predicate such as is_def ined_as. we would expect a suitable
theorem asserting
h V/ : atom.A(3m : metaterm.is_def ined_as(/, m))
Functional prerficaf.es would have a more straight-forward form. Again, much as
CAWs library mechanism updates its predicate data base, so the correspond¬
ing mimicking theorems can be updated. We call this load-time, simulation and
describe it in section 3.5 below.
3.4.3 An algebra of tactics
In (Paulson, 1983a), Paulson notes that "conversions may be amenable to algebraic
reasoning." It is an algebra of rewrite tactics which we must ultimately present, to
CIAM and use in synthesis proofs. At the bottom level we will specify primitive
tactics using the definitions which naturally arise, such as those of the CLAM
method language. As we build larger tactics we expect to make use of those
tactics previously defined, putting them together in the modular LCF style of
Paulson. And rather than give them primitive specifications, we expect to be able
to determine their behaviour from the specifications of their subparts and of the
gluing tac.tic.als.
We follow Howe's encoding of Paulson-style tacticals for use with the reflection
mechanism. We have:
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f then g: apply f. then apply g; fail if either does.
f orelse g: if f succeeds apply f: otherwise apply g.
try f: if f succeeds apply f; otherwise do nothing.
sub f: apply f to immediate subterms. failing if any application does.
idtac: succeed by doing nothing.
We can give simple (2nd order) equations describing the behaviour of such tactic-
als, for example:
f(x) = ok(i/)m?(metaterm) —> (/ then <])(x) = r/(y) in ?(metaterm)
f(x) = failuith(y)jn?(metaterm) —» (/ then g)(x) = failwith(;/) in ?(metaterm)
By using the wave-rules for these tacticals and a well-chosen set of inductions
schemes we can use CLAM to reason about the behaviour of compound tactics
built in this way.
3.5 Load-time simulation
One problem that is common to any reflection mechanism used in a theorem
proving environment is the need to take account of context. One rarely proves
a theorem in isolation. More usually there is a large body of definitions and
previously proved theorems present, and possibly meta-theoretic information, all of
which influence the proving process. This context-setting is typically implemented
by a library mechanism. The reflection mechanism, based on the logic used rather
than the theorem prover, is unable to represent the library mechanism. Various
ways of overcoming this problem and one direct attack (??) are described in
chapter 6.
This problem is compounded in our case since our tactics, for use with CLAM.
must refer to an extensive data base of meta-level information wave rules,
induction schemas, conditional rewrites etc. We have chosen to partially simulate.
the CLAMdata base. Our method is more tractable and far less complex than
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thaf, described in section ??, but at the cost of a certain logical inadequacy. We
first describe our approach in detail, then its inadequacy and how it affects us in
practice.
When a definition, theorem etc.. is loaded into CLAM the action has two con¬
sequences. One or several object-level definitions and/or theorems are loaded and
become accessible in the OYSTER logic. Simultaneously CIAM'.s meta-level data
base is updated. The effect is similar no matter what kind of object is loaded, so
we shall described only how definitions are treated for simplicity.
A detailed description of Howe's work and a comparison with ours can be found
in section 6.3.
3.6 Discussion
Q: How can our tactics fail?
A: When their preconditions fail. We move all the conditions necessary to decide
whether the tactic will fail or succeed into the precondition.
Q: Can we always do this?
A: No. We couldn't do it for. say. a theorem prover for FOPL since it is undecid-
able. However, we are considering only terminating tactics and we can if necessary
move the whole tactic, into the preconditions. E.g.
Q: What do we have to prove to class an (atomic) tactic as synthesized?
A: We have to prove the theorem:
Vi.(3o2.effects(t, o2)) —> 3o.effects(?'. o)
h Vi.preconds(i) —> 3o.effects(i, o) A i ~ o (3.1)
Almost as important is the decidability of the preconditions:
h V(.(i(preconds(?)) (3.2)
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Note that, (3.2) allows us to transform (3.1) into
I- Vi.3o.preconds(i) —> effects(j. o) At ~ o (3.3)
Q: What advantages does (3.3) have over (3.1)?
A: First, it is in prenex form and more suited to CLAM (at least without context
sensitive rewriting). Second, compare the extracts:
Xi.Xh.yp. < o. _ >
and
Xi. < o. Xhyp._ >
We see that it is much easier to get hold of o in the second; in fact we don't need to
show the preconditions first! (Of course, o will not necessarily be a valid substitute
for i if the preconditions do not hold. But we see below that this is still useful in
the case of compiled tactics where we are interested only in the value of o.)
Q: So. if we have proved (3.1), and possibly (3.2), how do we get the actual tactic?
A: We use the reflection mechanism. We assume, as do our methods, that the
correctness goal, i ~ o, always occurs as the topmost, right-hand conjunct of the
succeedent in a synthesis goal (see (3.1) and (3)). With this we can show that the
rewrite i :=> o is a valid rewrite for that environment. To apply it, i.e. substitute
o for i in some goal all that is required is that we prove
F preconds(j)
and use the primitive substitution rule. [There are OYSTER tactics to do all this
transparently.] If we have proved (2) then we simply evaluate its extract: if it is a
left injection then we do as above; if right we fail. We never try to use or evaluate
the effects if the preconds(i) is not provable.
Q: Isn't it inefficient to replicate the effects in the preconditions?
A: No. Remember that the effects are purely declarative and, unlike CU-M. will
never be "executed". We use them purely for their logical content.
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Q: What about compiling these tactics to Prolog?
A: We can quite easily, given (2). compile a guaranteed-to-terminate (modulo
floundering) Prolog program that is correct, i.e. succeeds exactly when preconds(i)
is provable. We are also able to easily calculate the unlifted version of o. Since
this is an informal "running" of the preconditions we are unable to directly infer
the correctness goal.
This presents us with a paradigm for abstract proof planners. We can compile
precondition decidability and output term into a CLAM method. The tactic sup¬
porting it results from the ordinary reflective case above. A successful plan is
guaranteed to succeed and may be found considerably quicker than evaluating the
preconditions at the object level. Of course, to apply the tactic we will have to
evaluate preconditions at the object level (to get at the correctness goals), but. only
the ones picked out. by the planner.
Q: Is the correspondence between preconds(i) and effects(i.o) and CLAM's
precondition and effects slots precise?
A: No. preconds (i) is sufficient to decide whether a tactic applies (unlike CLAM).
effects(i,o) are purely declarative since the output, o, is calculated in evaluat¬
ing the extract. We use effects(i.o) to chain proofs together (in synthesizing
compound tactics) rather than rely on the explicit structure of o as CLAM and the
abstract planner above do. [In fact, CLAM's slots would better be termed analysis
(taking the input apart) and synthesis (no relation: putting the output together).
It was intended originally to have a more declarative version of the effects slot
but tractability problems prevented this. Meta-level annotation (waves) were put
explicitly in the input and outputs instead.]
Q: How do we build compound tactics?
A: We take a very simple approach at present, relying on a few properties of given
tacticals. For example, given that tacl and tac2 have, respectively, the following
synthesis theorems:
Vi.3o.precondsl(i) —> effectsl(i.o) A i ~ o
V».3o.preconds2(j) —» effects2(«. o) A i ~ o
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we automatically deduce for respectively tacl ORELSE tac2. tacl THEN tac2
and REPEAT tacl the following:
Vi.3o.(precondsl(«) V preconds2(?')) —» (effectsl(j, o) V effectsl(i, o)) Ai~o
Vi.3o.(precondsl(?') A (3/,.effects2(?,f) —♦ preconds2(/))) —»
3t.effectsl(«, f) A effects2(t, o) A i ~ o
Vi.3atrue —> (-ipreccmdsl(o)} A i ~ o
The last property is not valid in type theory since REPEAT tacl may not terminate.
We "because" this lemma and implement repeat by iterating tacl a large (but
finite) number of times.
Q: How does non-determinism arise?
A: The main way in which non-determinism arises is via the QRELSE tactical.
We suppose that all CLAM predicates are used in such a manner that they are
completely deterministic. If we wish to parameterize non-determinism then, as in
ML tactics, we may iterate ORELSE over a list of alternatives.
Q: How is the environment used?
A: This is used to store information which is likely to change in the course of a
proof. Unfortunately, it assumes a fixed theory throughout a session. This isn't
as bad as it seems since we can do the necessary well-typedness proofs once and





In this chapter we develop proof plans for tactic synthesis, that is to prove the¬
orems which assert the existence of a correct rewrite in the formalism developed
in the previous chapter. One should ask what is reasonable to expect of such a
programme. It is unlikely to be as successful as a human at writing tactics since
it possesses none of the high-level semantic guidance of how a tactic is to be used
and how it is integrated into a library of existing and future tactics. It would also
be optimistic to expect large inference steps from highly declarative specifications
to executable tactics for the same reason, and also from looking at the state of
the art in the simpler work of verifying recursive programs (Bundy e.t. al 1991:
Boyer & Moore, 1979). What we can expect is a useful array of techniques which,
under human guidance, can formally construct provably correct rewriting tactics
satisfying specifications written in a declarative, high-level language.
We have split tactic synthesis into two parts: the automatic synthesis of atomic
tactics and the partial automation of the verification of compound tactics from
already-synthesized tactics. We have found, after synthesizing several atomic tac¬
tics, a number of principled extensions to the existing CLAM method set were
required. Below we motivate the introduction of these with a detailed example
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showing why and where they are needed. We have tried, as far as possible, to
make all extensions monotonia, i.e. extending CMM's proving ability to include
tactic synthesis rather than redirecting it. The principle extensions we make are
the use of higher-order (h.o.) wave rules and context-sensitive rewriting. We also
list more minor ways in which we have extended methods.
In our representation of tactics and the predicates involved their specifications
we have attempted to hide all the low-level features (such as association lists,
matching, non-determinism) from the synthesis theorems. This has been achieved
by using assuming that the user has already provided lemmas stating the necessary
high-level properties of these predicates (such as correctness and decidability in
various modes). By putting as much as possible of the computational content of
a predicate into theorems of its high-level behaviour, less of this occurs in the
synthesis proof itself, so leading to more efficient extracted tactics.
4.2 Synthesis proofs
We have shown in chapters 2 and 3 the well known methods by which programs
in general and tactics in particular may be specified in a constructive type theory,
and how. once these specification theorems have been proved, programs may be
extracted. In this section we explain in detail how we derive such specifications
directly from CIAM method specifications. We also state what it means to have
synthesized a tactic and some properties of the theorems.
We consider here CIAM methods which have been simplified in keeping with our
restriction to rewrite tactics over metaterms: in particular, the input and output
slots are now occupied by subterms of a sequent in place of the sequent itself.
Recall that a method specification has the form:
method (name (Args ) , ~'/.name and arguments
I, '/. input slot






'/. tactic we wish to synthesize?
).
We have made explicit the Prolog variables present in this specification. In a
formal specification these approximate to prenexable existential variables. Note
also that we have not disallowed the sharing of variables between preconditions
and effects. X. Y and Z denote respectively variables common to preconditions and
effects, private to preconditions, and private to effects. Args may contain any or
all of these variables.
We require the following to hold:
1. The preconditions should not mention the output 0 and should be sufficient to
decide whether the tactic is applicable, i.e. if the preconditions are true then we
can find 0 such that the effects are satisfied.
2. The preconditions should, if possible, be decidable. This property is used in
transforming proofs so that extracts become "cleaner", in compiling pseudo tactics
to Prolog, and in synthesizing compound tactics. (See chapter 5.)
3. The metaterms constituting the input and output have the same meaning, i.e.
the OySTER terms they represent are provably equal. This is our correctness goal.
i ~ o, from chapter 3. It ensures that the tactic is correct at the object level.
4. We do not. require that the effects uniquely determine the output.
We can now formalize criteria (1) and (2) by the assertions:
V?' : metaterm.V.T. y.precondsf i. x. y ) —»
3o : metaterm.3z.effectsft, o. I, z)At~o (1)
V« : metaterm.Varr/.s.AfSr. y — args.preconds(i, x. y)) (2)
where x. y and z are parameters of fixed type dependent on the theorem, and
x, y — args denotes variables occurring in x or y and not in args. [Note: like X,
Y and Z. we use x. y and z as a shorthand to indicate tuples of variables.] We
call the first the synthesis theorem and the second the decidability theorem. The
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reason for the form of the. latter is that we must search for the free variables of
the preconditions which are not input explicitly as arguments. The decidability
assertion states that this search terminates with success or failure. We will see in
chapter 5 that this search can be moved to the execution of a Prolog program. For
this reason we will always be interested in proving a second form of decidability
theorem where args is x. y, i.e.
V?' : metaterm.Vx. y.i5(preconds(i, x, y))
Once we have proved these theorems it is simple to construct a tactic. Given an
input i and arguments args. we evaluate the result of applying the extract of the
decidability theorem to these. If it is a right injection the tactic fails. If it is a
left injection we may obtain the witnesses for x. y — args by taking projections
and apply the extract of the synthesis proof to these and args. Evaluating this
term gives us the output o which we know will be correct, i.e. it satisfies the
effects and i ~ o. If the decidability theorem for a tactic is unavailable then the
proof obligation 3x. y — ar#s.preconds(«, x. y) remains as a subgoal. This process
can be made transparent using OYSTER tactics. For a tactic called tac we follow
the convention of calling the synthesis theorem tac_synth and the decidability
theorem tac_dec. The second form of decidability theorem is called tac.comp.
tac_comp is useful in several ways. We will show later in section 4.5 how it is used
for putting synthesized tactics together to form larger ones. It also allows us to
make the output o independent of the way in which the preconditions are proved.
For. given tac.comp. we can show the equivalence of the synthesis theorem with:
Vf : metaterm.Vx, y.3o : metaterm.Bz.precondsfi, x. y) —>
effectsji. o. x. z) A i ~ o
The extract of this proof
Ai.Xx. y. < o. _ >
is much "cleaner" than that of the synthesis theorem we may extract o simply by
taking the first projection after applying to the arguments. We have not considered
this aspect of efficiency closely. Work has been done (Paulin-Mohring. 1989:
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Constable e.t. al. 1986) on the elimination of computationally uninteresting terms
from a proof extract. We believe that the use of OYSTER'S subset types could be
applied to the work in this thesis but have not had time to verily this.
tac_comp will be used in chapter 5 to compile a pseudo tactic prog to simulate
preconds. A correctness theorem there will show that:
1- preconds(j. x. y) hg^pprogf/, X, Y. O)
We have then come full circle since prog can be used as a pseudo-tactic, as are
CIAM methods, allowing the efficient planning of proofs. The difference now is
that we know we are able to reify the planned proof with tactics.
For each pre-defined predicate of interest in CIAM's methodical language we either
provide a direct analogue in type theory or, in cases where this is not possible,
e.g. routines for manipulating quantifiers which our formalism does not permit,
functions carrying out equivalent operations, e.g. exp_at and replace in the ex¬
ample which follows. For each of these we will have a set of lemmas: for predicates
we will have a lemma asserting decidability in various modes; for functions and
predicates we will have lemmas asserting correctness where suitable. There will
also be the usual lemmas relating functions and predicates to each other.
4.3 Example
In this section we go through an example synthesis proof as if CLAM were at¬
tempting to build a plan for it. At certain points we highlight shortcomings of the
present CLAM system and note how one might fix these. Later we shall present a
rational reconstruction of these fixes and see that, in essence, they represent ex¬
tensions to the present set of CIAM methods rather than a wholesale introduction
of new ones. This is in keeping with our hopes of monotonically extending general
induction theorem proving techniques to tactic synthesis.
The examples we present are the synthesis and decidability theorems for the
eval_def tactic. This is used in its full form by CIAM to rewrite a definition
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to its definiens. To keep the example clear, and because we are anyway working






[replaced ,Pos ,NewExp, 0)] ,
?
)
The definitions for exp_at and replace and the theorems we assume about the
simulated predicate def_eqn can be found in appendix K. We do not show the full
proof below since much of it is repetitive. In particular we give only one base and
one step case of the main induction. The base cases are almost identical. In the
first example we show only the second step case: this involves multi-hole rippling
(see section A.3). the other step case going through with similar caveats.
As explained in the previous section, the two theorems which we require for the
synthesis of a tactic to satisfy these specifications are:
I- V», x. n : metaterm. pos : posn.(exp_at(i, pos, x) A def_eqn(r. n)) —»
3o : metaterm.replace(i,/)o.s, n. o) A i ~ o
h Vi : metaterm.(?(3x. n : metaterm. pos : posn.exp_at(i. pos. x) A def_eqn(x. n))
First induction: i : metaterm
Recursion analysis, after examination of the definitional wave rules for exp_at and




Let; us look at, the first base ease:
v : atom h Vz, n : metaterm, pos : posn.(exp_at(tvar(?;), pos, i) A def_eqn(x, n)) —»
3o : metaterm.replace(tvar(?;),po.s, n, o) A tvar(u) ~ o
We can now rewrite both exp_at and replace according to their definitions:
... h Vr, n : metaterm. pos : posn.
(pos — nil in posn Ar = tvar(u) in metaterm A def_eqn(x. n)) —>
3o : metaterm.(po.s = nil in posn A n = o in metaterm) A tvar(w) ~ o
As (Boyer &: Moore. 1979) point out. equalities should be eliminated whenever
possible - they usually indicate a substitution which we can carry out and forget
about. It also obviously simplifies a formula. More importantly, as we shall see in
the step case below, they may form part of a wave front and their elimination is
an essential part of unblocking. If the equality is between a variable and a term
free in that variable, we can often eliminate the quantifier binding that variable as
well. This depends on the position of the equality in the formula in a way we shall
make clear later. In this case the positions of the equalities involving both pos
and x are such that we can eliminate their quantifiers. Thus, our much-simplified
goal is now:
.. . b Vn : metaterm.def_eqn(tvar(u), n) —>
3o : metaterm.(nil = nilmposn A n = o in metaterm) A tvar(w) ~ o
We can simplify the equality nil = nil and eliminate the the quantifier 3o since
this satisfies too our position criterion. This step, since it involves instantiating
the existential variable o with the value n. is our first explicit point of synthesis.
The result is:
... h Vn : metaterm.def_eqn(tvar(u), n) —> tvar(w) ~ n
At this point we note that the goal matches the correctness statement for the
simulated predicate def_eqn. and are finished.
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Step case: tbin
We now examine the second step case, that involving tbin(/. . Our goal
is:
/ : atom, a : metaterm. b : metaterm.
hi : Vx, n : metaterm, po.f: posn.(exp_at(a, pos, x) A def_eqn(x, n))
—> 3o : metaterm.replace(u, pox, n, o) A a ~ o
h2 : Vx. n : metaterm. pox : posn.(exp_at(h. pox, x) A def_eqn(x. n))
—> 3o : metaterm.replace(i). pos, n,o)Ab~o
h Vx. n : metaterm, pox : posn.(exp_at( tbin(/, a1, h2) . |_y)osJ , x.) A def_eqn(x, n))
3o : metaterm.replace( tbin(/, a1, ho) ■ \j>os\ ,n,o) A tbin(/, a1, h2) ~ o
Seconds induction (nested): pos : posn
Recursion analysis, again from the definitional wave rules and taking note of the
position of sinks, suggests a nested induction on pos.
Base case: nil
In the base case we have, after expanding base case definitions:
... (- Vx. n : metaterm.(x = tbin(/, o„ 6)tbin in metaterm A (if:fj,x, n)) —»
3o : metaterm.n = o in metaterm A tbin(/, a. h) ~ o
As in the previous base case, the equalities for x and o are in such positions that
we can eliminate their quantifiers, instantiating o with n:
... b Vn : metaterm.def_eqn(tbin(/, a, h), n) —> tbin(/. a, h) ~n
As in the base case we note that this is another instance of the correctness theorem
for def.eqn.
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Step case: h :: (3
We now move on to the step case of the pos induction. We have a new hypothesis.
A3, in addition to the two already present, from the induction on i:
h : pnat. t. : pnat list.
A3 : Vx,n : metaterm.(exp_at( tbin(/,n1, jh>) ,x) A def_eqn(x, n))
3o : metaterm.replace( tbin(f-Hi-bo) .t. n.o) A tbin(/. a^, hy)
h Vx. n. : metaterm.(exp_at( tbin(/, Oj.A,} , x) A def_eqn(x, n))
3o : metaterm.replacef (/. oj. h>) h :: U , n. o) A tbin(/. ni.fto)
We can now ripple out exp_at in this goal. Note that we can only ripple the
different fronts (1 and 3/1 and 2) since in each case the wave fronts for 3 are
inside a sink for 1 or 2. Since the wave front for 3 is moved inside a wave hole for
1/2 it. is erased throughout the goal since it is 110 longer possible to fertilize it. i.e.
we have no hope of using h3:
... h Vx. n : metaterm.
( ((A = Qinpnat A exp_at(n, t. x),) V (A = linpnat, A exp_at(b,t.,x)o))
Adef_eqn(x, n.)) —> ...
At this point the rippling is blocked. To continue we require the presence of
prepositional wave rules, viz.
A C(Ai v Bo) (A AC).V(BA C)„
(Ai v Pj 1 c, M ~* C), A (B—> C)„
Of more interest is the fact that we also need a ripple corresponding to the wave
rule:
Vx : T.I Aj A S2 ^ Vx : / . .11 A Vx : T.B ,
This is a higher-order wave rule where we need to take account of such things as
variable capture and dependence and perform the necessary a-conversion. Assum¬
ing that we have all these rules we may now ripple the goal to:
... h (Vx, n : metaterm.( (A = Qinpnat. A exp_at(a,t,x.)1)
Adef _eqn(x. n)) —> 3o : metaterm....) A .. .0
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Again, wave fronts inside wave holes are erased if they do not have identical indices.
Note that a convenient, but not necessary, operation at this point would be to split
the goal by performing an A-introduction. This behaves as a sequent-level wave
cancellation rule. [We can do likewise for the V connective, trying to prove one of
the subgoals.] Let us assume we have performed such an operation for reasons of
clarity. Thus our goal is:
...I- V®.« : metaterm.( (h = Oinpnat A exp_at(a. t. ®) ) A def _eqn(®. n)) ■
3o : metaterm.replace( tbin(/,«i,ft) ,h :: t.n.o) A tbinf/.oj.ft)
We can now eliminate the equality on h. This time we do not eliminate any
quantifier but we note which occurrences in the goal can be soundly rewritten
using this equality. This is a technique we have called context-sensitive rewriting
and explore in detail in section 4.7. We can eliminate the equality itself on similar
grounds to the quantifier elimination case. This time, however, we are in a step
case. It would not be useful to eliminate equalities if we disrupt the skeleton, so
we add an extra proviso to prevent this. In this case the equality is in a wave
front and the operation can be seen as an extension to the unblocking method.
The resulting goal is now:
... I- V®. n : metaterm.(exp_at(<7,, t, x) A def_eqn(.x. n)) —►
3o : metaterm.replace( tbin(f.a^.b) ,0 :: t. n. o) A tbin(/, a^.b)
The only ripple we can perform at this point is an existential one using the wave
rule for replace. This instantiates o to tbin(g,c,d). introducing in the process
the new existential variables g. c and d:
... t- ... —» 3/7 : atom.3c. d. : metaterm.
(/ = ginatom A ((0 = Oinpnat. A b = dinmetaterm. A replacefa, t. n, c))
V(0 = s(0)inpnat, A a = cinmetnterrn A replacefb. t. n, d))))
A tbin(f.a,i.b) ~ tbin(g,cx,flt)
After boolean simplification the result is:
3g : atom.3c. d, : metaterm.
(/ = ginatom A (b = dinmetaterm. A replace(a, t. n. c)))
A tbin(/. «x, fc) ~ tbin(g,Cj,d)
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We can now ripple out the ~ goal. We can also eliminate the the equalities on 17
and d and their quantifiers, instantiating them respectively with the values / and
b. If we assume the presence of the reflexivity theorem for ~ the result is:
3c: metaterm.replace(a, t. n, c) A a ~ c
This can now be fertilized with hypothesis hi. The proof is finished. An elided
form of the extract can be found in appendix H.
We now go on to finish off the synthesis process by similarly annotating the proof
of the decidability of the preconditions of eval_def. Since the tbin step case
does not illustrate anything that has not already been raised above with respect
to multi-hole rippling, we will use the simpler tuna step case in this example. Our
starting goal is:
h V« : metaterm.d(33:, n : metaterm. pos : ,exp_at(i, pos, x) A def _eqn(r, n))
The only induction suggested by recursion analysis here is on i. arising from
exp_at. The first base case simplifies to:
v : atom b />(3i. n : metaterm. pos : posn.
(pos = nil in posn A x = tvar(u) in metaterm) A def_eqn(:r, n))
Since they satisfy our position criterion we can now eliminate the existential quan¬
tifiers for pos and r with respectively nil and tvar(w). It is worth noting at this
point that a rewrite inside S(P) must be two-way since it is short for P V —P.
i.e. each subterm occurs with both polarities. Since our quantifier elimination is
equivalence-preserving, this is permissible here. After the elimination our base
case looks like:
... b <5(3n : metaterm.def_eqn(tvar(w), n))
We expect this lemma to be present already for the simulated predicate def _eqn
for it asserts its termination when used in the mode (+.-).
In the step case we have the goal:
/ : atom, a : metaterm.
Ill : d(3t, n : metaterm, pos : posn.exp_at(u, pos. x) A def_eqn(i, n))
b A(3:r. n : metaterm, pos : posn.exp_at( tuna(/.a1) .pos, x) A def_eqn(r, n))
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The only thing suggested by this goal is an existential ripple on pos. Since we
require this to be a two-way rewrite we must use information from the schema
corresponding to the ripple to arrive at:
r.. n : metaterm. (exp_at(tuna(/, a), nil, x) A def_eqn(:t, n))
V3/i.: pnat.t : posn.(exp_at( tuna(/, Oj) h :: tl . x) A def_eqn(i. ?>.))
.1
Now. applying definitions, eliminating h with witness 0, rippling and simplifying
we get:
... h S(3x. n : metaterm.
def_eqn(tuna(/. a), n) V 3t : posn.(exp_at(a, t, x) A def_eqn(i. n))j )
Now. applying higher-order wave rules of the form
and using the rules for distributing S over the prepositional connectives we arrive
at the fertilizahle goal:
... h S(3n : metaterm.def_eqn(tuna(/. a), n))
A5(33:. n : metaterm. t, : posn.exp_at(a. t, x) A def_eqn(.t. n))1
The first conjunct is handled as above, by supposing the presence of an decidability
lemma for def.eqn.
We now recap on the extensions required to CLAM. These were equality and
quantifier elimination, context-sensitive rewriting and the use of higher-order wave
rules. We also needed extensions to recursion analysis to allow for nested induc¬
tions involving sinks, and to existential rippling when two-way rewrites are ne¬
cessary. This completes our two examples. In the next section we analyse these
extensions were and attempt a rational reconstruction from these.
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4.4 Synthesis of atomic tactics
Having illustrated our case with an example we can now attempt a rational recon¬
struction. We should note that such a generalization is justified since, although
simple, eval_def has the characteristics of most CUM tactics. The preconditions
involve non-deterministically dismantling a goal whilst the effects use this inform¬
ation to build the output. We should also note that exp_at and replace have
very similar recursion schemes. Moreover the nested metaterm/posn induction
behaves like depth induction on metaterm.
The general purpose proof plan is well-suited to this form of proof with the pro¬
visos noted. In particular we have the problems of requiring higher-order ripples,
context-sensitive rewriting and quantifier elimination. These are all detailed in
there own sections below.
We also note some minor extensions required as follows:
1. Since we are working inside decidability statements we require all rewrites to
be equivalences or equalities. This is not the case with present existential rippling.
For example the ripple
31 : a list./*([?]) :=> 3h : a.t, : a list./ffj h :: I )
is not an equivalence. We require that the full equivalence be used:
3/ : a list./'([/]) :=>
Such case-splits can be automatically derived using the same schema information
as is used by recursion analysis to chose inductions.
2. The strong fertilization submethod has been upgraded. It now takes into ac¬
count an arbitrary quantifier prefix. We did not need such generality for our
essentially V3 theorem, but a simple means of skolemizing. matching and deskol-
emizing was found to be easier to express for the general case. This submethod is
given in the appendix G.
(| .-l
.P(nil) V 3h : a. t : a list.P( h :: / )
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3. We have added a new method to handle, as a last resort, cases of a pure
correctness, i.e. a goal where the only predicate is ~. This is reflected down and
CIAM given the object-level goal to attempt.
4. We have updated recursion analysis to take account of nested induction where
multi-hole rippling can take place only because of a sink. This is illustrated by
the tbin ripple on replace in the example above.
5. We have also updated the erasure of fronts which, by virtue of falling into
differently indexed wave-holes are no longer feasible fertilization candidates. This
reduces the search space.
Our formulation of wave rules is slightly unorthodox. Instead of writing several
conditional one-way wave rules, we prefer to write unconditional, two-way rules
containing equalities and propositional connectives. This would not normally be
an advantage, but since we are rewriting inside d(.) and possibly inside the scopes
of quantifiers, case-splits are done in situ as the introduction of a V on variables
which would not be available in the hypothesis. We also attempt to keep the LHS's
of wave-rules linear so that the only reason a match is prevented is occurrence
of incompatible constructors. This helps to motivate relevant inductions. The
rules in our glossary, appendix K. are in this form. Because we have context-
sensitive rewriting and higher-order wave rules available the complicated RHS do
not introduced many problems.
The eval_def proof follows closely that for wave, the equivalent wave rule rewriting
tactic. We have also had success with a number of similar tactics. We noted the
need for certain propositional wave rules and higher-order wave rules to be present
in the above example. In our experience the same small set of such rules seems
sufficient for most proofs.
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4.5 Synthesis of compound tactics
We now look at; how to put the tactics we have synthesized previously together,
again verifying their correctness. We consider only the verification of compound
tactics since the user is likely to have a given behaviour in mind and find it easier
to express this procedurally (using a tactical) than with a complicated, monolithic
specification. Of course, we could attempt to prove such a specification using the
above of section 4.4.
Since our tactics are confined to being total we cannot specify those of the kind
that would result from using the tactical REPEAT. (Howe, 1988a: Knoblock. 1987)
point this problem out. They use the trick of replacing it by iteration a large
number of times. Of course, such a construct will not be provably equivalent, to
REPEAT.
Suppose we have already synthesized tacl and tac2. Assume for simplicity that
neither tactic has arguments. We therefore have proofs of:
b V?' : metaterm.precondsl(i) —» 3o : metaterm.effectsl(i. o) A i ~ o
b Vi : metaterm.preconds2(i) —» 3o : metaterm.ef fects2(i. o) A i ~ o
b Vi : metaterm.Alprecondsl)!))
b Vi : metaterm./>(preconds2(i))
We examine how we would put these together to form the specifications for super-
tactics.
tacl ORELSE tac2
The synthesis and decidability theorems are:
b Vi : metaterm.(precondsl(i) V preconds2(i)) —» 3o : metaterm.
((precondsl(i) A.effectsl(i,o)) V (-iprecondsl(i) A effects2(i. o))) A i ~ o
b Vi : metaterm.d(precondsl(i) V preconds2(i))
and both are provable from the starting specifications.
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TRY tacl
This is a degenerate case of QRELSE. It. has the theorems:
I- Vi : metaterm.true —> 3o : metaterm.
((precondsl(j) A effectsl(t. o)) V (-iprecondsl(j) A i = oinrrietaterrn)) A i ~ o
h VI : metaterm.(5(tr)te)
4.5.1 SUB tacl
SUB searches non-deterministically for a subterm of the input to which rewrite can
apply. The result specification is:
I- Vi. x : metaterm. pos : posn.(exp_at(i. pos. x) A precondsl(.r)) —» 3o,k. : metaterm.
effectsl(x.k) A replace()',po.s. k. o) A i ~ o
(- V?' : metaterm.h(3z : metaterm. pos : posn.exp_at(». pos. x) A precondsl(.r))
Again, both of these are provable from the initial theorems.
PROGRESS tacl
By PROGRESS tacl we mean that. 1 has applied and the output is different from
the input. The specifications are:
I- Vi.preconds(i) —> 3o : metaterm.effectsl(i. o) A -it = o in metaterm At~o
tacl THEN tac2
This has the specifications:
h V). o2 : metaterm.(precondsl(i) A effectsl(i. o2) A preconds(p2)) —»
3o : metaterm.effects2(o2, o)
h Vt : metaterm.(5(precondsl(j) A 3o2 : metaterm.effects(i. o2) A preconds2(o2))
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REPEAT tacl
Like all implementations of reflection in constructive type theory the representa¬
tion of possibly non-terminating functions presents us with a problem. We cannot
give a formal specification for REPEAT tac unless tac is of the most trivial nature,
e.g. failtac. We show in chapter 5 a way around this: we allow a Prolog pro¬
gram to iterate (possibly forever) the compile pseudo-tactic for tacl. If this does
terminate then we can count the iterations and apply the tactic formally that
number of times. An important example of this type of tactic is the ripple of
CIAM. defined as REPEAT wave. This method is appropriate there.
4.6 Decidability proofs
We shall distinguish in what follows between predicates and functions. In the type
theory OYSTER we shall call any function whose result type is a universe (i.e. a
type of the form Ui) a predicate: otherwise we call it simply a function. Since our
type theory is constructive, all functions and predicates are total. This property is
manifested internally in the constructive nature of the inference rules, and extern¬
ally in the fact that the extract of a complete proof applied to appropriately typed
objects evaluates to a normal form. However, our type theory is not decidable
in general one cannot decide whether or not. a given type is inhabited and so
we have 110 algorithmic means of saying whether a given proposition is true or not.
A class of propositions for which this is possible is those that are deridable., i.e.
those V for which we can prove
...hS(P) (4.1)
Here we have used "decidable" in a different sense, applying to given propositions
rather than theories as previously; context should make clear which sense is in¬
tended from now on. Typically V will have free variables and a theorem such as
(4.1) provides us with a decision procedure for all instances of V. This is useful in
tactic synthesis since we often need to know when pre-conditions and effects hold
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and in what", cases the specification cannot he met. As OYSTER predicates are also
used to mode] Prolog predicates, and we expect the latter to be computable, we
should expect these to be decidable.
The decidability proof for a predicate allows us to extract much useful information.
For example, if we are interested in synthesizing and using a predicate p/2 in our




h 6(3x. y.p(x, ?/))
These correspond respectively to use in modes (+,+), (+,-), (-,+) and For
each predicate of the CLAM method language we shall assume (and have proved)
such lemmas. It will be shown below how these are used in synthesis proofs.
Our main tool in proving decidability theorems is a simple one but quite effective.
We have the follow rules and their wave rule equivalents:
Va, b : U1.6(a) A 6(b) - 6(a A b)
Va., b : U1.6(a) A 6(b) - 6(a. V b)
Va. b : U1.6(a) A 6(b) - 6(n, —» b)
Va. b : Ul.6(b) - <9hb)
true -> <5(true)
true -» i^lvoid)
As a demonstration of how general purpose rippling techniques can be applied,
unchanged, to decidability goals we outline below the rippling story for the de¬
cidability of equality in arbitrary freely-generated parameterized data types. This
is in contrast to the specific tactics developed for such goals by. for example.
Hamilton (Hamilton, 1993) and Howe (Howe. 1988a). The only data required for
the plan to succeed are the usual cancellation (wave) rules, uniqueness rules and
the primitive induction schema which can be derived uniformly from the rules
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for OYSTeR's rec type. If the data type is parameterized over previously defined-
types we also need the lemmas asserting decidability for those types. We give as
an example here our recursive type metaterm. and hope the reader can see how
the proof would proceed in the general case.
We have the goal:
h Vr, y : metaterm.<$(x = y in metaterm)
Individual induction on x and y is blocked since the cancellation rules are unable
to ripple past the '='. Thus, simultaneous induction on x and y is suggested. We
present three typical proof steps.
In the most complicated step case we have
... h ii(tbin(/, a. b) = tbin(r/. c, d) in metaterm)
...I~ !>{f = g in atom A a =c in metatermAh = d in metaterm)
... I- S(f — y in atom) A S(n, = c in metaterm f\k = d in metaterm)
... I- S(f = y in atom) A S(a = c. in metaterm) A S(b = d in metaterm)
... h S(f = y in atom)
Here we successively used the cancellation wave rule, the wave rule for splitting
up conjunctions inside />(.). and finally strong fertilized. The last goal is assumed
to be already present as a lemma.
When we have two non-identical recursive constructors the uniqueness lemmas
are used to write it to the form fi(void). which is trivially true. Finally, when one
of x and y is substituted for by a base constructor, the other is untouched. For
example, one of the subgoals will be:
... F fi(x = tvar(u) in metaterm)
The uniqueness rules suggest induction on x, which will end as in the first or
second case depending on whether the constructors match.
We shall frequently use such decidability results below.
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4.7 Context-sensitive rewriting
At various points in the foregoing example we needed more information during
the rewriting of a term than was explicitly available from the hypothesis list. This
- is a not untypical case since tactic synthesis proofs are likely to contain many
interacting subgoals. We have developed and implemented a partial solution to
this problem by making use of as much of the surrounding goal as possible when
rewriting a particular subgoal context-sensitive rewriting (CSR). We define a
function (see p. 85). by recursion over formulas containing a distinguished oc¬
currence, which produces a set of sets of formulas the context which may
be used as if they were part of the hypothesis list. We say partial solution be¬
cause, as will be explained below, for reasons of tractability we limit the amount
of inference which takes place in calculating a subterm's context. Below we use a
presentation of typed, first-order intuitionistic predicate calculus derived from the
Curry-Howard interpretation of OYSTER type theory. By dropping the uninterest¬
ing type declarations from sequents and the well-formedness subgoals from rules
we arrive at the set of rules given in appendix B.
Our notion of context is based on an abstract notion of fertilizability. Suppose we
have a goal of the form
h G\H\
where £/[-] indicates a distinguished occurrence. We can rewrite the conclusion to
Q[true] using the hypothesis Ti and stepping through S during rewriting (this is
the process called strong fertilization in CLAM when H is an induction hypothesis
and [-] a wave hole). However, the instance of Ti. we use to perform the rewriting
may not be readily available explicitly as a hypothesis but may itself be buried in
the goal Q. Consider a more concrete example:
... h ... ((1 = nil in pnat list)#member(x, 1))...
where we also have available the rewrite
Vr : T, / : T list.(/ = nil in T list) —» member(x.l) <-> void
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(For simplicity we will often refer to occurrences within a formula by using the
names of meta-variables or object-level formulas which appear exactly once;
will often be used as an anonymous meta-variable.) For meta-level reasons, or if
this goal were surrounded by other connectives for example, it may never happen
that I = nil becomes a hypothesis. However, in the goal above / = nil can
fertilize member) :r, /) allowing.it.to be rewritten to void.
We generalise this example now to consideration of all formulas. Let us say that:
an occurrence [-] in a formula £7 [-] is fertilizable with respect to an occurrence B if
any rewrite conditional upon B can validly be applied to [-]. Since we are rewriting
at the prepositional level, i.e. using implications rather than equations, there is
the usual notion of polarity involved (see. e.g., (Girard. 1987)). This leads us to
formalise the above definition as:
Definition 4.1 (Fertilizability) Occurrence B (strongly) positively fertilizes [•]
"»£[•] iff
h (V.B - K =* A) -> G\K) -> G\A\
Occurrence B (strongly) negatively fertilizes [-] in C/[•] iff
h (V.B - A-*K\ - g\K] -» g\A]
Occurrence B weakly fertilizes [•] in Q\-\ iff
h (V.B -> K <-* A) -> g\K\ -» g\A]
[Note that strong fertilizability of either kind implies weak fertilizability.] In these
definitions ft* and A are distinct dummy prepositional atoms which are assumed
not to occur in <7[-], and whose free variables are exactly those of B. V is assumed
to close everything in its scope. [The heuristic is to read these as: if B allows
me to use the rewrite A :=t> ft*."What is the condition under which I can validly
apply this. i.e. rewrite the goal G[A] to Q\K\l\ Applying these definitions to the
previous example we see that I = nil weakly fertilizes member(x.Z) since, putting
83
{?[■] = ...((/ = nil
can show that
n pnat list)#-)... and B = I = nnin pnat list, we
I
h(Vi: T.Z : T list.B -» K(xJ) <-> - £[/f(:M)] -> £[^(*<0]
is a theorem. In the same way we see. as examples, that, B positively fertilizes A
in B —> »4 and negatively fertilizes .4 in (B —> j4) —> C. The idea of a context is
to gather together all the B's w.r.t. a particular occurrence in a goal, and to treat
these as if on the hypothesis list so that conditional rewriting at that occurrence
is more likely to succeed.
The idea of using contexts when rewriting is a common one Boyer & Moore
(Boyer &; Moore. 1979) and N11PRL (Howe. 1988a; Constable e.t al 1986) for ex¬
ample. Neither of these examples is appropriate to our requirements, however:
Boyer &; Moore, since they are working in quantifier-free, classical logic, are able
to put all goals into a normal form, in essence moving everything that can be put
there into a hypothesis list; NuPRL implements only a limited form of context
sensitivity, described in the tactic documentation as "descending through con¬
junctions. through universal quantifiers, through implications (via the consequent
only), and finally by applying ... a term destructor." This latter is not sufficient
for our purposes as demonstrated by the examples given previously.
From the "semantic" definitions of fertilizability above it can be seen that an
arbitrary amount of theorem proving may be necessary in order to decide the
context of a term. We can make the context of an occurrence calculable in linear
time by restricting the notion of context to one of position only. i.e. by considering
each atomic proposition in the goal as distinct. Consider the goal
I- C —» (C —> B) —» A
According to our definition above A is positively fertilizable with respect to B. but
this is by virtue of the inference h C —> (C —> B) —> B. If we replace one of the C's by
C'. say. this is no longer the case. It is this restricted notion of context, sensitivity,
depending only upon the logical skeleton of the formula and not its contents, that,
we have implemented and explain below. We formalise this restricted notion of
84
context, by applying the original definitions of fertilizability to a formula whose
predicate symbols (including the OYSTER atom void) have been renamed so that
^ ^ no two are the same, e.g. by using indexes.
First let us define context. An occurrence B of a subformula of a (renamed) formula
G[-] is said to be in the context of [•] iff B weakly fertilizes [•]. As is clear from the
induction schema in the correctness proof below, the kind of fertilization (positive,
negative or weak) depends only on the polarity of [•] within £/[•]. Thus the context
and polarity of [•] need only be calculated once. We now define a function context
and show in the correctness proof that this computes the context as just defined.
The last two cases are included for completeness though not primitive connectives.
context([-]) = {0}
context(C[-]#D) = {{P}} ® context(C[-]) + symmetric case
context(C[-]|P) = context(C[-j) 4- symmetric case
context(C —» T>\-]) = {{C}} ® context(P[-])
context(C[-] —> P) = context(C[-]) where V is atomic
context(C[-] —> P#Q) = context(C[-] —> P) U context(C[-] —> Q)
context(C[-] —> P|Q) = context(C[-])
context(C[-] —> P —> Q) = {{P}} ® context(C[-] —» Q)
context(C[-] —> \fx : T.V) = context(C[-) —> V\y/x]) where ?/ is "fresh"
context(C[-] —> 3:r : T.V) = context(C[-])
context(Vi : T.C\-\) = context(C[-][y/x]) where y is "fresh"
context(3:r : 7\C[-]) = context(C[-][?//v:]) where y is "fresh"
context((i(C|-])) = context(C[-])
context(C[-] <-> V) = context(C[-]) + symmetric case
By ® we mean here the set operation defined as:
A ® B = {t U y\x e A A e B}
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4.7.1 Motivation for correctness of CSR
In the section below we prove the correctness of CSR, i.e. the theorem (in the
positive case):
r. T[K] I- K\A] for all Se context^-]), P, S, if h A
We can use this result to determine exactly when it is permissible to rewrite a goal
of the form T\A] to T\K\. i.e. when we can show T\K] b ./""[A]. This is entailed
by the correctness result as follows.
We first assume that we have a set of rewrite rules of the form B, —> K —> A where
Bi are atomic or the negations of an atoms. Putting P equal to this set of rewrite
rules in the above gives us a necessary and sufficient condition for rewriting K to A.
It remains to show that the RHS is true exactly when, for every S € context(lF[-]).
there is some B, € S.
Write A for any S 6 context(jT(-]). If B is a member of A then the R.HS clearly
holds. Now suppose, that the R.HS holds, i.e. we have B —> K —> .4. A.K I- A.
Applying the interpolation theorem (4.2) with Pi = A. To = B —> K —> A.K,
and G — A. we get an interpolant / all of whose predicate symbols (apart from
void) are common to A and B —> K —> A. This leaves only B. This means I
must be equivalent to one of the following: void, void —» void. B. B —» void.
(B —♦ void) —> void (see section C.l for proof). The interpolation theorem also
^telis-efHrhat^y
Ah/ and I.B —> K —» A. K b A. and that, where B does occur in / it occurs
positively, thus eliminating the fourth c^se: Of-Ui^remainjjig-cases^ll_but the
third can be eliminated by considering the first result. Thus we have A b B and
hence, by the form of A. that B is a member of-ATTt is this inexpensive test which
forms the basis of our tactics and methods employing this result.
The procedure context/5 does not explicitly carry around a sequent. Instead
it notes the position (Pos) of the distinguished occurrence in the term (Term),
the context so far (Context), and how many times K and A have swapped sides
(Switch + for even: - for odd; o if we have both cases, e.g. <5, <-» or any truth-
congruent connective rule). This simple form for Switch is possible since all the
rules are symmetrical in A and K. It will also be seen from..the definition above
that the number of operations required to calculate the context for a position in a
formula is proportional to the depth of the position, and that if we allow for the
breaking up of conjuncts and existentials that this is at most linear in the size of
the formula (a proof of this result can be found in section C.6).
We extend the notion of context to include sequents using the strong conservat-
iveness of the —<-int.ro rule, i.e. we treat a sequent x.\ : hi, x.„ : h.„ h G as
b ij : hi -> ■■■-> x.n : h„ -> G.
4.7.2 Correctness of context-sensitive rewriting
We work in a fragment of OYSTER type theory which is the equivalent of sorted
first-order intuitionistic predicate calculus. Although we may be in the middle of a
proof set in (and using rewrites based on) a much stronger theory typically one
containing induction rules we assume that it is possible to carry out the rewrit¬
ing process itself in this fragment. The presentation we use is given in appendix
B. In this section, whenever we say a sequent is provable we mean provable in this
fragment of the type theory. We also abuse the notion of provability in OYSTER
slightly by saying that a sequent with a non-empty hypothesis list is provable
by this we simply mean that there is a closed derivation which ends in that
sequent. (Strictly speaking, for reasons of well-formedness, only sequents with
empty hypothesis lists are provable in OYSTER. This will not be a problem for our
fragment since well-formedness in it is a (decidable) syntactic property.) Before
showing the correctness of context-sensitive rewriting we require some lemmas.
By simple adaptations of standard proofs (for example those in (Girard. 1987))
we have shown the following for the OYSTER presentation of predicate calculus:
Theorem 4.1 (Cut-elimination) If a sequent is provable then it. is provable
without, using the seq rule-
Theorem 4.2 (Interpolation theorem) If the. sequent. I'd. 1% h G is provable,




are provable,. Moreover, every predicate symbol (apart from void) that occurs in
I occurs in both Ti and T2 I~ G with the same polarity; and if it. occurs strictly
positively in I then it. occurs strictly positively in T1.
We use a corollary of this along with the fact that any formula whose only predicate
symbol is void is either provable or its negation is. We have:
Theorem 4.3 (Corollary) If the sequent T b G is provable but T and G have
no proper (i.e. non-void) predicate, symbols in common, then either:
(i) T b void is provable, or
(ii) b G is provable
We also need three more proof theoretic lemmas. Each is proved in a similar
fashion: induction 011 the cut-free proofs of the sequent mentioned in the assertion,
with a case analysis of the last rule of such a deduction. Lemma .4.3 is used onl;
in the proofs of lemmas 4.1 and 4.2.
<sT
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Lemma 4.1 (Property A) Suppose the sequent T h C\D is provable, and has in
addition the following properties:
1. no symbol occurs more than once in D. and void not at all
2. any symbols of T> which appear in T occur only in the 13 parts in formulas of the
form Yx.B —» K —> A or Yx.B —» A —* K
3. void does not occur in T apart, possibly, from the Bfs of (2) \ ^
'■ 1
Then fhC. (An analogous result, holds for T b D\C.) ^
Lemma 4.2 (Property B) If the. sequent T. C —» D b D is provable, no symbol





Lemma 4.3 (Property C) Assume, that hypothesis list F and formula V have
properties (a)-(c) of lemma f.l. Then V \f T>.
Before stating the next theorem we must define a class of formulas-'commonly
known as Harrop formulas (see (Smith. 1993) for historical-details). We define
this class inductively:
1. atomic formulas (including voi£) are Harrop
2. if A and B are Harrop then so is A#B
3. if A is Ha then so is \/x : T.A
4. -ii A is Harrop then so is C —t> A (for arbitrary C)
We can now state:
Lemma 4.4 (Generalized disjunction and existence-properties) Provided
r contains only Harrop formulas:
(i) if r h A\B is provable then either' V h A or !' h /? is provable.
(it.) if T provable then, for some term t. of type T. T h A\t /x] is provable.
Finally, we need to define the function * used to break up a context into constitu¬
ent parts:
A* = {j4}where A is atomic
(A -> B)* = {A —> B}
(A#B)* — {AjfB} U A * UB*
(A\B)* = {A\B}
(V.r : T.A)* = (V* : T.A}
(3.r : T.A)* = {3x : T.A} U A * [)//x]where y is "fresh"





Theorem 4.4 (Correctness) Suppose. £?[-] is n formula with a distinguished oc¬
currence as indicated. In order to limit our notion of context, to one based on
position only we now suppose that all atomic, proposifimis (apart, from void) in Q
have been renamed, so that all are distinct: and that boolean simplification has-been (]
6ly
^
applied so that void appears only as negation. Call lilts llUUI goal We can I
now apply the. previous definition of abstract, fe.rtilizabili.ty to T. viz. occurrence.
B positively fertilizes occurrence [-] with respect to T\-\ iff h (B —» K —> A) —'
T\K\ —> F\A\. The other definitions follow similarly. We. now prove that. B is a r\^
ftmember of the context, calculated, by our procedure iff the above holds. I.e. that
r, T\K\ h ^[A] <=> for all S 6 context(T[]). T. S. K h A
for positive T\ ], and.
r. T\K\ I- T\A\ <=> for all S e context^-]). T.S.AY- K
trf
for negative iF\-}, where. F contains no propositional variables front iF\-\. K or A
except in rewrite, rules of the form T —» K —» A or T> —4.4 —* A where T is an
atom or the. negation of an atom. ^ ^
<LA
We assume in the following that [■] is a positive occurrence in C\-] and Z>[-]; the
negative case has symmetric subproofs. We also assume that T contains no symbols
in common with T[■] apart from those in formulas of the form Vx.B —> A —> K or
Vx.B —> K —» A. Proof is by induction over formulas on T[•] with the following
case-split according to its outermost connective:
•hr
m = •
We require T. K A <=> for all S 6 context) [-]), P, S. K b .4. Since context([-]) =
{0} this is immediate.
r\-\=c\-]iiv
We require F, C\K]ffD h C\A\ffD <=> for all S € context(C[-]#jD). r. S. K h A.
By induction hypothesis we have V.C\K] h C\A] <i=> for all 6" 6 context(F[-]).
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f. K A. Putting F' = F. V and'S = ,S". P Tfere. we see that, is sufficient to show
ie\ii;
i
the equivalence of the LHS's. This is imm diate since each direction corresponds
to a simple derived rule.
Similarly for the case ;F[-] = C#D[-].
m = cH \v
We require T,C\K]\V I- C\A\\V for all S € context(C[-]|2>),,y K h A. By in¬
duction hypothesis we already have r'.C\K] h C\A] <s=t> for all S" € context(C|-]),
T'. K h A. Putting P' = T and S" = 5 we see that it is sufficient to show the
equivalence of the LHS's. The <= direction is immediate since this corresponds
to a derived rule. The opposite direction is more problematic.
From l.C\K\\V h C[A]jP we immediately get l.C\K] h C[j4]|D via a derived rule.
This now satisfies the syntactic conditions for using lemma 4.1. which gives us
T.C\K] h C[.4] as required.
Similarly for the case T\-\ = C|P|*]
T\] = C - V{-\
require Y.C —* T>\K] h C —* T>[A\ <k=k for all S G context(C —» T>\-\).
h A. By induction hypothesis we have V. T>\K] h T)\A] <=> for all S' Gi~k
context(P[-]). I'.K I- A. Putting P' = P. C And S = S".C? we see that it is
sufficient to prove the equivalence of the LHS's. This is immediate since both
directions amount to simple derived rules.
.F[ ] = C\-\ —> V where V is atomic
We require l.C\K\ —> T> h C\A] —» V <=> for all S £ context(C[-] —» T>).
A h K. By the induction hypothesis we have P',C[4l] h C[K\ for all
A>' € context(C[-]), T'. A b K. Putting P' = P and S = S'. it is sufficient to show
the equivalence of LHS's. The <= direction corresponds to a derived rule. The
proof in the opposite direction results from lenmia ??. J
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T\-) = C[-] - V#£
We require Y,C\K] -> 27#£ b C[i4] -> V#£ <t=> for all 5 G context(C|-] ->
V#£). r.S.Ah A". By induction hypothesis we have Y'.C\K\ —» 27 I- Cp4] —> 27
<=> for all ,5" G context(C[-] — 27), r':S',A b if and r', C[/C] -> £ b C[y4] -» £
<=> for all 5" G context(C[-] —> £). T'. S". A b K. Putting T' = T and letting S
range over the values for both S" and S", we see that it is sufficient to show that
the LHS of the required conclusion is equivalent to the conjunction of the LHS's
of the induction hypotheses. (pO
The <t= direction is iii>mediat(\ corresponding to a derived rule. For the => direc¬
tion: from the desirecPconclusion via a derived rule we have F, C\K] —> 27, C[K] —>
^ £ b F[d] —» 27 and Y. C[K\ C\K\ —> £ I- C\A] —» £. From these, via lemma
( ??. we obtain the respective induction hypothesis LHS's. rfl
T[) = C[-] - 27|£
The proof in this case is analogous to the case when 27 is atomic (see above).
T\-] ee C[-] - V - £
We require F,C[2y] —> 27 —» £ b C\A\ —> 27 —> £ for all S € context(C[-] —>
27 —> £). Y. A h K. By induction hypothesis we have Y'.C\K\ —> £ h C\A] —» £
<=> for all S1 G context(C[-] —> £), F', A b K. By putting Y — Y.V and
S = S', 27. we see that it is sufficient to show the equivalence of the LHS's. This
is immediate since both directions correspond to derived rules.
T\] = CM - 27
Here we assume 27 is not of the form P —♦ Q. We require F, C\K\ —» D b
C\A\ —» D Y,context(C\.] —> 27).^4 b K. Note that on the RHS the K and
A have swapped sides; this is the sole manifestation of polarity in this proof. By
the induction hypothesis we have F'. C[A] b C[K] <=> Y', cont.ext,(C[.]). A b K.
92
Putting T' = P. if, is sufficient to show the equivalence of LHS's. The <= direction
corresponds to a derived rule. The proof in the opposite direction is as follows.
From T, C[K] —> D P C[A] —> D we get, via a derived rule. P. C\K\ —> D. C\A\ P
D. Write P = B —> A —» K. T'. There are two subcases:
(1) B has no symbols in common with D. By theorem 4.2 we have an interpolant
I which contains no symbols from D and such that B —> A —> K. P', C\A\ P I and
I. C\K] —> D P D. By lemma 4.2 we have I f- C\K], from which the desired result
follows.
(2) B has a symbol in common with D. By theorem 4.2 we have an interpolant I
containing only symbols common to B and D and such that B —» A —> K. f P I
and I.C\A].C[K] —> D I- D. Note that K and A cannot occur in / since they
have the wrong polarities and that any symbol which occurs in I occurs with
opposite polarity to its occurrence in B. Apply the interpolation theorem again
to the first sequent we get a J containing only the symbol void and such that
r'. B —> A —> K h J and J h I. Since .7 must be equivalent to true or false either
r'. B —> A —» K P void, which is impossible because of the syntactic restrictions
on P: or h I. whence C\A], C\K\ —> D P D and C\A] P C\K] by lemma 4.2.
QED
4.7.3 Elimination of quantifiers
We remarked in the course of the example in section 4.3 that it is often possible
to eliminate a quantifier if in its scope there is an equality between the variable it
binds and some other term. This was motivated by the following type theoretic
equivalences, where t is an arbitrary term of type T:
(V.r : T.x = t. in T —* C) <-» C[t/x]
(3x : T.x =t in TAC)« C[t/x]
Since we have the OYSTER theorems:
P VT : Ul.Vt : T.VC : (T U2).(V.r : T.x = t. in T —> C(x)) <-> C(t.)
P VT : Ul.Vt: T.VC : (T U2).(3.r : T.x = t in T#C(x)) <-> C(t.)
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in order to use these equivalences in an actual proof we need to breakdown a
formula in the same manner as in the proof above and, at the point when C[.]
reaches the outside and by which point we will have appropriately typed T and t.
show that:
But this would have arisen as part of the well-formedness subproof of the original
formula. [Since they are sufficient for our work we have used universes U1 for
data types and U2 for propositions here; analogous theorems hold for arbitrary
universes.]
We also noted that in order to eliminate the quantifier, for soundness certain
criteria had to be met on the position of the equality. Having described the
notion of context-sensitive rewriting, and with the above equivalences in mind,
one possible set of criteria becomes apparent. Let us look at the universal case.
Suppose we wish to eliminate the outermost quantifier in the formula Vr : T.V\x =
t in T\. where !>[-] again indicates a distinguished occurrence. Let * be another
anonymous meta-variable. If - is in the context of * in the formula * —> D\-\ then
we have the following simple equivalence-preserving sequence of rewritings:
Line 4.3 logically implies line 4.4. Line 4.4 implies line 4.3 by virtue of CSR with
the conditional rewrite (x = t in T) —> (x — t in T) <-> true since we are given
that • lies in the context of *. A similar situation holds for the existential case:
... h Ax.C in (T -> U2)
Mx : T.T>\x = t, in T]
V.r : T. true —> T>\x — t in T\
V:r : T.(x = t in T) -> V\x = t in T]







3x : T.V\x = ( in T]
: T. true A V\x = t, in T]
3r : T.(x = t. in T) A V\x = t in T\
V\x = i in T] [t/r]
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D\true][t/x]
Tims our criteria on the position of the equalities are:
1. In the case of a universal quantifier: if • is in the context of * in the formula
* —» ■£>[•] then one may replace Vx : T.T>\x —t in T] with Z?[true][t/x].
2. In the case of an existential quantifier: if • is in the context of * in the formula
* A V\-) then one may replace 3x : T.T>\x = t in T\ with X>[true][f/x].
Note: a variable may not be explicitly quantified in the goal but instead declared
in the hypothesis list. The same criterion applies here as for universal quantifiers
with the difference that we thin the declaration rather than eliminate a quantifier.
This is the case that is handled by CZAM's existing equal/2 submethod.
In inductive parts of proof we need to ensure that applying these elimination
procedures does not disrupt the skeleton. However, they are positively useful if
the equalities occur in a wave front since they shrink or eliminate that front. For
this reason this submethod has been made part of the unblocking submethod,
unblock/3. In addition we eliminate any quantifier which, because of earlier
rewriting, no longer has a free occurrence of its variable in its scope.
These criteria are certainly not the most complete since they depend on the notion
of context-sensitive rewriting and. as noted above, this is based on position only.
However, we have found it very useful in practice. These criteria also have the
virtue of being decidable with linear complexity. These features have lead us to
use rewrite rules which feature equalities on the right-hand side rather than several
conditional rules.
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4.8 Higher-order wave rules
The rippling process in the example given above became blocked where the wave
front reached a quantifier. This is to be expected since CIAM uses only first-order
matching for wave rules at present. We had a goal of the form:
I- Vx : f. p A q(x) [1)
where p did not contain x free. It is clearly valid to perform the desired ripple to
h p A V:r : t..q(x)
but the current formulation of wave rules cannot soundly handle such cases: its
first-order matching is incapable of expressing variable capture. In order to be
able to perform such ripples we have at least three choices:
• Use first-order rules but allow meta side-conditions to test for variable cap¬
ture. perform a-conversion. This would require careful entry of wave rules
and be opaque to the user.
• extend the unblocking method to handle such cases explicitly. This is ex¬
tremely ad hoc and cannot served as a principled way to store rewrite rules.
• extend the notion of wave rule to cover such cases. This would require
higher-order unification to take account of binding constructors.
For reasons of being able to fell a coherent "rippling story". being able to write
transparently correct wave rules and of retaining more natural proof plans we have
chosen the last option. We shall see below that this brings with it unexpected
advantages and few disadvantages.
We consider here only wave rules where all the wave fronts contain at most one
hole. i.e. where rippling is aiming towards a single hypothesis. We discuss at the
end of this section how the notion might be extended to multi-hole rules. Our
idea is to annotate waves using a binding construct (Liang, 1992) in the abstract
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syntax of OYSTER and express the LHS of wave rules as higher-order patterns
(hop's) (Miller. 1991; Nipkow. 1991)1. Our novel idea is to include higher-order
variables expressing the presence of potential wave fronts in all wave holes. The
result is still a hop. We first give some preliminaries.
Waves are used to distinguish subterms of a goal, and within each such subterm
a further subterm. The notation is used to make explicit the difference between
a particular hypothesis and the goal, the latter containing extra structure which
we hope to ripple out to obtain a match. As shown by Liang (Liang. 1992). we
can elegantly represent wave fronts using a binding construct, which we shall call
wave. The wave front t.[c(x) | is expressed as t.[(wave(\y.c(y))x)]. Using such a
notation it is easy to supply a semantics for the wave notation. We consider the
two (5-rules:
(wave C X) evaluates to (C X) (<il)
(wave C X) evaluates to X (62)
The expression with all wave fronts removed (the erasure) is got by evaluating
using (<51), the skeleton using (62). Hence our semantics: we require that wave
rules preserve the skeleton and express a given relation between erasures. If the
wave rule is L :=> R and the relation is ~ we have:
skeleton(L) = skeleton)/?)
erase(L) ~ erase(/?)
In choosing to use this notation we are faced with the choice of how to implement it.
We can either extend the syntax of the object logic or use a meta annotation. The
former would allow the possibility of confusing object- and meta-level abstraction
and application, so instead we chose to extend the underlying abstract syntax of
OYSTER. Although neither explicitly uses an abstract syntax they are both based on
Martin-Lof type theory (Martin-Lof. 1984) where a theory of expressions is given.
It is a curried version of this that we extend with the binding wave constructor.
'For reasons of self-containment, a brief overview and explanation of terminology can
be found in section C.7.
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[In what follows we use the Prolog convention of giving variables names beginning
with a capital, and constants lower case letters.] We will use the notation x\\M
for abstraction and MSN for application. So, for example, the object level terms
Ax.M. P of x. plus(x,y) and \/x : t.P have the abstract syntax respectively A 8
(x \\M), of a P @ x. plus a x a y and V 8 t a (x \\P).
V fl T 8 (r \\wave Q
We can now immediately express higher-order wave rules such as (1). :=>
wave 0 (z \\A 0 P 0
[In fact this is not quite true: see section 4.11.4 for details.] By using higher-order
matching, and since P does not have x as an explicit argument, we can ensure that
the meta condition that P does not have x free is observed.
After studying a large number of wave rules it was noticed that the LHS always
has the form of a higher-order pattern (Miller. 1991). i.e. free variables only appear
in the form F 8 xl 8 ... 8 xn, where xi are distinct bound variables. This is not
surprising since single hole wave rules have the general form
/1 r-i(Xi) :=>
f [(waveletVIA'i)] :=s> (umveU'w'P1/ [AT])
Miller shows that, unlike full higher-order unification, unification between hops is
decidable. Further, it has the other desirable properties of first-order matching
of having a most general unifier when unifiers exist (Miller. 1991) and having a
linear algorithm (Qian. 1992). We propose limiting higher-order wave rules to
having hops for LHS's.
The form of the wave rule given above is not as flexible as it could be: it requires
that the wave holes in the LHS match exactly with those of the goal. This is not
always the case, even when the rule is applicable. The reason for this is that a
wave front may itself fill a wave hole. [This has led to the use of split and join
operations on wave fronts and a normal form where each wave front is exactly one
functor thick.] Consider a goal containing the wave front s(s(x)) and a wave rule
with LHS s(2l) . These only match after splitting the goal wave front to give
,s(x) with the result that X is bound to s(x) . The higher-order notation
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allows us l,o match such wave fronts directly. We do this by including in the wave
rule LHS a new variable which "absorbs" any wave front in the wave hole. The
LHS wave front would thus be written
(wave @ (x \\s ® (D ® x)) ® X),
where D is our new potential wave front variable. Since D may become instantiated
with a wave front we now have to replace all occurrences.of X in the RHS with
(wave ® D @ X). If the wave fronts match exactly then D is unified with x \\x
and we may remove the degenerate front-
Thus, we now think of every wave hole in the LHS of a rule as containing a
potential wave. i.e. we now have:
/[ ci(\Xj, j) . i.e.
f\(waveQ(x\\ci@(Di@x))@Xi)\ :=> (waveAlwiif\(wave&Di&Xt)])
Note that these are still hops. The translation of general theorems into such wave
rules is easily automated, using existing algorithms for difference matching and
uniformly adjusting the wave holes as shown. The soundness of this approach to
rippling follows immediately from the soundness of unification and the fact that
wave rules are taken to preserve skeletons and equivalences between erasures. We
also assume that the /f-normal form of the RHS contains no variables which do
not appear in /J-normal form of the LHS: this ensures that rippling introduces no
uninstantiated terms.
Theorem 4.5 Correctness
If rewriting is carried out as described above then the result is correct.. I.e.:
Suppose that in the goal G\X] we re.wri.te the subt.emi X using the h.o. wave rule
L :=> R for the relation Suppose, also that hop unification returns the unifier t)
s.t. t)L — X and that the goal is rewritten to G\6R\. Then by correctness we mean:
skeleton(G) = skelet.on(G\9R\)
h erase(G\9R]) —» erase(G)
In the above, we. assume that G\X], L and R are (monohole. wave) hops annotated
using the Liang notation. We. additionally assume, that. the. relation ~ is such that
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A ~ B implies OA ~ OB for all substitutions 0 and terms A and B; and that ~
and G[.] are. suc.h that., for all wane. free, terms X, Y
X ~ Y implies erase(G[Y]) —• erase(G[X]).
Proof: From the. definition (62) and a simple, induction on the. abstract syntax we,
have,
0 (skeleton(T)) = skeleton(9 T).
From property (1) of a wave rule, it follows that, skeleton( 0 L) = skeletonf
0 R).
Similarly we have.
0 (erase (T)) = erase f 0 T).
From the. first assumption we. have:
erase( 9 L) ~ erase( 9 R).
Requirement (1) now follows from (3) and the easily proved (as for (1)) fact that
skeleton(X) = skeleton(Y) implies skeleton(G [X] )=skeleton(G[Y]).
From the. second assumption, and noting that erase is ide.7npot.ent, we, now have.
from (f), that, b erase.(G\e.rase.(OL)\) —> erase(G\e.rase(9R)\)
which is our 2nd correctness requirement.
QED
Note: forG[ 9 R] to be syntactically correct we require that 9 R is ground. This
is ensured by our condition on the appearance of variables in wave rules.
We now note some unexpected advantages arising from this formulation.
1. We no longer need to split wave fronts in order for wave rules to apply as was
previously the case. The normal form is now the much simpler and space-efficient
single wave front form. There is no need to explicitly put terms into this form
since the join rule is itself a higher-order wave rule (as noted by (T.iang. 1902)):
wave ® F 0 (wave ® G ® X) :=>
wave @ ((f \\g \\x \\f 8g@x)@F@G)@X
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and thus we no longer need explicitly join wave fronts either.
2. The presence of the potential wave front Di allows a least-commitment form
of middle-out reasoning (MOR) (Bundy e.t. al. 1989a) where, even after applying
several wave rules which instantiate the wave front around the induction variable,
any number of further ripples are still possible. We start the search with the
induction variable, say x. replaced with wave ® C fi x. We know that fertilization
is possible when the wave front next becomes a pure variable. Of course, it is still
necessary to show that the eventual instantiation of C results in a well-founded
order for the induction.
3. Being able to use h.o. wave rules will extend the domain to which CTWcan be
applied. We can reason about higher-order abstract programs, e.g. fold and map.
in a way not previously possible.
Some possible disadvantages of using higher-order wave rules are:
1. The introduction of extra wave terms. This is not a problem at all since these
only appear when necessary for a wave rule to apply. In the degenerate case. i.e.
when the wave front is x \\x, they are easily removed. We have implemented this
by adding, at a high-priority, the wave rule
(wave S (x \\x) X) :=>• X
In MOR.. pure speculative fronts are easily distinguished as by the presence of a
pure Prolog variable as the wave front.
2. The expense of higher-order unification. As stated above, a linear algorithm is
know for hop unification (Qian, 1992). In addition the use of binding constructors
need not be expensive: the raison d'etre of hops is that normalization is possible
using only reduction which is very cheap. As with t'.o. wave rules, we may
index h.o. wave rules by. for example, outermost functor and outermost wave
functor ensuring that only a small number of unifications are attempted. Further,
it is possible to hard-wire a highly efficient C implementation of the Qian algorithm
into Prolog for use as a compiled predicate.
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4.8.1 Multi-hole wave rules
We have examined f,he problem of extending the above formalism to multi-hole
wave fronts, i.e. front where each wave hole pertains to a distinct hypothesis. The
only immediate way forward would appear to extend the abstract syntax with a
countable infinity of new constructs waveN corresponding to N-hole wave fronts
(wavel is our original wave). waveN has type (o o) —> o o —> o.
where o is the type of saturated expressions, so that waveN has the wave front as
its first argument and the ith wave hole as its (i-t-l)th argument. For example we
would express
as
(x \\y \\plus @x®y)®afib
The most serious shortcoming of this notation is that wave holes are indexed by
their position in the term, i.e. their argument number. We cannot, therefore, use
unification to match wave hole indices, and require instead that an N-hole wave
rule be present in all its N! permutations. The final example demonstrates this
problem. This is not too burdensome for small N in practice we have not
encountered N greater than 2.
Our use of an absorbing wave front variable is straightforwardly extended to the
multi-hole case. As before each binding occurrence of a hole, say xi. is replaced
by Di ® xi. and each occurrence of Xi on the RHS is replaced by wave ® Di ®
Xi. We will use the multi-hole rule
£i+K2 = Xi + VC, :=>
as an example. Compiled into our formalism we have the two permutations:
1 eq 9 (wave2 9 (x \\y \\plus <9 (CI 9 x) 9 (C2 <9 y)) 6 U 9 V)
<9 (wave2 9 (x \\y \\plus 9 (DI (9 x) (9 (D2 (9 y)) 9 X 9 Y) :=>
wave2 9 (x \\y \\A 9 x 9 y) 9 (eq 9 (wave 9 CI 9 U) 9 (wave 9 Di 9 X))
9 (eq 9 (wave 9 C2 9 V) 9 (wave 9 D2 9 Y))




<9 (wave2 <9 (x \\y \\plus <9 (D2 9 y) 0 (D1 9 x)) 9 X 9 Y) :=$•
wave2 <9 (x \\y \\A 9 y 9 x) (9 (eq 9 (wave 9 CI <9 U) 9 (wave (9 D1 0 X))
0 (eq 9 (wave <9 C2 (9 V) 0 (wave (9 D2 (9 Y))
4.8.2 Wave terms
In the following we consider only monochromatic, mono-hole wave annotation
it should be quite straight forward to extend the idea to the polychromatic/multi-
hole case by extending the skeleton and erase functions. We try to take as ab¬
stract a view of wave terms and their properties as possible so as not to preclude
some forms of representation. For this reason we give a specification in terms
of the extensional properties (essentially observable properties) rather than in-
t.ensional (in terms of annotation is the box/hole representation already an
over-specification?). The essential properties of a wave term are that it allows
access to something called the erase part, something called the skeleton and that
these are related by a special subterm relation. We also need to specify how wave
terms are affected by substitution. Thus:
A wave term is a data structure with at least the selectors erase and skeleton.
These are bound by the condition that for all wave terms t. skeleton(t) is a
wave-subtenn of erase(t). The wave-subterm relation is an extension of the
usual subterm one which allows deletions. More precisely:
{(si.... tsm) is a wave-subterm of <?(* i,... ,tn) iff
(i) / = !)■. m = n and Vt'.s,' is a wave-subterm of f,-: or
(ii)3..., sm) is a wave-subterm of ft,.
[Note: strange though it may seem, this condition does not appear to be required
for the definition of wave-rewriting which follows.]
We also need to specify the effect of a substitution on a wave term. Using the
abbreviation f(a) for {< v. f(z) > | < v. z > ea} we require that
(i) skeleton(<rf) = (skeleton(<r))(skeleton(t)). and
(ii) erase(<rt) = (erase((r))(erase(t)).
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From these definitions it may be inferred that we allow wave terms as well as
normal terms to appear in the right-hand sides of substitutions.
[Note: We have required that the skeleton of a wave term always be defined. This
leads to a slight difficulty if our definition is to include hole-less wave terms. This
can be patched since the skeleton of a hole-less wave is immaterial: we can satisfy
the wave subterm condition by setting the skeleton to be some special null term
which is a wave-subterm of every term.]
[Note: we can regard an ordinary term t. as a degenerate wave term t', i.e. one in
which t = erase(t') = skelet.on(t,').]
4.9 Wave rewriting
Since what are traditionally called wave rules are derived from ordinary equa¬
tions/formulas by performing a parsing operation, and since we have found it
necessary in practice to "jiggle" with the results (e.g. allow weakening of a rule),
we define wave rewriting with reference to the original equation/formula rather
than a wave rule i.e. we perform on-the-fly wave rule parsing.
We suppose we have some kind of rule L ~ R which is universally closed. [We do
not consider here unification under a mixed prefix.] We define wave rewriting of
a term /.[.?] at the subterm s as follows:
(i) There exist wave terms V and R' such that erase(L') = L and erase(R') = R.
and skeleton(L') = skeleton(R')
(ii) There exists a substitution a s.t. erase(s) = erase(oL') and skeleton(s) —
skeleton(oL').
The result is the (wave) term 1.\oR'\.
The motivation behind wave rewriting is to preserve some kind of equivalence and
to preserve skeletons (and. of course, to move "closer" to some desired term). We
show that this is in fact the case if the above conditions are met.
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skeleton(oR') — (skeleton(a))(skeleton(R')) = (skelet,on.(a))(ske.leton(L')) =
skelet.on(aL') = skelet,on(s)
Similarly, we can show e.rase(s) ~ erase(oR') which is the equivalence required.
The difficult part in the definition is finding L' and R! given L and R, though
clearly, according to our earlier definition of wave term we can exhaustively try
all wave-subterms of L as the skeleton: suitable ones will be those which are also
wave subterms of R. and which satisfy the match conditions (ii). We have also
not defined what it means to be a subterm of a wave term or to replace such a
subterm with another, i.e. we haven't defined what t[.s] and t\aR'\ mean.
4.10 A wave term language?
In section 1 it was suggested that we could think of normal terms as degenerate
wave terms. If this is to be of any use we must describe how one can perform the
usual linguistic operations of abstraction and application on wave terms and what
an atomic wave term is? In keeping with the rest of this section these descriptions
should be semantically based and independent of any particular notation.
We now propose a wave calculus based on the normal applicative/abstractive
structure of the lambda calculus. We write wave terms explicitly as pairs, <
erasure, skeleton >. and show how these can are combined to cover the whole
language. We start from the semantic definition of what it is to be a wave subterm
in a lambda-calculus type language. It will be noted that we lose the "pleasant"
property of always having the erasure and skeleton be of the same type.
s is a wave-subterm of f iff one of the following is the case:
1. s and t are identical atoms.
2. s is AB and /. is UV and A is a wave-subterm of U and B is a wave-subterm of
V.
3. t. is UV and s is a wave-snbterm of U.
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4. t is UV and s is a wave-subterm of V.
5. s is Xx.A and t is Xx.B and A is a wave-subterm of B.
6. t is \x.A, s does not; contain x free and is a wave-subterm of A.
[It is cases 3 and 6 which no longer preserve the box/hole type match.) This
definition motivates our definition of a wave language. Note that there are now 3
kinds of application and 2 kinds of abstraction. Note that we have the property
that non-annotated terms t. can be simply injected into the wave terms as < t, t >.
1. < u. u > is a wave term, where « is an atom.
2. < a, b > ® < u, v > is the wave term < an.. bv >.
3. < a, b > < u, v > is the wave term < an, b >.
4. < a, 6 > ®2 < u, v > is the wave term < au. v >.
5. \x. < a,b > is the wave term < Ax.a. Ax.b >.
6. X'x. < a.b > is the wave term < Ax.a. b >. where b does not contain x free.
Let us give some examples. The wave term sfsfx)) can be written < s. s > ®2(<
s.s > ® < x.x >). and the wave term .s( s(x) ) as< s, .1 > ®(< s.s > (A-i <
x. x >). Since all terminals have the form < u.u > where u is an atom, we may
abbreviate accordingly.
Does this wave term calculus allow us to describe /,[.]? Does it help simplify the
unification of annotated terms?
4.11 Problems
4.11.1
Are the properties we have chosen above to characterize annotated terms, viz. eras¬
ure. skeleton and substitution behaviour, sufficient for a characterization? Con¬
sider the wave term < (x-t-x)-t-(i-l-a;), x. + x >. There are six different annotations
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thai", could have give rise to this:
(x -1-1) + (x + x)
(x + x) + (x + x)





(x + x) (x + x)
(x + x) (x + x)
(x -fx) (x + x)
Do they all really mean the same? Now consider the effects of rewriting these.
Simple wave rewriting would not appear to be a problem since only the erasure
is affected. [In the higher-order case we will have to consider aftrj—conversion as
well.] What is more interesting is ordinary rewriting. This is restricted in Clam
so that it never changes the skeleton (therefore possibly upsetting a later fertiliz¬
ation). hut we can't immediately be sure how the skeleton and erasure are related
by looking at the wave term pair. If. for example, we used the (admittedly strange)
equality x + x = a, then it would be applicable to the first 2 cases but not the
last 4. In either case the Clam restriction ensures that the skeleton is preserved so
this would also appear to be OK. How could we tell, though, just from the wave
term pair, that it could not be used at the top level to give < a. x + x >? Is it
sufficient merely to check that the result of rewriting is still a wave term? In that
case: what is the difference between a wave-rule and an ordinary rewrite?
4.11.2 Counter-examples
To counter the thought that we can get away with wave-rewriting merely by
checking that the erasure of the rule is a subterm of the erasure of the goal
and that (with the resulting substitution applied) the skeleton of the rule is a
subterm of the skeleton of the goal, we have the following. Consider the goal
f(a,c) + c (i.e. < f(a, c) + c. a + c >) to which the wave-rule /(a.c) :=> c (i.e.
< f(a,c),c >:=>< c,c >) is to be applied. Although one can see immediately
from the notation that there is no wave-match (whatever that means), the false
hypothesis mentioned above does indeed hold and would result in the rewritten
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goal < c + c, a + c > which is not, a wave-term. It is clear what is going on here:
the occurrence of c inside the skeleton is being confused with the one which is not.
We can also give a counter-example to show that naive rippling is non-terminating.





X + c + d.
X + c + c
(4.7)
(4.8)
Starting from the goal (|n + c| + c) + r. we get the vicious cycle: (\a + c|) -I- c :=>
:=S> (|a + c|) + c. The last step comes abouta + c + d c :=> (a + c) + c + c
since we can't distinguish the two from only their erasures and skeletons.
4.11.3
What is the unification algorithm for the wave term calculus like? For example,
by virtue of the 3 kinds of application and 2 kinds of abstraction there are 6 kinds
each of /?- and //-conversion, not all of which appear to be meaningful.
4.11.4 Aspects of implementation
Higher-order wave rules have been implemented for OYSTER almost exactly as
stated above. We have used the unification algorithm for hops given by Nipkow
(Nipkow. 1991) in such a form that Prolog variables correspond to higher-order
free variables. This leads to a small problem in that care must be taken to avoid
variable capture as Prolog variables become instantiated. This can be circumven¬
ted by rewriting all occurrences of Prolog variables that are in the scope of a \\
binding in the form of an application. For example, in the R.HS's of wave rules
instead of writing
(x \\g ® F)
we would write
(y \\x \\g ® y) ® F
and allow reduction to perform the substitution soundly. This explains the
rather long-winded form of the join rule above.
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As stated, after a subterm of the goal is h.o. unified with the LHS of a h.o.
wave rule, the RHS must be /V^-normalized (at the abstract \\, 8 level) before
being replaced in the goal. If the result is a degenerate wave front it is removed
altogether.
The goal must first be put into its abstract syntax form before our routines can be
applied and converted back after a successful ripple. As this only has to be done
once per ripple, or even once per series of uninterrupted ripples, and is linear, the
overhead is small.
The code for our routines can be found in appendix F. Higher-order wave rules are
stored using the predicate ho_wave/2. As presently implemented the annotation
contains no direction or type information for the wave front all fronts are
assumed to be real and moving outwards. The top-level unification predicate is
unify/1. This takes a list of equalities as its argument, and instantiates Prolog
variables if unification is possible. The result is not normalized. Routines are
included for various forms of normalization and pretty-printing of terms.
4.12 Conclusions
We have been able to successfully using ("Pilfs existing method set and induction
proof plan to prove both the synthesis and decidability theorems for several tactics.
We required principled extensions to the rewriting facilities, viz. context-sensitive
rewriting and higher-order wave rules. Using the notion of context we able to
formulate criteria for elimination of quantifiers. With these extensions, and several
smaller extensions, in place synthesis was successful.
We have seen how these proofs may themselves be used as tactics via the reflection






In this chapter we finally achieve the object of synthesizing tactics which satisfy
Clam method specifications, albeit greatly simplified ones. We do this by looking
at the extract from the decidability proof for a tactic (the second form where all
"Prolog"' variables in the preconds are universally quantified) and the synthesis
proof. We use the former do derive a Prolog program which succeeds exactly
when the preconditions are true, and the latter to calculate the output when this
is the case. In addition to this principal aim. we are also interested in using the
technique described as a general means of synthesizing logic programs formally;
for this reason we shall try as far as possible not to rely on any special properties
that the kinds of proof discussed in the previous chapter may possess.
This being said, the immediate requirement of the resulting logic programs is
for use as pseudo- tactics. We can use them in the same manner as CLAM's proof
planner searches for a meta- level proof. If the programs are called. say. pre(I,X,Y)
and eff(I,X,0). then we have the pseudo-tactic
pseudo(l,X,Y,0):-pre(I,X,Y),eff(I,X,0).
one for each tactic. We use these as we would CIAM methods to build a plan.
Once a successful one has been found (simulated) we use the reflection mechanism
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t",o turn it into a proof as described in section 4.2. It may appear that this circular
exercise is rather futile we have gone from an existing method, backed up by a
tactic, to its formal specification, proved that it is satisfiable, and arrived back at
a Prolog pseudo tactic. The difference is that we know that the latter is correct.
As methods become more complicated and theorem provers more powerful this
correctness will be as important here as for any programming project.
5.2 Compilation
Our idea is to derive a Prolog program prog(Tr,Args) from the OYSTER term t.
where Args are f ring holds: for all
serts that t ^valuates. to a left injection. Here t must be the inhabitant of a
specification type: in most cases we consider either the extract of a synthesis the¬
orem or the inhabitant of dequantified versions of such a theorem. Where the
extract comes from a decidability theorem we are interested in a simple yes/no
answer. Where the extract comes from a V3 synthesis theorem we will in addition
want to calculate any witnesses implied by the specification, e.g. the contents of
the output slot. One obvious way to find such a program is simply to normalize t
and check if the outermost constructor is inl. This, however, as a Prolog program
will work only in the mode prog(+,-). We wish to use Prolog's backtracking
mechanism to search for values for Args. To do this prog searches for all possible
values of Args which results in t being a left injection.
The primary notion is that of the decidability of a proposition, i.e. an instantiated
predicate. For the present we consider only first-order predicates. Hence, the
propositions we consider will all be in the universe of small types, Ul.
Such a translation works for simple programs. However, we are working in a
constructive logic where failure, as well as success, of a sub-program can pass back
(5.1)
where isl(t) =def decidejf; u.true; u.false) is the OYSTER predicate which as-
ground substituti
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information. For this reason we need to allow predicates to explicitly make use of
such information. We do this by adding a truth variable, to the predicate. Thus
we now have a generalization of 5.1:
hSLD Prog(rT Args) <=*> t-iArr/s) = T (5.2)
where Tr is a Prolog term corresponding to the OYSTER term T. In order to regain
a standard logic program from this we must transform the resulting logic program
for the case when T is unified with inl(_).
The logic programs synthesized below are quite large and awkward. They are not
as poor as they appear for the following reasons:
• extensive use is made of auxiliary functions. In most cases this is not neces¬
sary (as they are not recursive) and so could be moved in-line. Many Prolog
compilers do this as a matter of course.
• where auxiliary predicates are used they appear to have an abundance of
arguments. This is because they usually correspond to terms deep within
the extract, at which points there may be many bound variables. Most of the
arguments can be eliminated since they are either duplicated or not used.
• the top level type is that of a decidability theorem so, roughly speaking,
we can ignore all text inside an inl(_) or an inr(_). As stated above, this
cannot in general be ignored, but in most cases can.
• these are constructive logic programs. Just as we get a standard logic pro¬
gram for pred by unifying T with inl(_). we get a standard logic program
for not_pred by unifying T with inr(_).
There are (at least) two ways to improve the resulting logic programs. We can
"optimize" the raw logic program after translation, e.g. unify T with inl(_), re¬
move trivial clauses, move auxiliary functions in-line, remove unused or duplicated
arguments. At the expense of complicating the translation process a little, a lot
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of this burden could be moved there: by looking ahead we could check which vari¬
ables are free (i.e. used) in a term and only use these as parameters in auxiliary
functions.
We first give as a motivating example a simple (non-recursive) program, test,
n
to decide whether a given integer is 0 or 1. We have the straight forward logical
definition:
test(x) x = 0 in int V x = 1 in int
Transforming this into an executable logic program starts with its










We can reason as follows. The value of body on line 3 is always going to be a left
injection. Similarly line 5. The converse is true of line 6. Thus the body of line
4 is a left injection exactly when its deciders first argument is. This argument in
turn is a left injection exactly x is 1. In such a bottom-to-top fashion we are able
























After simple optimization described below the result is
prog(B):-B=0;not(B=0),B=1.
This is not a good Prolog program because of the ordering of the literals in the
second disjunction. However, floundering caused by such ordering can Ire preven¬
ted by a simple reordering of literals. The use of not here does not imply a closed
world assumption (CWA): since our predicates are SLD-decidable we can soundly
use negation-as-failure. We expect the predicate inside to Ire fully ground by the
time it is called and therefore decidable.
Having given an idea of what is going on in the previous section we now give a
more involved example. This is the synthesis of the logic program for deciding
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whether a integers is a member of a list of integers (i.e. the traditional member/2
predicate) and involves simple recursion over lists. We define:
member(x, I) = list_ind(l; False; h.t., v.x = h in int V v)
and prove the theorem


































; B= [DIE] ,
( member_dec_l_l(inl(F),D,C),
A=inl(. . .)












Translation is divided into two mutually recursive steps. The first takes removes
all outermost lambda abstractions so that the job of translating the extract Ax.t,
in Vx.fi(P) into a logic program becomes the job of translating t in b(P) into the
logic program body for the head pred(Tr,x).




a — b,l*\ not(a = b), r*








list_ind(/: b: h, t, v.r)
5.4 Soundness and Completeness
One of the advantages of using the existing NuPRL logic (of which OYSTER is a
re-implementation) is its soundness. The implementational soundness of NuPRL
is highly likely by virtue of its large user base. Its theoretical consistency is shown
in the work of various members of the NuPR.L group (Allen. 1986: Howe. 1989:
Mendler, 1986).
We now show the soundness of the translation described above w.r.t. the semantics
of NuPRL. The proof is informal since we need to mention objects both of NuPR.L
and a first-order logic programming language.
Before proceeding with the proof we need to define the notion of a first-order
data type. Objects in NuPRL can belong to a very rich set of types, and cannot
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all be meaningfully translated into a first-order language. In particular, a first-
order language has no way of expressing arbitrary application or binding. For this
reason, although we do not care how terms are used inside a proof, the ones that
we must of necessity translate, i.e. the terms which will instantiate the top-level
variables, must be representable in a first-order language. Thus we define a first-
order data type, (or simply data type) as a NuPRL type all of whose constructors
belong to the set {unary, #, I, pnat, int, atom, rec}. Note that we do not
allow function types in this definition and that all types are non-empty.
Our completeness result is a corollary to the following. We show that if an Oyster
term t. has data type ft and all of its free variables have a data type as their type,
then we can find a Prolog program with top predicate pred such th<it. w.r.t. the
completion! and for all ground terms Params and o:
>> t = o in T
*. «\r I Here Params is exactly the free variables in t. Often we will not need to use all
(\ the free variables to define a predicate, either because they appear in parts of the
extract which don't get used during logic program synthesis or because they disap¬
pear as subparts of t. get evaluated. Free variables may also be implicitly present in
induction hypotheses though nor, present in the extract itself; by keeping track of
when this occurs, e.g. by remembering that, say. the induction hypothesis corres¬
ponding to variable v2 contains the free variables vO and vl. it is not necessary to
keep accumulating variables the deeper we go into an extract we showed an ex¬
ample of this in the merge extract. For these three reasons it is simpler to remove
redundant parameters at the post-synthesis stage, by which time all dependencies
are known. This process of defining a program corresponding to t. can be seen
as partially evaluating the Prolog query ? eval(t,0). Our objective is to give a
"natural" partial evaluation corresponding to the logic used in synthesizing t. By
restricting the free variables to have data types as types we ensure that we can
do this in Prolog (first-order). We could, of course, have written a backtracking
evaluator and used the query given above. However, our objective in using this
technique to realise tactic synthesis is to produce a Prolog program independent
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of a particular system; we also wish to show that this paradigm of logic program
synthesis is generally applicable as in (Bundy et. aL 1990a: Wiggins. 1992).
The proof is by induction on the evaluation order of f. A property of the OYSTER
type theory is that all well-typed closed terms evaluate under normal-order reduc¬
tion to a canonical term. Hence, our induction, whose base case is signalled by t's
being a canonical term, is well-founded. NuPRL's canonical terms may contain
non-canonical subparts which we don't want present in the Prolog output term;
these are dealt with by further reductions which we explain below. [See footnote
3 on p. 100 of (Constable et aL 1986). This may suggest a slightly more efficient
compilation technique.]
We evaluate t under normal-order reduction until a free variable. X say. becomes
the outermost redex. In all cases except that where t is X. X will be, in NuPRL
terminology, in an argument place, whose non-canonical constructor requires that
that position be occupied by an appropriate canonical term before evaluation can
proceed further. We perform a case-split based on these non-canonical construct¬
ors. In the case where these constructors are. additionally, recursive (e.g. pSnd.
UstJnd) we must make use of an assumptions corresponding to induction hypo¬
theses. This form of proof, for a particular t. is formalizable in NuPRL. The proof
itself is not wholly formalizable since it employs metatheoret.ic notions such as
redex, principal argument.
We give the rules for the non-recursive non-canonical constructors first. The nota¬
tion C[.] is used to indicate that the redex of the term C\.] is [.]. All formulas are
to be understood as universally closed.
C\b\L, R/l, r]] = a <-» pre.d\(L. R. Param.s. o)
C[spread(X: I, r.h)] = a <-» pred(Pa,ram.s, o)
where pred(Params.o) *—> X —< L.R> Apredl(L. R. Params, o).
<P[a|L/i!]] = o e-» pred\(L, Params, o) C[fe[/i/r]] = o *-> pred2(R. Params, o)
C\decide(A; l.a:. r.b)] = o <-> pred(Params. o)
where pred(Params. o) <-> (X = inl(L) A pred\(L. Pa.rams, o)) V (X = inr(/I)A
pred2(R. Params. o)).
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C\r] = o «-» predl(Pars, o) C\d\ = o <-> pre.d,2(Pars.o) b = o <-* pred.3(Pars,o)
C[pnat_eq(A"; b: c; rf)] = o <-> pred(Pars. o)
where pred(Pars.o) «-» predZ(Pars,d) A ((X = o' A predl(Pa.rs, o)) V (X\
i A pred.2(Pars, o))).
C[c] = o e-> predl(Po.r.i, o) C\d\ = o *-> pred2(Pars.o) a — o *-> pre.dZ(Par.i,o)
C[pnat_eq(a: X; c. <i)] = o <-> pre.d{Pars, o)
where pred(Pars.o) <-» predZ(Pars.d) A ((X = o' A predl(Pars. o)) V (X\ =
o' A pred2(Pars, o))).
C[X(a)] = o <-» pred(Param.s, o)
Note: this situation can never occur since we restrict our free variables to have
data type type and all rules preserve this property.
t=OH pred(Params, o)
where t is a canonical term. We are done and our predicate is defined as
pre.d(Params, o) «-» t. = o
t and all its subterms must be canonical since there are no redexes present in t.
We now gives the rules for the recursive non-canonical constructors.
C[b] = o <-> predl(Param.s, o) C[.s[P//)]] = o <-> pred2(P. Params. o)
C[p_ind(X: b: p. ?;..s)] = n «-» pred(Pararnn. o)
where the second premise is under the assumption that C[«] = n <-» pre.d.(.... P o).
This rule presents two problems. First, it introduces a free variable v which is not
necessarily first-order and thus may violate our restriction. Second, it is not clear
that the assumption C\u\ = o. although universally quantified over all variables
apart from P. will always of the correct form to close of a proof.
The first problem is not real since we have in Prolog the advantage of arbitrary
recursion: we replace all calls to v with calls to pred(.... T..... o). This way out
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of the first problem presumes we have answered the second: that all calls to v
will will be of the form C\v] for some instantiation of the universally quantified
variables therein. This is not always the case. We hope at a later date to provide
a precise characterization of the class of proofs for which the translation process
succeeds.
Similarly with:
C\b] = o <-> predl(Param.s, o) C[s\H, T/h. ft]] = o «-» pred2(H,T, Params, o)
C[list_ind(X: k: h, t, v, ,s)[ = o <-» pred(Params, o)
where the second premise is under the assumption that C\v] = o <-> pred(.... T o)
and we have the definition pred(Param.s, o) <-> (X = []Apredl(Pn.rarn.<i, o))V(X =
\H\T] Apred'2(H. T. Params, o)). Note that, barring the exception of the new pos¬
sibly higher-order variable v as in Peano induction, both the new variables H and
T have data types as types since X did.
Having shown how we translate auxiliary functions into Prolog programs we im¬
mediately have a means of logic program synthesis from decidability proofs. Since
we are only interested at the top level in whether the inhabitant of the decid¬
ability assertion d(P) is a left or right injection we can treat the assertion as a
data type. [If one wished to be precise we can "squash" the top-level type with
e.g. de,cide(D:l.inl(axiom);r.inr(ax,iom)) which is a member of the data type
(Oinpnat)|(Oinpnat) whenever D is a decidability assertion.] Thus, if t, is the ex¬
tract of our decidability proof, and if pred(Param.s, O) is the corresponding logic
program when t. is viewed as an auxiliary function, then pred(Param.s, inl(_)) is
the program corresponding to P and pred.(Param.s, inr(_)) is the program corres¬
ponding to -iP. We show below how using a delaying meta-interpreter for these
programs allows us to use them multi-mode.
Extract reduction
Above, extracts were simply given. However, these are different from the im¬
mediate extracts of the decidability theorems. The extracts shown have had all
definitions expanded and have then been reduced by OYSTeR's eval function, eval
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carries out eager reduction on all subterms. This is safe with all extracts we use
since none of our theorem proving procedures will introduce non-terminating sub-
terms. We prevent this reduction being applied to certain terms, however, where
we wish to retain structures arising form the decidability proof. Since these struc¬
tures are typically cut into the proof by use of a lemma they occur in extracts as
term_of terms. Examples are non-primitive induction/recursion schemes such as
that for metaterm. predicates for which we already have a decidability lemma and
hence are able to compile a sub-program, and purposely introduced connectives
which are compiled to particular logic programming connective. Examples of the
latter are the extracts of the lemmas which distribute the <S's around propositional
connectives. For example the lemma d_and
I- Vo.. b : U1.5(iz) A i1(h) —> dfa —< h)
has extract . We can either evaluate term_of (d_and) when it occurs or use a
custom translation one translation may call its goals left-to-right, the other
right-to-left. d_and behaves like a higher-order logic programming construct. In
this way such things as modular logic programming and Prolog cliches could be
incorporated into synthesized logic programs if the corresponding lemmas are used
in the proof of the decidability theorem.
Another example where this is useful is in the use of data types where equality is
decidable. For instance, instead of generating an auxiliary predicate which decides
if two integer lists are equal, we leave term_of (int_eq_dec) (1) (t) unexpanded
and translate it simply as Prolog unification. l=t.
Translation is still veiy primitive at present. For example, we only consider list
recursion on variables, not arbitrary terms. In the integer equality case split we




The optimizations that we carry out are divided into three types: those that are
carried out before translation (i.e. on the OYSTER extract term), those carried out
during translation, and those after translation (i.e. on the raw logic program).
5.5.1 Pre-translation optimization
As outlined above the optimizations available here consist of term normalization
and choices over which term_of terms to expand.
5.5.2 Translation optimization
There are many optimizations which could be carried out during or after transla¬
tion. After trying arity reduction as a post-translation optimization it is clear that
some optimizations are best carried out at translation time. The single reason for
this is the form of the information we have available: during translation, at any
point, we know exactly which variables are bound, whether variables will be used
in a sub-program, etc. Thus, information that would be distributed across the
whole of the translated logic program is here highly localized. For this reason we
feel it best to carry out all optimizations which make use of non-local information
at translation time. This has been done for arity reduction, which now consists
simply of checking for which variables are free (i.e. used) in a subterm and using
only these as arguments.
5.5.3 Post-translation optimization
The optimizations in this class that we have implemented so far are:
• Arity reduction: this simply checks for singleton or repeated variables in the
head of a clause and transforms them to a simplest form. The transform is
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then extended program wide. This operation is carried out repeatedly until
no more simplifications can be made.
• Injection elimination: a predicate of the form pred_dec(TruthVar, . . .) is
split into two predicates pred(. . .) and not_pred(. . .). Often, the original
and not.pred will not be used by the program and so can be thrown away.
At present the translation process is very primitive. It expects most of the terms
it is translating to belong to a decidability type (i.e. inl(-) or inr(-)). In these
simple examples this was always the case. However, it easy to imagine cases where
one has. instead of a variable over which list, recursion is taking place, another list
recursion. Thus we need to allow for the synthesis of auxiliary predicates for
calculating such nested recursion. This can be accomplished by adding another
argument to the translate predicate for the type of the term being translated. At
the top level this will always be <$(.), but in general we must provide translations
for all primitive types considered, e.g. int. int list. pnat. etc.
All optimizations, although trivial, have so far been done by hand. These are
easily automated.
5.6 Use of compiled pseudo-tactics
Atomic tactics that we have successfully synthesized can be translated as shown
above. [We supply as appendices the compilation of the earlier eval_def synthesis
and decidability theorems]. They may also be used directly with the reflection
mechanism. There are some tactics, however, where a pseudo-tactic is the sole
means by which it can be used. The reason for this is the limited nature of our
reflection mechanism. First, since we lift only terms and not sequents. we are
unable to express naturally the correctness of hypotheses without giving rise to a
contradiction. This means we are unable to specify a tactic such as strong fertil¬
ization. Second, by choosing to use type theory we are restricted to synthesizing
terminating tactics. There are some cases, for example a semi-decision procedure,
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where we might; be willing to forgo totality for completeness. In the latter case we
can use Prolog's unconstrained search to build a plan from previously compiled
pseudo-tactics but, of course, we lose the guarantee of termination.
An example of such a pseudo-tactic of direct importance to CLAM is ripple. A
simple definition of this would be:
ripple:= wave
We are able to synthesize the terminating tactic wave as we did evaUef and
compile this to a pseudo-tactic, say wave_pseud(I,Pos,Exp,0). We could then
write a pseudo-tactic for ripple:









In this chapter we describe in some detail work related to that of the preceding
chapters. The area of interest might be summed up as "verification and synthesis
of proof procedures". The approaches taken can be divided into two broad camps.
Howe has used the terms "syntactic reflection" and "semantic reflection" to differ¬
entiate between systems which internalize (part of) their own proof theory, usually
via some kind of "reflection principle" in the form of an axiom or inference rule,
and those which internalize only (part of) their semantics, i.e. a meaning mapping
between terms and their values. Since the mechanism we describe in chapter 3
is the latter kind, the major part of this chapter describes two other "semantic"
systems, those of Boyer and Moore, and Howe1. The descriptions below will pay
particular attention to areas which we found difficult, e.g. how met,a-theorems are
used in extensions of the theories in which they were originally proved correct
1 According to (Roycr & Strothev Moore. 1981), Brown (Brown. 1977) appears to
have been the first to use a meaning function in this manner, though not "in a way that
permits its mechanical application."
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(monotonicity), implementing reflection mechanisms efficiently, formalizing extra-
logical concepts (in onr case, CLfiM'a database), and applying reflection to whole
goals rather than jnst. terms within them.
For comparison with the work in the thesis the following aspects have been de¬
scribed in detail:
1. The objective(s) which the reflection mechanism is intended to meet. Give
a historical perspective: when was the system devised; was it a first: has it
been overtaken since then?
2. The object logic, its strength and expressiveness. E.g. does it have (and does
the reflection mechanism make use of) a notion of evaluation/computation?
3. The meta level: is this part of the object-level; how is the object logic rep¬
resented; is it sound and consistent; is it a conservative extension of the
object-logic; the space-complexity and naturalness of this; how large a frag¬
ment of the object logic can be represented and what are the ramifications
of any restrictions, for example...
4. What kind of knowledge can be stored in the form of meta-theorems, e.g. is
there something akin to Knoblock's analytic preconditions? Is this essentially
different from what is possible without the reflection mechanism.
5. Is there a reflection theorem? Is it formal or informal; object- or meta-level?
6. Is there more than one meta level? What is the purpose of further levels and
what is their architecture?
7. What facilities are provided for the user when formulating meta-theories?
Must one first define useful syntactic operations, or does a good supply
come with the mechanism? Can one direct a theorem prover (if applicable)
to help in the proofs.
8. Is there any attempt at the automation of the proofs ofmeta-theorems? How
far does this attempt go (whole proofs? lemmas?) and how successful is it?
127
9. Once proved, can met,a-theorems be used by the theorem prover, so that a
"bootstrapping" process is going on?
10. The transition between the object and meta levels. How are object-level for¬
mulas lifted; how are they lowered? What are the computational complex¬
ities of these processes, e.g. are a large number of well-formedness subgoals
produced? Also:
11. If the meta-theorem requires computation (e.g. a decision procedure in the
form of an analytic pre-condition), how is this carried out? Answer the same
questions for this process as in the previous item.
12. How is monotonicity handled? I.e. if we extend the object logic (with. say.
some new definitions), is the corresponding extension of the meta-level pain¬
less? Is there any such facility at all?
13. How can the meta-theorems be used? Is there a time/space/other advantage
to their use in proofs? Is there a penalty; a trade-off?
14. Is there a (LCF-like) tactic language as such so that one can easily piece
together meta-theorems to form new ones, for example? Is there a "nice."
way of representing and using failure. Could such a facility be easily imple¬
mented?
15. Have any big examples been done with the reflection mechanism? Was there
something essential about its use in these?
16. From the user's perspective: what level of sophistication is required to use
the reflection mechanism? Does the user have to write tactics, prove meta-
theorems, incorporate these in any way so that the theorem proving envir¬
onment can make use of them?
17. Are there likely to be any problems in scaling the mechanism up for everyday
(industrial strength) usage?
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18. (Related to{l) and (4)) Do the specifications used in pre-conditions etc. in¬
volve a meta-level system. For example in CLflM we not only talk about the
syntax of object-level formulas, but also manipulate meta-level annotations
to that (wave annotations) and refer to a meta-level database (wave-rules,
reduction rules etc.). This presents us with a problem, for while the object-
level system is monotonic (when a theorem is proved it stays proved) the
meta-level system may not be (e.g. a proof which Clam finds may not be
found when more rules are added since the search is not necessarily mono-
tonic). Should monotonicity Ire a pre-requisite of any search procedure?
6.2 Boyer and Moore
We describe here the theory and use of metafunctions given in (Boyer & Strother Moore. 1'
Knowledge of the logic and theorem prover NQTHM (Boyer k. Moore. 1979) is as¬
sumed.
(Boyer & Strother Moore. 1981) covers five broad areas. First, the object-level
aspects of the reflection mechanism and the obligations of correctness proofs are
described. The validity of reflection is then proved in the central metatheorem.
The largest part of the paper describes how the reflection mechanism is made
extremely efficient by taking advantage of certain properties of NQTHM's im¬
plementation. A short section describes how NQTHM was used to prove the
correctness theorem for the cancellation example (i.e. to verify the metafunction)
and gives an idea of the likely difficulty of this problem in general. Finally, it is
explained how metafunctions, once proved correct, can be used by the theorem
prover. Running through the paper is the concrete example provided by the can¬
cellation metafunction, CANCEL, for cancelling PLUS terms across an equality.
This work is the earliest we have found which implements semantic reflection
(though see footnote on page 126): it is also the most efficient. Of most interest
to us are the nature of the validity proof and the efficiency aspects of the im-
129
plementation. The latter demonstrates that it is possible to be both formal and
efficient.
6.2.1 Aims
The aim of Boyer and Moore with this work is to allow the user to extend the
theorem proving capability of NQTHM in ways not previously possible. Hitherto,
the theorem prover has been a "black box" whose actions could only be influ¬
enced by the addition of lemmas for use in prescribed ways. There is no provi¬
sion for the user to add tactics, in the LCF sense, to the system. The approach
described in (Boyer & Strother Moore, 1981) allows the user to add executable
code in the form of met.afunct.ions, through which the formulation of "schematic
lemmas" becomes possible CANCEL described below is a good example. In
(Boyer & Strother Moore. 1981) it is proved in the metatheory of NQTHM that
provably correct metafunctions may be soundly added to the system. Boyer and
Moore also place a premium on efficiency here, the intention being that metafunc¬
tions be used as an eveiyday part of NQTHM. Indeed, a slightly optimized version
of CANCEL is now incorporated in NQTHM as standard and has been used for large-
scale problems.
The main obstacle to this overall aim is seen to be the obligation to prove metafunc¬
tions correct. These proofs are complicated enough to make them feasible only
with the aid of a theorem prover. and this paper shows that NQTHM. with its
particular ability in the domain of inductive proofs, can be a useful tool to this
end2. The justification for continuing to use a reflection mechanism in the face
of this problem are the same as those given in chapter 1. viz. that it is the best
long-term hope for raising the level of reasoning in a system.
2Howc shows (see section 6.3) that it is possible, using powerful techniques and
antotactics. to undertake such proofs without the aid of an inductive theorem prover
though extremely tedious.
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Although other metafunctions have been developed by Boyer and Moore (see
(Boyer &: Moore. 1979) for a decision procedure for prepositional calculus), the
emphasis in (Boyer & Strother Moore. 1981) is on one-off correctness proofs. There
is no indication of the methodology for combining metafunctions which one might
expect if metafunctions are to be used as the tactics of NQTHM.
6.2.2 Technical details
NQTHM (Boyer & Moore. 1979) is a mechanised, classical, quantifier-free, unsor-
ted. first-order predicate logic with equality and is implemented in a dialect of
LISP known as INTERLISP. (The absence of destructive operations from this
subset of LISP is further evidence for our supposition in chapter 2 that, even for
very efficient implementation of tactic-like programs, imperative languages are a
poor choice. It also suggests a relatively spartan language such as type theory is
sufficient.) It allows induction npto fo- and has facilities for the introduction of
simple inductive "types" called shells, and provably total functions. NQTHM has
a notion of computation called reduction; this always terminates. There is also a
capability to add arbitrary axioms, though this is rarely used. A theory to which
no arbitrary axioms have been added is called by Boyer and Moore constnir.twe.
NQTHM contains a powerful heuristic theorem prover capable of proving complex
inductive theorems3.
Expressions in NQTHM are written in a Church-style prefix notation, like that
used in LISP. (To reduce the confusion NQTHM terms are written using upper
case, and LISP terms, where possible, using lower.) Since these expressions only
exist as internal representations, (Boyer & Strother Moore. 1981) uses the follow¬
ing convention to relate representation to NQTHM output. The LISP function s
(for solidify), given a representing LISP term, produces another LISP term which
displays as the corresponding NQTHM expression. The notation |x| is used to
*CTAM includes a pi-oof-plan-basod reconstruction of these heuristics
(Rundy e.t al. 1989b).
131
indicate the actual output produced by displaying the LISP object x. So the
suitably well-formed LISP term obj represents the NQTHM expression |(s obj)|.
The original logic of NQTHM as presented in (Boyer fc Moore. 1979) has under¬
gone "certain minor revisions ... to undertake the meta approach conveniently."
These are in the main related to the efficient and consistent representation of
quotations, and a new class of lemma. HETA. is defined. In addition, some uncon¬
ventional forms of axiom and definition are used. All are described below. Note,
however, that it was not found necessary to make any changes to the theorem
prover itself, its heuristics etc., to verify the metafunctions.
Boyer and Moore use a form of semantic reflection, similar to the mechanism
described in chapter 3. Quotation of NQTHM terms is formalized in NQTHM
itself. A predicate. FORMP. characterizes those terms which correspond to, i.e.
which are quotations of. other terms. This is on a par with our use of the OYSTER
type metaterm. The function MEANING, along with an assignment for giving a
value to variables, is used to evaluate or "drop" quotations. This is equivalent
to our OYSTER function eval. Also like our system, assignments take the form of
association lists, the standard a-list being (LIST (CONS "A" A) (CONS "B" 8))
etc. and containing look-ups for all the variables in the lifted formula. MEANING
takes the (arbitrary) default value (TRUE) when applied to a non-FORMP term.
The steps for adding a new procedure are similar to ours: conceive some suitable
term-to-term transformation; express this as an NQTHM function operating on
the quotation of terms: use the theorem prover to prove the correctness theorem
for this function; incorporate the metafunction into the system. We differ in that
CIAM is used to synthesize the metafunction from user-provided specifications,
and in the flexibility of use afterwards. If all these steps are successful NQTHM
adds the new metafunction to the list of things it tries during the simplification
process.
The correctness theorem for a function fn has the form:
(IMPLIES (FORMP X)
(AND (EQUAL (MEANING X A)
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(MEANING (fn X) A))
(FORMP (fn X))))
i.e. thai", for all input FORMPs X. one has to show the metafunction fn preserves
MEANING under all assignments A. and that it produces a well-formed quotation
term as output.
The quotation mechanism, what Boyer and Moore call the "correspondence between
terms", can be confusing. First, the LITATOM shell, with constructor PACK, is used
to quote symbols. A O-terminated list of numerals corresponding to the ASCII
codes of a symbol's name is the quotation of that symbol. E.g.
(PACK (CONS 78 (CONS 73 (CONS 76 0))))
is the quotation of the symbol NIL. The former is abbreviated to "NIL". (Note
that 1 is an abbreviation for (ADD1 (ZERO)) etc.) A further abbreviation is em¬
ployed so that (CONS A (CONS B "NIL")) may be written as (LIST A B) etc.
The quotation of NQTHM terms is as follows:
• Variable symbols are quoted as described above, e.g. X as "X".
• The quotation of a function application is a list consisting of the quotation
of the function symbol followed by the quotations of its arguments (if any).
E.g. ZERO has quotation (LIST "ZERO")4, and (NOT P) (LIST "NOT" "P").
The confusion arises because a second form of quotation is permitted for explicit,
value terms or EVTs (roughly: fully evaluated, ground terms). If t is such a
term, (LIST "QUOTE" t) is also a quotation of t. To avoid ambiguity the use
of QUOTE (and NIL) as a function symbol is forbidden in NQTHM. This second
form of quote is a result of the implementation-level representation of terms and
is explained below.









objc p <1 objd
Figure 6—X: Boyer and Moore's reflection mechanism
The second form of quotation is only possible because what appear to be formulas
in NQTHM are in fact terms. What appears at the top level as the formula FORM
is actually the formula FORM / (FALSE), FORM being a term. What appear to be
predicates are actually characteristic functions. Thus, although (like ours) Boyer
and Moore's reflection mechanism is used only on the term level, it can effectively
be applied to what appears to be the whole logic (unlike ours). Compare this with
Howe's reflection mechanism (section 6.3) where actual propositions are lifted.
Such mimicry of propositions by terms would be difficult in an intuitionistic logic
since no finite truth-value model exists. For example, Howe's partial booleans
(section 6.3) require the use of a third, proposition-valued injection when a simple
true/false value cannot be obtained.
The reflection mechanism is used in much the same way as that of chapter 3.
To rewrite a term p using the metafunction fn. NQTHM finds the quotation c
of p and applies fn to it to produce a term d. Having proved (FORMP c). the
correctness theorem fells us that d is the quotation of some term q. say. and that
(EQUAL (MEANING c A) (MEANING d A)). Substituting the standard assignment
for A and evaluating further, we get (EQUAL p q) and may thus rewrite the goal to
q. This process is illustrated by the inner loop of fig. 6 1. Compare this with our
fig. 3 1. In practice this process is carried out at the implementation (LISP) level,
illustrated by the outer loop of fig. 6 1. Boyer and Moore have utilised a feature
of NQTHM's implementation which means that the lifting and dropping steps are
done in constant time and space and that the evaluation step is as efficient as
hand-coding the metafunction as an LISP routine.
With any reflection mechanism the problem of monotonicity arises: how can a
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metafunction be used- outside the theory in which it was proved correct. Boyer
and Moore solve this in an interesting way. but one that is dependent upon spe¬
cial features of NQTHM. One requires a metafunction to be valid in any ordinary
extension of the theory in which it was proved. This is achieved by separating the
axiomatizations and definitions of FORMP and MEANING and their auxiliary functions
called meta-axioms and meta-definitions and denying the user access to the
latter. The meta-axioms. and therefore the validity of any correctness proof em¬
ploying them, change monotonically as the theory is extended, as shown formally
in the metatheorem (see below), whereas the meta-definitions do not. However,
the meta-definitions are such that the meta-axioms are always satisfied. The reas¬
ons definitions are required at all are: superficially to satisfy the conventions of
the NQTHM logic, and for evaluation at reflect-time where default values may be
needed. It is only with respect to these default values that the meta-definitions
are underspecificied by the meta-axioms. In fact, meta-definitions behave as if
they are introduced immediately before reflection and removed immediately after.
There is no means in OYSTER to prevent the use of definitions and we, following
Howe, have made monotonicity explicit. Note, though, that where we have needed
to simulate CMM predicates at the object-level, and these are theoiy dependent
(e.g. defeqn/2). we too have found it necessary to subvert, the idea of a fixed
definition (see section 3.5).
For example, consider the meta-definitions and meta-axioms for the auxiliary func¬
tions APPLY and ARITY. the only ones which actually change with the theoiy. when
PLUS is the last function defined in a theory. The meta-definitions are:
(APPLY XL) =
(IF (EQUAL X "PLUS" )








(EQUAL (APPLY "PLUS" X)
(PLUS (CAR X) (CADR X)))
(EQUAL (ARITY "PLUS") 2)
APPLY defines the metar level PLUS in terms of the object-level one, and ARITY is
used by FORMP. If in this state the function FQQ. say, is undefined then at reflect-
time (ARITY "FOO") will evaluate via the meta-definitions to "NIL" but one will
not be able to prove (EQUAL (ARITY "FQQ") "NIL" from the meta-axioms. The
other reflection-related functions are similar. After defining a function FQQ of arity
1 the meta-definitions are different:
(APPLY X L) =
(IF (EQUAL X "PLUS" )
(PLUS (CAR L) (CADR L))




(IF (EQUAL X "PLUS")
2




but the meta-axioms are simply augmented by the following two:
(EQUAL (APPLY "F00" X)
(FOQ (CAR X)))
(EQUAL (ARITY "FOO") 1)
Analogous meta-axioms are tacitly added every time a new function symbol is
defined. Thus, the meta-axioms describe the language and meaning of the current
theory for use in correctness proofs.
On consideration, FORMP and MEANING could not have normal definitions since they
must change as function definitions are added to a theory. From(Boyer & Strother Moore,
it is clear that the functions involved in the reflection mechanism. FORMP. MEANING,
etc., are not themselves reflected in the way just described. Hence, although we
said above that the mechanism appeared able to refer to the whole logic, it can¬
not reason about itself, and its "hard-wired" architecture is restricted to this one
object-meta bridge. It is not clear why this limit has been imposed, apart from
the resulting large jump in the complexity of the admissibility proofs given in
(Boyer & Strother Moore. 1981) were it to be removed.
We now describe the metatheorem. For conciseness, if T is a theory, then define
MA\T] as T with the meta-axioms added as actual axioms, and MD[T] as T
with the meta-definitions added as actual definitions. Let T\ be an constructive,
ordinary" theory, and To an ordinary extension of it. Further, suppose SIMP is an
explicit value-preserving (see below), unary function defined in J). The main result
that Boyer and Moore prove, what they call the me.tat.hr.orem. is the following:
Suppose we can prove the correctness theorem for SIMP in MA[7)]. that p is a
term of To. c is a quotation of p w.r.t. To. and d is the reduction of (SIMP c) in
'An ordinary theory is one where none of the non-meta-axioms mentions the special
functions FORMP. MEANING, etc.
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To. Then: the reduction of (FORMP d) in To is (TRUE), d. is the quotation of some
term q of To, and in To we can prove (EQUAL p q).
Note the special attention paid to monotonicity (T\ C To) in this theorem. Since
the use of meta-axioms and meta-definitions is itself unorthodox in logic, the
metatheorem takes the form of an admissibility result, i.e. if we ignore all the
reflective machinery then we have in effect, a conservative extension of To.
Although the metatheorem would seem to relate only to the object-level features
of the mechanism, it is critically involved in the correctness of the implementation-
level operation, via the hypothesis that SIMP is EV-preserving and the conclusion
that (FQRMP d.) reduces to (TRUE). This connection is even clearer in the require¬
ment that Ti be constructive and therefore, by assumption, consistent. For were
one to assume the reduction property when it was not in fact the case, NQTHM's
implicit use of lemma 18 (see later) and implementation are such that totally un¬
predictable behaviour, including a system crash, may result. In normal use of
NQTHM the ordinariness and const,ructiveness requirements on Ti and To will
always be satisfied.
On a more pragmatic note, it is not clear how NQTHM ensures that a META
lemma and its associated metafunction are used only in theories which are at least
as strong as those in which they were defined. It is easy to show that use in a
weaker theory results in inconsistency. Presumably along with each META lemma
are recorded the definitions in force at the time it is proved, and NQTHM ensures
the same are present before it may be used for reflection.
The requirement for a metatheorem shows up the biggest difference between Boyer
and Moore's mechanism and that of Howe's and ours: the absence of an ex¬
plicit environment in the former. What we do at the object level is done in
(Boyer & Strother Moore, 1981) by the use of meta-axioms etc. We have already
noted some of the advantages simplicity (since monotonicity problems are taken
care of by ametatheorem), ease of use. and, to some extent, efficiency of using an
implicit environment in the reflection mechanism, and some of the disadvantages
non-portability, opacity and inflexibility. However, one of the major disadvant¬
ages is mentioned by Howe (Howe. 1988a). Having an explicit environment allows
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one to abstract it so that one may. for example, write general metafunctions to
work on any commutative monoid and then instantiate these as the need arises
(Howe. 1988a). It would appear impossible to provide such abstraction in Boyer
and Moore's mechanism. While abstractness is not an important consideration for
the simple examples to which reflection mechanisms have so far been applied, it
will become so as larger scale work is attempted.
The object-level explanation above of the reflection mechanism is quite similar to
ours. But it is in the internals of Boyer and Moore's mechanism that some of the
most novel features lie and where we most differ.
The form the quotation mechanism takes is driven by the internal representation
of NQTHM terms. The objective is to make the lifting and lowering of NQTHM
terms very efficient. Boyer and Moore achieve this very simply: if" the LISP
term obj represents the NQTHM term f. then (list 'QUOTE obj) represents a
quotation of IS (Boyer & Strother Moore, 1981, lemma 19). To enable an equally
simple dequotation process a restriction is placed on representations of the form
(list 'QUOTE obj): they must represent an explicit value term (explicit quota¬
tions are always of this form). This allows the system to assume that the NQTHM
term represented need not be evaluated before being deqnoted by stripping away
the embedding QUOTE (Boyer & Strother Moore. 1981. lemma 18). Note that not
all LISP terms of the form (list 'QUOTE obj) represent quotations. That class is
decided by the NQTHM function FORMP.
A more general form of representation is also needed for those terms which are not
EVTs. The following is used: represent an NQTHM variable by the literal atom
formed from its name; represent the function application (/ «i... <?.„) by the term
(list F b\... b„) where F is the literal atom formed from the name of / and h,
represents a,.
The QUOTE form of representation allows a very compact representation for the
common NQTHM shell types. LITATOMs are represented by LISP literal atoms6,
"This also allows internal LTSP techniques such as indexing and hashing to be used.
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LISTPs by LISP conses. and NUMBERPs by LISP integers. These are the types
used in NQTHM quotations (see below) and this compact representation is an
integral part of the simple lifting and lowering process mentioned above. For
example, the NQTHM term (NOT P) is represented by (list 'NOT 'P). Its quo¬
tation. the NQTHM term (CONS "NOT" (CONS "P" "NIL")) is represented by
(list 'QUOTE (list 'NOT 'P).).
If the simple lifting procedure above is to apply uniformly, then the LISP term
(list 'QUOTE (list 'QUOTE obj)) must represent the quotation of the term
represented by (list 'QUOTE obj). To accommodate this Boyer and Moore have
defined two forms of quotation (described previously) analogous to the two forms
of representation (this explains why the phrase "a quotation of ..." was used
above instead of "tfie quotation of ...").
Boyer and Moore are not clear about the non-determinism of representation, i.e.
that some terms may have more than one representation (e.g. (list 'QUOTE 0)
and (list 'ZERO) both represent the NQTHM term (ZERO)). It appears that
the QUOTE form was intended originally only for lifted terms but later adopted
for all EVTs for efficiency reasons. It also appears that lifting is always carried
out by simply embedding the representation in a QUOTE and that, therefore, terms
represented in the QUOTE (resp. general) form become quotations of the "QUOTE"
(resp. general) form. The induced distinction between the two forms of quota¬
tion is critical to how metafunctions behave: once a QUOTE form is reached, i.e.
an NQTHM term of the form (LIST "QUOTE" t), the metafunction no longer has
access to the intensional structure of the term t. merely its denotation as an EVT.
One could argue that one may apply theory rather than metatheory when manip¬
ulating EVTs, but this misses two points. First, that one can no longer write
metafunctions in a uniform manner but must allow for the presence of either type
of quotation, or at the veiy least must treat differently terms which happen to be
EVTs. Second, the addition of shells to a theory changes the definition of EVT
so that the current, theory is no substitute for metatheory. These points aren't
discussed in (Boyer &; Strother Moore. 1981) since CANCEL does not need to ma¬
nipulate EVTs, but the same certainly cannot be said of all useful metafunctions.
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The final piece in the arrangement for efficient implementation of reflection deals
with the execution of the metafunction. As with lifting and lowering this is
performed at the implementational rather than object level. Boyer and Moore
define a class of functions in NQTHM called explicit, value-preserving. These
are defined w.r.t. the intension of the function, and as far as we can see en¬
compass all functions introduced using the definition principle though this is
never stated. One of the properties (though not the definition) of EV-preserving
functions is that an EVT is returned as result when EVTs are given as argu¬
ments. Eveiy time an EV-preserving function FN is defined in NQTHM a com¬
piled version called .fn., a LISP routine operating directly on representations,
is also stored and has the following property: if Ci,... ,cn are EVTs represen¬
ted by (list 'QUOTE ofc?'1),...,(list 'QUOTE objn), then (list 'QUOTE (.fn.
objl ...objn)) represents the reduction of (fn cj This property and the
existence of such compiled functions can Ire shown by induction over the NQTHM
histories (Boyer & Strother Moore. 1981, section 8). Since compiled functions are
themselves composed only from earlier compiled functions there is no unpack¬
ing/repacking penalty involved in working on this compact representation of EVTs.
During compilation several optimizations are also applied, including in-line expan¬
sion. redundancy elimination, and common sub-expression and tail-recursion op¬
timization. Since quotations are always EVTs. EVTs are always represented using
the QUOTE form, and metafunctions are EV-preserving, the above property results
in extremely efficient execution of metafunctions approximately the same as
LISP functions. We suggest how similar compilation could be achieved in type
theoretic, systems in section 7.2.2 as well as the more specialised case of chapter 5.
In summary we have the following, described by the outer loop of fig. 6 1. Lemma
19 establishes that NQTHM terms may be instantly lifted by embedding the rep¬
resentation in a QUOTE. Section 8 establishes that running the compiled metafunc¬
tion produces the same result as the object-level one. Lemma 18 establishes that,
under a certain assumption, terms may be instantly lowered by removing the em¬
bedding QUOTE; the assumption is provided by the metatheorem together with the
correctness proof.
141
The assumption mentioned above is that (FORMP d) reduce to (TRUE). This is
distinct from simple provability and is needed since lemma 18. and the lemmas
leading up to it, are proved by induction on reduction. This style of proof has the
twin advantages over induction on NQTHM proofs that: the induction is known
to be valid since each function admitted to NQTHM is provably total: the textual
form of the function definition concerned provides a guide to the shape of the
proof.
There are two almost completely separate aspects to the reflection mechanism.
There is the object-level justification given above, involving correctness proofs and
use of FORMP and MEANING: and there is the implementation, constructed for max¬
imum efficiency. The first, under the assumption of the consistency of NQTHM.
guarantees that the second can never go wrong. The only points at which they
meet is lemmas 18 and 19 and the justification of compiled functions. The meta-
theorem does not mention implementation though expressed in a form useful to
lemma 18. This separation is quite different from Howe's and our own mechanisms
where all work and justification is done at the object level including lifting, lower¬
ing and the running of metafunctions. Boyer and Moore eschew this approach
believing, "were we to implement the mechanical application of of 'metafunctions'
along the lines just described, the implementation would sink into a swamp of
PLUS-trees." This has to some extent been borne out by the comparative ineffi¬
ciency of the latter mechanisms. We offer suggestions for overcoming this problem
in section 7.2.2.
There is a further example of how the object-level explanation of the mechanism
is not used in practice: the meta-definitions of MEANING and FORMP are never used,
i.e. neither is ever run as a function, only their meta-axioms used during cor¬
rectness proofs'. Reflection in practice follows the outer loop of fig. 6 1 and goes
as follows. Lemma 19 justifies producing a quotation by embedding a representa¬
tion objc within a QUOTE, i.e. it ensures that (FORMP I (s (list 'qUOTE objc))\)
without running FORMP: thecompilecLitersion .fn. of the metafunction fn is ap¬
plied to objc to produce objd (justified by the explanation of how compilation of
EV-preserving functions works in (Boyer &: Strother Moore, 1981. section 8), i.e.
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that, I (s (list 'QUOTE (.fn. objc))) I is (fn I (s (list 'QUOTE objc))\)).
which is guaranteed by the metatheorem to have the desired properties, viz. that
MEANING is preserved and that (FORMP I (s (list 'QUOTE objd)) I), where objd,
is (.fn. objc): instead of running MEANING with the standard a-list, dequotation
consists of removing the QUOTE from (list 'QUOTE objd) leaving objd. justified
by lemma 18 and the properties provided by the metatheorem. The only time an
a-list is mentioned in the metatheorem is when the standard one is used to instan¬
tiate a correctness theorem. Thus, by using the metatheorem. instantiated with
a correctness proof, and lemmas 18 and 19, the whole operation may be carried
out in LISP there is no need to run anything at the object-level. In fact, even
QUOTE need not be used if one keeps track of when one is dealing with quotations.
Effectively the meta-definitions are never used and don't exist, being merely a
pedagogical device for explaining the object,-level behaviour of the mechanism.
In essence, (Boyer &: Strother Moore. 1981) shows that the changes to NQTHM
which enable correctness theorems to be used as META lemmas constitute a con¬
servative extension.
The writer of metafunctions for NQTHM has no specific tools to call upon but.
as is shown with CANCEL, the standard corpus of number, list and bag theory
provides a useful starting point. CANCEL does more than simply implement the
cancellation law for PLUS as a lemma-based rewrite might; it cancels addends
occurring arbitrarily deeply on both sides of an equation. For example, applying
cancel io B + (C + (I + X)) = (A-\- (I + J)) + (K +X) would produce B + C =
A + (J + K). CANCEL works by calculating the bag difference of the fringes of the
two PLUS-trees and reforming this into a PLUS-tree as output.
Boyer and Moore say that proving the correctness of CANCEL was "not particularly
difficult." The same cannot be said for the difficulty we encountered (chapter
4). There are several reasons for this disparity. The most obvious is the actual
task: verification of a hand-coded function in (Boyer & Strother Moore, 1981)
versus synthesis from specifications: (The absence of existential quantification-
from NQTHM precludes even expressing synthesis goals in the usual manner.)
CANCEL, too. does not need to refer to meta-level databases or annotation as our
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tactics do. The fact that the logic of NQTHM is classical and quantifier-free, while
constraining the specification language available, makes proof easier. And while
NQTHM, like OYSTER, constrains functions to be total, the lack of quantification
means that questions of decidability, and the necessity of proofs thereof, never
arise. We also attempt whole synthesis proofs, rather than deciding beforehand
how they are to be broken into manageable lemmas. The above notwithstanding,
CANCEL is of the same order of complexity as the tactics we wish to synthesize.
More detailed analogies can be drawn between our proofs and those in (Boyer & Strother Moo
The FQRHP part of a correctness proof is roughly equivalent to well-typedness in
ours, i.e. to showing that a function is a member of metaterm —* ?metaterm. A
small difference is the theory-dependence of FORMP. for example its use of the ar-
ities of function symbols; we regard all metaterms as well-formed and simply map
nonsense terms to a default value. In both cases the proofs involved are trivial.
Boyer and Moore comment that, having divided the FORMP proof into four simple
well-typing lemmas, no further user assistance was required: proofs involving in¬
duction over metaterms, bags and lists were completed automatically; and that
"besides induction, the proofs required a good deal of simplification and the careful
expansion of certain function definitions at the right moment."
The core of the correctness proof is the MEANING part. This is equivalent to the pari
of the synthesis goal stating the requirement that i o. A standard corpus of list,
bag and number theory is proved first, the latter including the object-level can¬
cellation result on which the metafunction is based. Three relatively deep lemmas
are then required before the main goal is proved automatically. In CLAM termin¬
ology they comprise a wave rule, a monotonicity rule and a reduction rule (see
section A.3). Although several "eureka" notions are present in these, all appear
within the definition of the CANCEL function. The top-level proof, again in CLAM
terms, consists of rippling MEANING inward. Along with the forms of the three lem¬
mas mentioned this suggests work on lemma speculation (Ireland & Bundy, 1992)
may prove useful in this area of synthesis as well as more generally. There is no
proof obligation equivalent to the remainder of our synthesis goal (the method
specification) since the metafunction is provided by the NQTHM user.
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The typelessness of NQTHM has both advantages and disadvantages. The ad¬
vantages result from the simplicity of well-formedness: FORMP is much simpler
than Howe's wf predicate, and there is no need for the complicated notion of
type matching or the meta-type mechanism that goes with it. The disadvantages
occur when dealing with the MEANING part of a proof, where NQTHM's type co¬
ercion, e.g. using the FIX function, must be accounted for both in formulating
the metafunction and proving it correct. Fortunately, type coercion is a common
problem in NQTHM and the standard heuristic eliminates the vast majority of
cases.
Boyer and Moore state that no modification to the theorem prover was required
to prove the correctness theorem, and this accords largely with our own experi¬
ence. While we required specific extensions such as context-sensitive rewriting and
higher-order wave rules (see chapter 4) to deal with the increased logical complex¬
ity of the propositions being proved, the overall heuristics provided by rippling
and the other methods were found to suffice. Minor adjustments were required to
guide synthesis.
Despite all the preceding detail about its properties the reflection mechanism in
NQTHM is used in only one way. Once a metafunction's correctness theorem has
been proved the result is stored as a lemma of sort META. From this point 011 the
(compiled) metafunction is executed during the simplification stage of NQTHM's
rewriting process; whenever the returned term is different from the input term
it replaces it. using the metatheorem as justification. Note that metafunctions
are total and that there is no failure mechanism as such. This simple pass/fail
behaviour, as well as the absence of higher-order features from the language, does
not allow metafunctions to be combined with tactical-like operators as is possible,
for instance, in Howe's and our mechanisms one could envisage defining new
metafunctions in terms of others and using their correctness theorems in proving
the new one, though this is never mentioned in ??. However, there is some heuristic
control available to the metafunction writer. To help avoid fruitless execution the
user may indicate that a metatunction should only be applied to a term whose
outermost function symbol comes from a specified list. This is the same form of
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control as used for "ordinary" lemmas. In the case of the CANCEL example, only
on terms whose outermost functions symbol is EQUAL is rewriting attempted.
The advantages of a closely integrated reflection mechanism are balanced by its
resulting non-portability. Besides some aspects of NQTHM itself which are state-
dependent (e.g. the COUNT function), many more are added by the use of so-called
meta-definitions. In conventional, monotonie logics, once a function is defined it
is fixed for all time. The other likely portability problem is the efficient repres¬
entation used. While any usable programming language will have equivalents of
the basic data types used, lifting/lowering is unlikely to be a constant time/space
operation. And the equivalent of compilation to .fn. form will be more complic¬
ated for a higher-order language compare this to our chapter 5 for example.
Finally, there is the burden of proving the equivalents of lemmas 18 and 19 and
the metatheorem for a system. The difficulty this presents is demonstrated by the
space devoted to it in (Boyer & Strother Moore, 1981): proof's will typically be
by induction over proofs (and require a cut-elimination theorem) or. as here, by
induction over computations (and require a normalization theorem). This com¬
pares unfavourably with the kind of object-level proofs involved in Howe's and our
system.
As with our system. (Boyer &: Strother Moore, 1981) uses no separate metathe-
oiy. metafunctions and their correctness proofs inhabiting the object level. But
as noted above, Boyer and Moore's mechanism has some essentially me.ta parts:
their central reflection theorem (the metatheorem) could be neither proved nor
expressed in the object logic, nor would meta-definitions be permissible. The cor¬
rectness theorems as they stand could in fact be used (thanks to the meta-axioms)
much as in our mechanism, though without access to meta-definitions and tac¬




This is in some ways the most closely related piece of work to ours extensibility
via a reflection mechanism and automated correctness proofs. We differ, of course,
in that we synthesize tactics whereas (Boyer & Strother Moore. 1981) deals in
verification, and in the kind of metafunctions we are trying to produce.
In effect, this work allows one to add to NQTHM any provably correct term trans¬
formation tactic, things which would otherwise be impossible to express. Although
term rewriting is a very localized procedure, NQTHM's conflation of terms and
formulas means that sophisticated behaviour can result, e.g. cancellation, a pro-
positional decision procedure. And while the control available over metafunctions
is simple and the overall system heuristic is unchanged, their presence can have a
profound effect on the theorem prover's ability.
Any user of NQTHM should be capable of adding metafunctions. Hiding the
workings of the reflection mechanism and underlying representation means that a
knowledge of how quotations work at the object-level is all that is required. The
user of our mechanism will need to be more aware of the underlying machinery,
e.g. formulating environments, ensuring monotonicity. using the correct definition
convention.
For all the many advantages of the "black box" approach of Boyer and Moore,
mainly efficiency related, there are accompanying disadvantages. Among the most
important of these is the non- transparency of the reflection process. The user has
no control, apart from the function symbol restriction, over how or when the META
lemma is used. Metafunctions, too. are limited to the form described above; since
the user has no direct access to the mechanism he is unable to develop new forms
such as the conditional rewrites and others mentioned by Howe (see section 6.3).
or the analytic preconditions of Knoblock (see section 6.4). The user also has
no control over the implicit reference to the current theory. Finally, there is the
problem of portability as discussed in the preceding section.
We remarked above that we found it necessary to go outside the usual forms
of definition in OYSTER to simulate some of CI^M'a non-monot.onic predicates.
147
This is different from Boyer and Moore's unconventional notion of meta-definition:
Howe (see section 6.3) shows that this notion is not essential and can be eliminated
by principled use of an explicit environment. Unfortunately we can see no similar
means of eliminating our problem.
The comment in (Boyer & Strother Moore. 1981) that use of the CANCEL metafunc-
tion slowed the system down by only 0.5% is noteworthy. Although the heuristic
control restricts application to only equalities and the metafunction will quickly
exit unless it finds PLUS-trees, this is an impressive figure. This statistic and the
fact that Boyer and Moore found the correctness proof quite tractable provides
strong evidence that efficiently implemented reflection mechanisms are one of the
most promising ways of extending a theorem proving system.
6.3 Howe
This section is based on (Howe. 1988a; Constable & Howe. 1990: Howe. 1988b).
Chapter 5 of (Howe. 1988a) details Howe's implementation of a partial reflec-
tion mechanism which elegantly brings together the ideas of Boyer and Moore
(Boyer k Strother Moore, 1981) and Paulson (Paulson. 1983a) in the constructive
type theory NuPR.L. and it is a simplified, type-less version of this that underlies
our work in chapter 3. The mechanism, like that in the preceding section, is a
semantic one. However, unlike the preceding section, here the mechanism is built
entirely inside the object logic "met,a" in the usual sense is a misnomer so
that there are no new reflection inference rules or prescriptions on how metafunc-
tions must be used. This logical transparency was one of its attractions for our
work. It also ensures that the result is a definitional extension of the original and
therefore relatively consistent. Finally, not needing to tamper with the system in
any way makes this mechanism much more portable than the others described in
this chapter.
We have discussed how our simplified reflection mechanism might be extended to
make use of the more sophisticated aspects of Howe's, and how this will in turn
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affect reasoning about, it, in section ??. To make sense of this we now describe
in some detail Howe's work and how it differs from ours. In particular we discuss
Howe's use of a typed reflection mechanism, the forms of reasoning employed in
correctness proofs (especially the major role of evaluation) and their degree of
automation, how monotonicity is accommodated, and the distribution of work
between the proving and running of a verified tactic.
6.3.1 Aims
Howe's aims in constructing his reflection mechanism are theoretical rather than
pragmatic, although aspects of the latter are analysed. These aims are two-fold: an
encoding in NuPRL of Bishop's constructive analysis (Bishop. 1967): and provid¬
ing for the natural expression of new kinds of theorem, e.g. metatheorems which
talk about the syntactic properties of terms. A reflection mechanism is also at¬
tractive from the tactic writer's point of view for the reasons we give in chapter
3.
The main application of the mechanism is the construction of verified rewriting
tactics. Again, the transparency of the mechanism means that, one isn't limited to
this form of use: Howe also describes an expression normalizer and a more general
form of tactic (see below). Like Boyer and Moore, the main question for Howe
is "whether it is feasible to formally verify in NuPRL significant procedures for
automating reasoning."
Howe's aims are quite different from our own. In our case the reflection mech¬
anism, instead of being an object of study in its own right, is an elegant means
of expressing the formal correctness of tactics. The word "verify" in the previous
paragraph is with respect to object-level correctness. This is our starting point:
the tactics we synthesize must additionally satisfy met,a-level criteria arising from
CV'M method specifications. Howe has nothing like, for example, the analytic
preconditions of Knoblock (see section 6.4). Of course, we are also interested in
automating large parts of the synthesis proofs and providing a generic high-level
story a proof plan.
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6.3.2 Technical details
NuPRL is a very expressive constructive type theory. Founded on the programs-
as-proofs paradigm (see sections 2.3.5 and A.l), it has an intrinsic higher-order,
A-calculus-based programming language and notion of computation, and many
commonly used types are primitive, e.g. atoms, integers, lists, and tuples. There
are a couple of conventions in NuPRL of which extensive use is made. The first is
the method of definition. As in OYSTER a definition (called Name, say) of a term
of fixed type T can be defined as the extract of the theorem >> T (called Name.).
In addition, in NuPRL one may in the same way define a polymorphic object
using a theorem of the form >> object. An extra, well-typing lemma (called
Name ) is required in this case. (The naming convention is for the benefit of the
well-formedness aut.otact.ics.) There is currently no equivalent of the object type
in OYSTER.
The other convention relates to the computational content of a NuPRL proof. A
witness for the assertion : T.P will comprise the pair < t.p > where t is provably
a member ofT and p is a witness for the assertion P[t/i], Often one isn't interested
in the p part, and the NuPR.L subset, type allows it to be hidden: a witness for the
assertion {x : T\P} consists only of t. though its proof would similarly require a
proof of Precise details can be found in (Constable et.nl. 1086). The subset
type is used by Howe to "squash" propositions whose computational contents are
uninteresting. It is defined as
I (P) == {(() in int)|P}
i.e. it has the sole witness 0 iff P is true.
The most noticeable difference between Howe's mechanism and ours is the presence
of metatypes in the former. In line with Bishop's dictum on the properties of set-
hood, and because of shortcomings in NuPR.L's quotient type, the type Set(i) is
defined, indexed by universe level. A member A of Set()j is a pair consisting of a
carrier type (|j4|) in U« and an equivalence relation over it (written x = ?/{.4}). As
Bishop's analysis does not require it, and because its absence significantly reduces
the complexity of defining metatypes, the computational content of the equivalence
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relation is squashed. The metatype "Prop" is used to lift top-level assertions and
maps to
Prop ==< 176. AP. Q.P <—> Q >
which is in Set(7) (also called SET). All other atomic metatypes map to types in
Set(6) (also called Set). Prop is treated specially throughout the mechanism so
that one can always lift equalities in all of the other metatypes. Prop is import¬
ant since it allows the mechanism to manipulate actual NuPRL assertions: it is
distinct from Boyer and Moore's term-based rewriting, which relies on the fact
that propositions masquerade as terms in NQTHM. and our even more restricted
mechanism where only terms of type pnat are treated. See also our discussion of
this in section ??.
The indexing of universes above is by necessity a simulation and partial since uni¬
verses are not internally indexed in NuPRL. In this instance indexing is simulated
upto to level 12. Thus, the tower of types Set(i') would have had to stop at some
point, and this and the predicative nature of NuPR.L mean that the reflection
mechanism cannot in general be applied to itself. In practice this may not be a
very important limitation on "bootstrapping". An identical limitation, of course,
exists in OYSTER and the suggestions of section ??. Howe suggests a possibility for
avoiding this problem but at the expense of changing NuPR.L and a considerable
increase in the complexity of the reflection mechanism.
Howe calls his work a "partial reflection mechanism" and there are limitations
apart from those on self-application just described. The mechanism's ignoring of
computational content is described below, as is its restricted form of type match¬
ing. More important is the impossibility of expressing general quantification, or
indeed any binding constructs, using Howe's metaterms. Essentially the metalan¬
guage is first-order and quantifier-free.
Howe's raw metaterms, the type
TermO == rec(T.(Atom#T list)[(7'#T#Atom)|(Atom#T#T)|lnt).
are trees with four kinds of node. Function-application nodes (written "/(/)")
consist of a function symbol (/) from Atom and a list (I) of TermO arguments.
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Equality nodes (written "x=y in A") consist of two TermO's (x and y) and an
Atom naming an atomic metatype (A). The third kind of node, i-nodes, are used
to represent Bishop subsets in the form of injections; although considerable effort is
expended on i-nodes throughout the development of the mechanism no application
using them is given, and we shall not mention them further. The final node kind
is used to lift integer numerals (written "n"). It can be seen that TermO affords
linear space and time complexity w.r.t. translation. It is a restricted form of the
function-application node that constitutes our metaterms in chapter 3: instead of
a variable length list we have a fixed number of arguments.
The dual notions of metatype and metaterm occur at all stages. There are the
corresponding type environments and function environments. A type environment
maps the names of atomic metatypes to their corresponding object-level sets. More
formally, an element of the type TEnv is an association list (a-list) of AtomKTEnvVal
pairs. The Atom is the name of the atomic metatype, and the TEnvVal the member
of Set(6) to which it is mapped, plus an indication of whether its equality is trivial
(i.e. has no computational content). Metatypes may have the form
A#" ' #Ai -> Pa
where n > 0 and po■ - - ■ ,P„ are atomic metatypes. When n = 0 this is treated as
the type pa- Thus, although the underlying sets may not be. at the meta-level types
are restricted to this first-order form. Well-formedness similarly restricts function-
application nodes (see below). In keeping with "Prop"'s special treatment it is
always mapped to <Prop, fail> fail indicates that Prop's equivalence relation
is non-trivial.
Function environments are defined w.r.t. a given type environment. They too take
the form of a-lists, but of AtomSFEnvValCq) pairs, where 7 is a type environment
and FEnvVal(7) consists of: a metatype as described above and represented as the
pair < \P\..... /?„],Pa >, an object-level function, and an indication of the nature
of this function (principally its computational content which, along with informa¬
tion from the type environment on the triviality of a metatype's equality, is used
when "squashing" a lifted sequent (see below)). An environment is then simply a
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pair consisting of a type environment and an appropriate function environment:
Env == 7 : TEnv#FEnv(7)
Howe defines an initial environment 0:0 ==< 70. <">0 > 011 which all others are built.
This has the type environment 70:
"Int" i-> <f(Int),s(Int_eq_triv)>
"False" 1—» <f (False) ,s(False_eq_triv)>
"True" 1—> <f (True) , s(True_eq_triv)>
and the function environment (i0;
"True" h-> «nil, "Prop"> .True , no_kind>
"False" 1—• «nil, "Prop">,False,no_kind>
t (T) denotes the canonical injection of a NuPRL type T with its usual computa¬
tional content-free equality into Set(i). The types False and True are synonyms
for the types void and (0 in int): they are also (nullary) functions of type Prop
(see above).
The metaterms of our chapter 3 always map to values in the OYSTER type pnat.
Like Boyer and Moore, symbols which aren't specified by the environment are
mapped to a default value. The case with Howe's mechanism is much more
complex. To start with, not all members of TermO are well-formed. To take
function-application nodes as an example, both the number and metatypes of the
argument list "1" must "match" the metatype of "f", the metatypes in each case
being provided by the function environment, if "f(l)n is to make sense: and the
arguments must themselves be well-formed. To this Howe adds the requirement
that the matching of metatypes must be more flexible than mere identity more
like the behaviour at the object level. The result is that the definition of well-
formedness depends upon that of evaluation of metaterms. But evaluation is only
defined for well-formed terms. In NuPRL this mutual recursion requires a com¬
plicated simultaneous induction proof on terms of type object before a properly
typed definition is possible.
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At this point the following functions are defined with the following properties
(compare this with our single function eval in chapter 3). For raw term f e Term.0
and w.r.t. to the environment «:
wf®(a,t) says that t is well-formed
Termfo:) == {t:TermO 1 wfjKoi.t)} is the set of well-formed terms
mtypefa.t) gives the ostensible metatype of t € TermO based on its outermost,
constructor.
type(a,t) gives the object-level member of SET corresponding to the metatype
of t. i.e. it is the evaluat.or for types
val(a,t) gives the object-level member of type(o:,t) corresponding to t. i.e. it
is the evalnator for values (the equivalent of our eval)
Making sure that all these are well-formed is the central theorem of the reflection
mechanism which states (note that well-formed terms must have atomic types):
Va : Env, t. : TermO.wf@(«. t) in U A j (wf@(o:. f)) —»
(mtypefo:, t) in AtomicMType(a) A val(o.t) in |type(«. t)|) (6.1)
As explained in chapter 3. a usable mechanism must be monotonic. Howe takes a
different approach to ours: although like ours the necessary objects are monotonic.
often the requirement will be an explicit part of the definition. For example, using
the notation cst(ai,o:2) to denote consistency of environments, and «i@n:2 their
join, the definition of the type of rewrite tactics is:
Rewrite(<r) == {/ : TermO —♦ ?TermO|Va2 : Env where cst(a. «2).val_inv(»@o:2./)}
I.e. members must be valid not only in a but in all extensions of it. The main
monotonicity result is then an immediate consequence:
Vo:i,o:2 : Env.ai C <i2 —> V/ : Rewrite(o:i)./ in Rewrite(a2)
This form of definition also illustrates another important aspect of the development
of the mechanism. Howe has relied extensively on the use of exhaustive evaluation
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as a means of proof. Though simple when it works, it can lead to some difficulties
when defining concepts. Howe mentions in his conclusion that one definition lead
to "serious complications" when it was noticed too late that it did not allow
this style of proof. It can also lead to less general and declarative definitions.
Throughout, for example. Howe uses the "trick" of proving lemmas of the form
V« : Env.P(«o@o) instead of the more usual monotonicity lemma Va : Env.oo C
a —> P{ol). (C is the sub-environment relation.) The advantage of the former
is that when, as will often he the case. «o is concrete but a is abstract (e.g. a
variable), evaluation is still possible since list recursion proceeds head-first. We
have not taken this approach.
For all the above, it should be noted that the monotonicity of Howe's mechanism is
completely explicit. Again, this confers transparency and portability on the mech¬
anism. as well as providing a powerful abstraction mechanism. Compare this with
the unprincipled part of our use of load-time simulation, and Boyer and Moore's
somewhat circuitous and highly system-specific metatheoretic demonstration of
monotonicity.
The lifting of a sequent is a multi-stage process. As with our version, the user
is required to specify the environment to be used for lifting, and any variables
present in the sequent at the time must additionally be lifted. Howe's lifting tactic
(LiftUsing) takes a list of environments from the user. Clearly, the reflection
mechanism's expected mode of use is the development of small, disjoint (there is
a special check for this for efficiency's sake) environments which are combined at
lift-time. Thus lifting becomes quite an expensive operation, requiring a check
for pairwise consistency of all the environments and the cutting in of a hidden
hypothesis asserting that each is a sub-environment of the combined one. This is
quite different from our approach where environments are treated like theories and
combined statically at load-time via "bridging" lemmas. Howe's method has the
advantage that it is easy to add small changes as a library of proofs is developed,
but the disadvantage that there is.a large overhead involved in joining and proving
consistent a number of environments each time a reflection proof is performed.
Ours is the reverse: at the cost of forcing the user to bundle library objects
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into environments as they are completed, the cost at the time of reflection is
greatly reduced. This is appropriate in our case since the same synthesized tactics,
corresponding to CIAM's methods, will be re-used many times.
The lifting-transforming-lowering sequence of a reflection proof is like that de¬
scribed in chapter 3, with the addition of an extra layer to handle types and
formalized in the central typing lemma (6.1). However, unlike both Boyer and
Moore and us. the lifted sequent is not merely a transient intermediary. Much
information relating to the environment and well-formedness of the metaterms
is hidden in an elided hypothesis. Along with a conscious effort to make lifted
terms resemble as closely as possible the objects they represent, this means that
in use the lifted sequent appears like a normal sequent with metafunctions taking
the place of inference rules, and that several metafunctions in succession may be
applied before the result is lowered.
An attempt is made by the lifting tactic to lift the conclusion and all (non-
declaration) hypotheses of the sequent. Metaterms are computed by lifting an
object-level function application term of the form term_of (f _) (al) . . . (an) to
"f([bl, . . . ,bn])", where bi is the lifted form of ai. Like ours, this restriction
to functions defined in the "terni_of" style does not limit the mechanism since any
definition can easily be given this form. The sets appearing in equality metaterms
are lifted in the same way.
Because of his decision to ignore the computational content, of propositions it
is in general not possible to rewrite arbitrary assertions with Howe's reflection
mechanism. Therefore an attempt is made to squash the conclusion after lifting,
using information from the environment about the kinds of the equalities and
functions present. (Although the mechanism is not limited to it. Howe's tactics
are oriented towards rewriting only the conclusion of a sequent.) If the attempt
at squashing fails, lifting fails. If successful, a sequent of the form
Hi, H„»G
will after lifting become
o : Env. (...). val(ft, "Hi"),..., val(ft, "H„'')» ( (val(«. "G"))
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where (...) is the elided hypothesis mentioned previously. For efficiency reasons
the combined environment, a say. is abstracted to a variable a, and the hypothesis
a — a in Env elided, a will typically be a very large term. This abstraction
means that it need only be substituted when required to carry out evaluation.
Lowering a lifted sequent is achieved by simple evaluation, as in our case.
Howe's metafuncfions for the most part are members of the type Rewrite(<*) (see
above). These are applied to the lifted sequent by a specific tactic, RewriteConcl.
taking a member / 6 Rewrite(cr) as its argument. If the result of evaluating
/[a/ft] applied to ~'G" is a failure injection then the rewriting is aborted; otherwise,
for a success injection of ciG'", the conclusion becomes J. (val(a. "G"')) and the
elided hypothesis is updated accordingly. The form of evaluation used here appears
to be a very efficient, low-level NuPRL routine (eval) not immediately available as
a primitive inference rule, specially introduced by Howe for this purpose; it can be
simulated though much less efficiently using the existing direct computation
rules and appears to have become an established feature of NuPRL. Our approach
to metafunction application is identical to that just described, though we have no
equivalent of eval in OYSTER.
Showing a function / to be a member of Rewrite(tt) is veiy similar to the re¬
quirements of Boyer and Moore and to ours. Proving that / € Term —> ?TermO
is equivalent to showing their (FORMP (fn X)), and the val_inv(a®«2./) part
to their MEANING-invariance requirement. Note that val_inv is defined to have
no computational content and so that metatypes must match exactly, i.e. if /(t)
evaluates to inl(t'), then val_inv(<*. /) is:
J, (mtype(a, t) = mtype(<i, f') in Atom A val(a.t) = val(<r.t') in type(a.i))
We have already mentioned the most important method of using the reflection
mechanism: rewriting of the conclusion using members of Rewrite(a). We too
have adopted Howe's convention of making the notion of failure explicit, i.e. when
an / € TermO —» TTermO is applied tawi_metaterm t. € TermO, the output is a left
injection of the result if successful, and a right injection if the application failed.
Howe develops this idea much more thoroughly than we have, defining failure-
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aware analogues of most of the common constructs user! elsewhere in the library.
The most important use of failure is in allowing the easy construction of complex
tactics from simpler ones using Paulson-style combinators. Our work utilised only
a subset, of Howe's: Repeat. ORELSE. THEN. Try. Progress. Sub. TopDown. BotUp.
and Topmost.
Of particular interest is Repeat. We encountered the same need for general re¬
cursion. and therefore partial types, if one is faithfully to implement this tactical.
Since these were not available in NuPRL at the time of (Howe. 1988a) a work¬
around was implemented. This entails approximating the fix-point of a function
(the standard way for defining recursive functions in the A-calculus) by a fixed,
though very large, number of iterations. This number is so large that due to phys¬
ical constraints there will be no discernible difference in the behaviours of the true
and 'fake" fix-point. However, their behaviours are not provably the same. This
distinction is not important to Howe since he is not interested in the specifications
of his tactics (other than that they belong to Rewrite(a)). We have discussed our
solution to this problem in chapters 3 and 5. In short, although we require our
tactics to provably satisfy their specifications, atomic CLAM tactics are sufficiently
well instantiated by the time they come to be executed that any kind of search
(which would require such general recursion) can be excluded it can be removed
to the Prolog level.
Making use of the powerful NuPRL membership tactic and a small number of
lemmas showing that the combinators preserve membership of Rewrite(tt). e.g.
Va : Env.V/, g : Rewrite(d)./ THEN g in Rewrite(tt)
verifying that complex tactics are genuine metafunctions usually amounts to no
more than simple, unaided type-checking.
Perhaps more interesting from the point of view of automating the synthesis of tac¬
tics is how the atomic tactics come about in the first place. Rather than synthesize
them from starting specifications as we have. Howe "lifts" already proved, object-
level theorems having the form of a universally quantified equation. To go from
an equation to a rewrite procedure requires an object-level matching algorithm.
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This is developed by formalizing the notion of various classes of substitution and
first-order matching, culminating in the constructive existence theorem (producing
the substitution s):
\/vars : Atom list.Vti,f-2 : Term0.?(3.s : Atom#TermO list where
(sjnar,?} complete on tj) A s(t-i) = t,o in TermO)
from which the matching algorithm is extracted. As with most of our mechanism
we have followed Howe in this, though we have used it slightly differently: we use
matching to simulate CLAM's use of Prolog's unification when applying various
rules, some of which are equivalent to rewriting with an equation. We have also
formalized the notion of pattern variable differently, having a dedicated node for
this purpose in our definition of metaterm; Howe uses an explicit list of variable
symbol names (vars in the theorem above).
Howe gives several examples ofverified rewrites. These are members ofRewrite(a JQ),
where «_Q is an environment defining the rational numbers and the addition and
multiplication operations on them. In one example the object-level equation
Vx, y : |Q|. — (x + y) = -if—y in Q
is lifted and combined with the tacticals Repeat and TopDown to produce a rewrite
which exhaustively moves " signs outwards over "+" signs; its membership of
Rewrite(«_Q) is shown completely automatically. Another example is an instance
of the expression normalizer described below.
It is interesting to contrast the different methods used to construct proofs in our
and Howe's mechanisms: this is apart from the methods used to synthesize tactics.
An earlier chapter of (Howe. 1988a) covered the development of a principled tactic
library for NuPRL. This depends heavily on the definition convention described
above, and also on the user's carefully updating global lists, or. like Boyer and
Moore, making sure appropriate lemmas are present. (It is notable that the ma¬
jority of these lemmas are ordinary or higher-order wave, rules.) These lists are
used by the autotactics when their default behaviour is likely to be insufficient
to complete a proof. Examples are autotactics for proving well-formedness, mem¬
bership. type inclusion and decidability. A common proof method of Howe's is
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exhaustive evaluation in the hope that a term will simplify to, say, True or False.
With the increasing complexity of the theorems in the reflection library this ap¬
proach often fails. A strategy for overcoming this is typified by the type.atom
"suite".
First the declarative, "real" definition is given, called type_atom® and, as usual,
consisting of the theorem type_atom®_ and the definition type_atom®. This defin¬
ition, though clear in meaning, is either not executable or hopelessly inefficient.
It is followed by a theorem (type_atom®_decidable) showing that the the defined
property is decidable. Some ML code then adds this fact to a global list as men¬
tioned previously. Next, what might be called the procedural version of the defin¬
ition, one that can be efficiently evaluated, is defined using theorem type_atom_
and definition type.atom: it is usually based directly on the preceding decidabil¬
ity proof, and a totally ground instance should evaluate to either True or False.
Finally, a characterization theorem (type_atom_char) is given which shows that
the two definitions are equivalent, in this case:
V7 : TEnv. a : Atom.type-atomfa, a) <-» type-titomM(i. a)
Such theorems can be used to replace "declarative" statements with equivalents
which are more amenable to proof by evaluation.
It may not always be feasible to prove a decidability lemma as in the above case.
Where a full decidability theorem is not required Howe often proves an under-
specification of the problem: instead of showing P V —P. a theorem showing ?(P)
is proved. While such a theorem can be trivially proved, a convention is used
whereby a left (success) injection occurs in exactly the cases where P is true.
Alternatively, an efficient characterization (such as type_atom_) may be still be
possible, most, of which can be evaluated away. e.g. those properties for which a
decidability lemma is present or which the decidability tactic can prove. Howe
uses an interesting method to ensure that evaluation of such terms proceeds as
thoroughly as possible. A type of partial boolean.'! is defined
PBool. == Bool V U
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which allows for injections of known boolean values or arbitrary propositions G U.
Analogues of all the logical connectives, including various forms of bounded quanti¬
fication. are defined so that whenever the arguments contain sufficient information
to determine a boolean value, that is the result; otherwise a general proposition
results. When procedural characterizations of definitions are written using these
PBool forms of the connectives it is often possible to remove all the decidable com¬
ponents of the expression simply by evaluation. Use of the PBool type is made
relatively transparent by the definitions mentioned, characterization lemmas re¬
lating them to the Bool forms, and special-purpose tactics.
Compare the above approach with our use of CLAM when developing part of the
mechanism. The only antotactic used is for well-formedness subgoals (which CLAM
does not examine in any case). Instead of a decidability tactic, for example. CLAM
was used to plan decidability proofs using only definitions and a small, constant
set of chaining lemmas (see section 4.6). Of course, in other contexts exhaustive
evaluation was often the most effective means of proof.
As mentioned previously, one of the attractions of Howe's mechanism over Boyer
and Moore's was its transparency, it's core implementation being completely object-
level. Essentially all it does is provide a mapping from metaterms to the objects
they represent. Howe demonstrates the flexibility this engenders with two further
quite different forms of meta-procedure.
To define rewriting meta-procedures Howe used the type Rewrite(a). He defines a
more general class of meta-procedures which apply to the whole of a lifted sequent,
the hypotheses being represented as a list of metaterms:
Complete(a) == {t : Pro]LTerm(a)\t(a)}list —» concl : PropTerrn(a) —» ? | (concl(a))
where PropTerrn(a) defines a class of metaterms whose metatype is "Prop", and
t,(a) abbreviates val(a.t). A different tactic (ApplyCompleteTac) is used to apply
members of Complete(a): Howe gives the example of an equality procedure which
decides whether the equality in the conclusion follows from equalities amongst the
hypotheses and the laws of symmetry and transitivity.
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This is very interesting from our point of view since we have already noted the
limitations imposed by our choice of synthesizing only rewrite tactics, in particular
the impossibility of a fertilization tactic in such a setting. Completed) suggests
a way of proceeding to sequent-level tactics with little extra work or added com¬
plication to synthesis proofs; we comment further on this in chapter 7.
The second example of Howe's is an expression normalizer. This takes terms in a
commutative monoid (whose definition Howe formalizes) and produces a normal
form by sorting the components and eliminating the identity operator where pos¬
sible. The order used to perform the sort is taken from the order in which declar¬
ations occur in the hypothesis list and is available to the metafunction via its en¬
vironment argument. Howe shows that the normalizer is a member of Rewrite(a)
when a includes a suitable commutative monoid.
6.3.3 Summary
It was explained above that in many places in the development of Howe's reflection
mechanism, to keep what is already complex manageable, the subset type is used
in place of the product type. In particular the decision to ignore computational
content in the definition of Set(i) and in the definition of value-invariance as part
of Rewrite(a) ensures that only terms without computational content may be re¬
written. This is unfortunate since the important uses of constructive type theory
(and goals of proof planning) include formal program verification and synthesis,
where computational content is significant. Although this consideration is imma¬
terial in our simplified mechanism, we feel it to Ire a prerequisite for a full-scale
system for tactic synthesis. This is discussed in more detail in section ??. Note
that the notion of preserving computational content is not applicable to NQTHM
and Boyer and Moore's work.
As we have noted already in several places, while Howe and Boyer and Moore
both have the goal of sound extensibility, their approaches are quite different in
emphasis one could say theoretical elegance vs pragmatism. Howe notes that
there are possible problems with his mechanism in practice, for example the time
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taken to lift and drop sequents (typically > 90% of the expense of a reflection
proof), problems with the continual reproving of well-formedness snbgoals (an
inherent problem of the NuPRL type theory), and the expense of maintaining the
hidden hypothesis in a lifted sequent. He also notes that running NuPRL programs
is quite inefficient but that this may not be a fundamental problem, related more
to the naive and unoptimized evaluation algorithm and NuPRL's being written
in an old implementation of ML. Boyer and Moore have shown that very efficient
reflection mechanisms are possible (see section 6.2). Howe also does not indicate
a means of using meta-procedures as an everyday part of NuPRL. for instance
how they might be used as standard lemmas are by the various autotactics. In
contrast, Boyer and Moore concentrate almost wholly on making their mechanism
very efficient and hiding the details from the user so that a metatheorem, once
proved, is seamlessly incorporated into NQTHM's "black box" and used much
like any other lemma. It would seem that this trade-off between transparency of
mechanism and ease of use is hard to avoid.
Howe considers that there remains too the problem of inflexibility of type-matching
at the meta-level in his mechanism, which was mentioned briefly above. To achieve
flexibility, however, one must choose between two problematic courses: perform
most of the type-matching at run-time, thereby undoing one of the main attrac¬
tions of using reflection in the first place ("proof compilation"); or reflect a large
part of the object-level typing rules, thereby losing the attractive simplicity of se¬
mantic reflection. This is likely to remain a problem in non-strongly-typed theories
such as NuPRL. In the proofs for which CU'M has been used upt.o the present,
type flexibility is not important.
A significant difference between our mechanism and Howe's is our need to refer to
meta-level data. For example, because ClfiM uses, say, the predicate f unc_defeqn/3
to look up defining equations, our tactic specifications, and the resulting synthes¬
ized tactics, must interact with an analogue at the object-level (def_eqn). This
leads to the problems with ensuring monotonicity described in sections 3.4.2 and
3.5. Howe's metafunctions, on the other hand, apart from the requirement that
they be value-invariant, have to satisfy no other specification at all. Unlike Howe
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we also use meta-level annotations in our lifted terms, such as those indicating
wave fronts and holes, and synthesize tactics which act upon and manipulate
them.
Besides this difference in the nature of tactic synthesized and Howe lifts his
atomic tactics from already proved equations rather than synthesizing them from
specifications as we do we also" differ from Howe in the kind of automation
employed to help with proof. Howe has developed several powerful tactics, and
clever though specific techniques such as use of the "aiQao" form and partial
booleans. which enable large and tedious parts of the proof to be dispensed with. It
is noticeable though that instances of induction must be done by hand. We instead
have tried to tell a high-level stoiy using CLAM and proof plans, particularly for
induction proofs, using methods which apply across a wide variety of contexts and
logics.
We have shown the need for at least a restricted form of higher-order rewriting in
section 4.8. and quantifier manipulation is quite extensive in present-day CLAM
methods. Thus a mechanism capable of fully reflecting current CLAM proofs will
need a metaterm syntax considerably richer than Howe's. If we are eventually
to synthesize tactics such as CLW presently uses then a reflection mechanism
at least comparable to Howe's will be necessary. The problems outlined in this
section therefore remain to be solved to achieve this goal.
6.4 Knoblock
This section is based on (Knoblock. 1987: Knoblock & Constable, 1986) in which
three reflective systems are studied.
Like Howe. Knoblock attempts to formalize part of. in this case nearly all. the
NuPRL logic. In contrast to Howe, who does this insult: NuPRL by partial self-
reflection. Knoblock augments NuPRL with rules describing the proof theory of
NuPRL to obtain a separate metatheory he calls Metaprl. This is syntactic re¬
flection. Calling NuPRL PRL° and Metaprl PRL1, Knoblock generalizes the idea
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to obtain a hierarchy PRL'. for i € u>. where each theory is the metatheory of its
predecessor. In (Knoblock & Constable, 1986) a third system whereby PRL" is
partially reflected into itself via a reflection principle is also discussed.
All three systems are of interest since each is capable of supporting tactic synthesis.
Indeed, one main motivation of this work is to replace the informal meta-language
ML of NuPRL with a formal one, Metaprl, very much like NuPRL itself. If this
goal were achieved one would have a unified language for object- and meta-theory,
and the attendant reduction in duplicated effort. It is Knoblock's intention that
all things previously external to NnPRL proofs, such as tactics, the library mech¬
anism. definition mechanism, and certain anomalous inference rules, be carried
out instead in Metaprl.
The other main goal of this work is to raise the level of reasoning at which proofs
are conducted. The main idea here is to prove that satisfaction of an "analytic
condition" possibly in quite abstract and high-level terms akin to normal math¬
ematical discourse is sufficient for the successful application of a formal tac¬
tic. Since these conditions, in the form of applicability predicates, may be much
cheaper to compute than actually carrying out. a primitive proof (see p. 3 for an
example), forms of reasoning which are impractical using the traditional tactic-
based approach (which must in the end perform proof at the primitive inference
rule level) may come into scope. This notion is reminiscent of a formal version of
proof planning and woidd serve as an elegant foundation for our work. However,
while (Knoblock. 1987) gives a precise description of Metaprl it appears that no
implementation exists.
Since Knoblock's goal is to formalize anything a tactic is capable of. a full, reflected
proof theory of NuPRL is required. Since it is not possible to do this in NuPRL
itself and remain consistent, a separate metatheory, Metaprl. is used. Metaprl
contains all the terms and rules of NuPRL plus new rules specific to the meta¬
theory. More precisely, Knoblock adds the new types charstring, ident. term",
rule" and proof", which represent their NuPRL namesakes, and the new operat¬
ors applies")-. •) and subgoals"(-. •), which represent NuPRL proof refinements.
All other necessary notions can be defined in terms of these.
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The reflection mechanism is centred upon the idea that irreducible members of the
Metaprl type proof" are in one-to-one correspondence with complete primitive
NuPRL proofs. Thus one has a bi-direction reflection principle of the form
»1proof_of"( "it")
»°it
where >>' is the PRL" turnstile and proof_of"(.s) = {p : proof°|goal"(/)) =
,s in sequent"}. It is not clear whether the principle has the status of a formal
rule. In (Knoblock. 1987) Knoblock says that "it is the system that implements
the correspondence" and that switching between the two levels is carried out from
within the proof editor, that "NuPRL proofs as conventionally written are just
an alternative syntax, a different notation for constructions in the type proof" in
Metaprl." This last suggestion resembles Boyer and Moore's idea whereby terms
and their quotations have identical representations as long as one remembers which
level is being referred to. We discuss this further in section 7.2.2.
The validity of the reflection principle above is shown in (Knoblock. 1987) by
defining successively the obvious bijections between NuPRL terms and canonical
members of term", rules and rule", and proofs and proof". This leads to proofs
that Metaprl is adequate that if w is a NuPRL proof of it then there is a
corresponding Metaprl term T 6 proof_of"("ir") and faithful for every
Metaprl term p € proof_of°("it" ) there is a NuPR.L proof *• such that f = p 6
proof_of"( "it" ) for NuPRL. thus justifying the reflection principle in each
direction. Metaprl is also shown to be consistent relative to NuPRL by defining a
function embedding the former in the latter and showing that, under this mapping,
Metaprl is a conservative extension of NuPRL.
Having formalized the notion of primitive NuPRL proof. Knoblock turns to formal¬
izing tactics: functions which construct proofs. He divides these into three classes:
complete, partial and search tactics.
Complete tactics correspond to derived axioms of NuPRL in the sense that they
construct complete proofs, i.e. with no remaining open subgoals. They are classi¬
fied in terms of their applicability predicates P so that
c_tactic"(P) := ,s : {s : sequent"|J>(.s)} —» proof_of°(.s)
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These correspond most; closely to our synf.hetic tactics, the method pre-condition
constituting the applicability predicate.
Partial tactics correspond to derived rules of NuPRL in the sense that they con¬
struct proof's which may contain open subgoals. This requires a notion of partial
proof and. for reasons of efficiency computing open subgoals, a notion of validation
similar to LCF's (see section 2.2). Thus we have:
prf_of°(s) := r; : sequent" list X validation"(r/. s)
validation"(/7, a) := proofs_of°(g) —» proof_of"(.s)
and the type of partial tactics:
p_tactic°(T>) := s : {s : sequent°|P(.s)} —» prf_of"(.s)
The applicability predicates of complete and partial tactics are used in the same
way. Knoblock envisages that these will typically be decidable. as we do, and that
the system will have available proofs of this whose extracts can be computed to
determine whether a tactic is applicable to a given sequent. If there is no such
proof then the onus for proving »1P("cj") falls to the user. If a tactic is found
to apply then in the case of a complete tactic, unless an explicit proof is required
rather than merely the guarantee that one could be constructed, no more work is
required. The case for partial tactics is similar except that the list of subgoals ((/)
will also need to be computed.
Search tactics correspond to the traditional LCF notion of tactic: they attempt to
directly construct proofs and signal failure when something goes wrong. The usual
sum type representation of failure is used, allowing combination via analogues of
the traditional tacticals (see (Howe. 1988a) and chapter 3). These tactics have the
type:
s_tactic" := s : sequent" —> ?prf_of(s)
The rationale behind search tactics is that for some proof procedures there may
be no better way of deciding success than what amounts to building a proof. Thus
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there is no advantage to be gained from putting this cheek into an applicability
predicate; there may even Vie a duplication of effort if one had to anyway construct
a proof later.
(Knoblock, 1987; Knoblock & Constable. 1986) are intended as foundational stud¬
ies and few applications are given. However. Knoblock does show how tactics
corresponding to primitive refinement rules can be easily built as well as a simple
well-formedness tactic. It is also shown how partial proofs can be formally grafted
together and, hence, how complete and partial tactics may be composed. In this
way the synthesis of NuPRL tactics becomes theorem proving in Metaprl. By
using a suitably modified proof editor one can build partial tactics by "emulating
the proof that the [corresponding] rule is derived."
It will be noticed that tactics as defined above make no reference to an environment
argument. As was mentioned. Knoblock intends that the library and definition
mechanisms and use of lemmas be carried out in Metaprl so that members of
proof0 are stand-alone, type theoretic truths. Yet tactics which operate at a high
or abstract level could Ire expected to refer to a library and in this sense to Ire
environment-dependent, but it is never made clear how this is to be formalized
in Metaprl. In other words, monotonicity. while likely to be a problem, is never
discussed. This problem is addressed in later work on Metaprl by different authors
(Allen. 1990).
We have already mentioned the two main advantages of Metaprl: a unified object-
and meta-language: and that in many cases one need not construct an explicit
proof, merely show instead that the applicability predicate is satisfied. The latter
of course requires that one has proved beforehand that a putative tactic is a
member of c_tactic(T) or p_tactic(.P). this burden being similar to that of the
other correctness proofs mentioned in this chapter.
The cases mentioned above where there may be no need to build a proof (i.e.
compute an irreducible member of proof") are when the computational content,
if any: is not required. To this end Knoblock classifies the premises of formalized
inference rules as computational or nan-computational according to whether their
extracts appear in the extract of the conclusion, and extends the classification to
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branches of proofs. Thus, when extract,ing a witness from a complete proof only
the computational branches need be constructed. This leads Knoblock to suggest
that tactic reduction should be lazy resulting in "proof on demand". This idea
is particularly attractive for well-formedness tactics since such proofs are non-
computational and are an important factor affecting practical use of NuPRL (see
Howe's comments in section 6.3).
The reasons for NuPRL s requiring Metaprl apply equally to Metaprl itself, and
so on. Thus Knoblock generalizes the idea to a cumulative hierarchy of formal
type theories, PRL*. where one has roughly:
PRL° = NuPRL
PR.L'+1 = PRL' + metatheory of PR.L'
The metatheory is generalized in the obvious way so that one has new types term',
proof*, c.tactic' etc. in PULL and the reflection principle
>>-'proof _of *( "<t" )
»'<T
for j > i.
With all PRL's being so similar the reasoning methods employed in each are
correspondingly similar. However, there is the serious problem that each PRL'
requires its own set of tactics. For example, a member of proof1 will not in
general be a member of proof0. Knoblock shows how to trivially "lift" tactics
by strengthening the applicability predicate or simulating higher level proofs, but
neither of these approaches solves the general problem. Knoblock conjectures
that this may not be a hindrance in practice since only the first few levels of the
hierarchy will ever be used, e.g. one could prove all tactics in PRL4. say. and use
them at all levels below.
Acknowledging the "intellectual burden" of working in a hierarchy, and perhaps
the problem of generalizing tactics across levels. (Knoblock & Constable. 1986)
suggests a third approach of partial self-reflection of NuPRL. Since a general self-
reflection principle is not possible while retaining consistency. Knoblock finds it
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convenient to stratify the principle according to proof level', proof, is defined as
a subtype of proof0 which represents level i proofs, and the other new types
and functions of Metaprl are stratified in the same way. The main result of
(Knoblock &: Constable, 1986) is a metatheorem justifying a self-reflection prin¬
ciple. However, only an outline of the proof is provided and (Howe, 1988a) states
that it was never completed. In (Knoblock. 1987) the self-reflect ion approach is
deemed "too complicated and cumbersome for practical use." and appears to have
been abandoned.
6.4.1 Summary
(Knoblock. 1987; Knoblock &: Constable, 1986) are theoretical studies and are not
concerned directly with tactic synthesis or the automation of this. The work is rel¬
evant to ours insofar as it provides an elegant framework for a much more general
and complete form of tactic synthesis than we have attempted; the use of an ap¬
plicability predicate influenced the eventual form of our tactics. However, we have
mentioned above that the lack of any mechanism for dealing with monotonicity is
a serious practical drawback affecting especially the extent to which abstraction
of tactics is possible.
While Knoblock's reflection of a full proof theory for NuPRL has the obvious
attractions of completeness and generality when compared against our use of se¬
mantic reflection, the very complexity of NuPRL over 100 inference rules, com¬
plicated notion of proof militates against it. This may also be a factor in the
non-implementation of Metaprl and would certainly affect the task of automat¬
ing synthesis. There is also the question, common to our and Howe's work also,
of whether NuPRL is a suitable programming language for tactics. Knoblock's
view, like ours, is that only "a complete implementation and extensive use" can
test the hypothesis, hut that "NuPRL logic provides an excellent framework for
metamathematical extensibility."
'A proof whoso greatest occurring universe is less than Ui is called a le-vcl v proof
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6.5 Weyhrauch and FOL
This section is based on (Aiello & Weyhrauch, 1980; Weyhrauch, 1980; Weyhrauch, 1982).
While (".his work hasn't, directly influenced ours, several ideas originate here which
have been taken for granted by later work in the area. (Weyhrauch. 1980), for
example, is the earliest example of an imple.me.nted reflection mechanism, showing
both the feasibility and attractiveness of the idea. It is important from the AI
standpoint in emphasizing that reasoning and knowledge representation should
take place in a metatheory as well as the object theory.
(Weyhrauch. 1980). as an informal "ideas" paper, is more concerned with lay¬
ing out the main aims of FOL simulating aspects of human reasoning, the
importance of LS pairs for knowledge representation, use of a metatheory and
reflection principles, and self-reflection in the structure META than with cor¬
rectness. The latter is addressed to some extent in (Aiello & Weyhrauch, 1980)
and (Weyhrauch. 1982). FOL has been re-implemented and the ideas extended in
(Giunchiglia & Traverso. 1990).
FOL is a classical first-order predicate calculus proof checker with some interesting
additions. Logical theories are represented as LS pairs (later called contexts). L.
the language, is the usual declaration of syntax. S. or SS, the simulation struc¬
ture, is the mechanical analogue of a model of L. The latter consists of a set
of algorithms, here in the form of LISP routines, which may by the act of se¬
mantic attachment at the discretion of the user give an "effective" rendering of
the domain, function and predicate symbols of L. LS "pairs" also have a third com¬
ponent. F. consisting of the facts or axioms of the theory. Semantic attachment
is compounded with rewriting by a set of equations/equivalences to provide eval¬
uation in FOL. The notion of a simulation structure is motivated by Weyhrauch's
belief that in AI all aspects of a logic should be (at least partly) mechanizable.
— As implemented here, however, there is the severe problem that the semantically
attached code in S need not satisfy the axioms of F. resulting in inconsistency.
Note that semantic attachment is quite different from Boyer and Moore's use of
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compiled explicit value-preserving functions (see section 6.2) which are proved in
(Boyer &: Strother Moore. 1981) to satisfy their object-level definitions.
We believe that the notions of simulation structure and semantic, attachment are
unnecessary. If one wishes to reason about the structures denoted by a language
then this should be by formalization in a constructive theory, such as NuPRL.
not attachments to an informal programming language. It appears that semantic
attachment is not an essential aspect of the reflection mechanism here but merely a
substitute for the intrinsic notion of computation which classical logic traditionally
lacks. Boyer and Moore's NQTHM (Boyer &; Moore, 1979) makes up for this by
having a principle of definition whereby the axioms defining a function can be used
to give it a computational sense. In NuPRL (Constable e.t al 1986) computation
is an intrinsic notion.
The user is able to direct FOL's attention to any particular LS pair, of which there
may be any number. Among these LS pairs Weyhranch defines a distinguished one
called META. This is a theory of LS pairs. With an axiomatization of the proof
theory of FOL. pre-defined predicates such as TERM. WFF and THEOREM, and
semantic attachments to the representations of terms, formulas, etc. used in FOL
to implement LS pairs, it serves as the metatheory of an ordinary theory8. META




This is syntactic reflection. Typically a metatheorem (like (6.2) below) in META
is instantiated with constants attached to terms or theorems of T. A constant of
META is then attached to the result of evaluating the original term f(x) of the
metatheorem. This should represent a theorem of T which can be "reflected back"
using the principle in reverse. Note that although, like Boyer and Moore, reflection
is "hard-wired" into FOL. being a general principle it is much less restrictive.
8Woyhrauch makes the point that FOL itself is the simulation structure of META.
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The reflection process exemplifies Weyhranch's aim of changing "theorem prov¬
ing in the theory into evaluation in the metatheory," which he believes explains
the traditional procedural/declarative dichotomy. By this is meant the way a
(meta)theorem has its usual declarative sense when reasoning in META, and is
given a procedural sense by being used to construct proofs via reflection. The
other aspect of this, extensibility of reasoning by developing metatheorems rather
than the ad hoc addition of routines, is also stressed. FOL is used in a conver¬
sational manner and it is unclear to what extent meta-level information is used
automatically or how search would be guided. In fact reflection is never used
for steps where any search is involved, consisting instead merely of instantiating
metatheorems. From the examples presented it would seem that there is no mech¬
anism besides reflection for adding tactics to FOL. Apart from a few built-in
decision procedures reasoning takes place at the level of primitive inference rules.
As noted, semantic attachment is again used, in this case to attach representations
of proofs etc. in T to constants in META. where we believe a quotation mechanism
would be more appropriate. Thus while, like Knoblock, the objective is to provide
a uniform language for theory and metatheory, the use of semantic attachment, has
the effect of pulling the formal system "downwards" towards the implementation
level instead of vice versa.
(Weyhrauch. 1980) provides several examples of how a metatheory can be used.
One is the example given in chapter 1 where a simple syntactic characterization of
the provable formulas of the {<->}-fragment is given. More generally, metatheorems
have the form
Yx.P(x) —» THEOREM(/(x)) (6.2)
where P is what Knoblock has called an applicability predicate, with the same im¬
plied "speed-up" benefit, and / is a metafunction constructing the output formula.
This is very similar to the form of metatheorem we use.
(Weyhrauch, 1980: Weyhrauch. 1982) provide other examples which use the meta¬
theory to provide features typical of a higher-order language. Examples of these
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are derived rules abstracted w.r.t. formulas, and the expression and instantiation
of schemas. e.g.. for induction.
As with Knoblock, Weyhrauch generalizes the idea of a metatheory to a tower
of meta* theories, looking in particular at the applications of a metametatheory.
Amplifying the central notion of object-level theorem proving as meta-level eval¬
uation, he suggests this as the proper setting for the expression of a system's
heuristics. He describes a small induction heuristic, based on Boyer and Moore's,
in this theory. As noted above, there is a blurring of what is strictly "meta" and
what is really simulation of higher-order features; it appears that the examples
requiring a metametatheory here, in NuPRL require no more than a metatheory.
Also like Knoblock, Weyhrauch considers collapsing the tower of metatheories
into one self-reflective, theory. This is done by making the theory linked to META
META itself. Since the general reflection principle described above is retained this
leads to a second, fundamental, form of inconsistency. Weyhrauch admits that it
is "possible to ask META embarrassing questions."
FOL is inadequate from the aspect of monotonicity in several ways. First, it is not
clear how a metatheory is associated with its particular object theory. Nor is it
explained how a metatheory is abstracted w.r.t. a theory so that when THEOREM
is used, for instance, the object theory to which it refers is clear. Finally, there
is no notion of monotonicity itself. As an object theory is enlarged, previously
correct metatheorems may becomes invalid. This is yet another point at which
inconsistency may enter.
(Weyhrauch. 1980) is more concerned with how metatheorems are used than with
proving their correctness. Weyhrauch compares the act of proving a metatheorem.
by simulating an object-level proof, to teaching FOL. (Weyhrauch, 1982) examines
the correctness problem in more detail, giving a step-by-step "teaching" proof of
a derived rule. No ideas for the automation of this task in general are expressed,
though Weyhrauch talks of coding in a metaxnetatheory a heuristic, reminiscent




FOL is attractive for reflection because of its ability to switch easily between
theories, and. of importance for syntactic reflection, its relatively simple proof
theory. (Weyhrauch, 1980) makes clear the advantages of reflection from both
the theorem proving and AI perspectives. However, nowhere are the issues of
automation of correctness proofs discussed, nor those of synthesis.
There are important problems with FOL. The three ways in which inconsistency
can arise unsound use of semantic attachment, metatheorems at variance with
the object theory, and use of a general self-reflection principle must be ad¬
dressed. Semantic attachment should be replaced by a principled notion of com¬
putation and a quotation mechanism. Problems of monotonieity are not recog¬
nized. The above can be forgiven since (Weyhrauch, 1980) states that its intention
is not to deal with these points but to propose a new paradigm for formalising
reasoning. Judging by the number of ideas originating in (Weyhrauch. 1980) and
their prevalence elsewhere now, it has has been successful in this.
6.6 Davis and Schwartz
(Davis &: Schwartz. 1977) provides perhaps the earliest example of computationally
oriented syntactic reflection and is cited as an influence in (Knoblock. 1987). It
is shown how new inference rules, similar to the kinds of tactics we use. may be
soundly added to a system.
The emphasis in (Davis & Schwartz. 1977) is the opposite of Weyhrauch's. Where
the latter was concerned with testing the usefulness of some "epistemological ideas"
to AI. the former grew out of work on raising the level of reasoning in program
verification systems with stress consequently placed on formal correctness and
scalability. A distinction is made with earlier work in this area which applied only
to small classes of problems: Davis and Schwartz intend their mechanism to serve
as a general framework in which more specific, systems can be included. In line
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with this aim, a "logical prototype" of a verification system, VT. is defined, and a
means of adding new inference rules, and the logical and metamathematical issues
raised by this, studied.
The formality is provided by a formal system. FS. based on an axiomatizalion of
set theory in classical first-order predicate calculus . A decidable subset of this
language. LFS (hereditarily finite set theory), is identified by banning u> from the
language and limiting all quantification to the bounded variety. This allows the
definition of a notion of computation (~*) for all sentences of LFS by recursive
evaluation of boolean truth values. One of the requirements of FS is that it be
complete w.r.t. LFS's evaluation, i.e. that for any sentence if> of LFS:
<f> true <=> hpg <j> (6-3)
Thus, LFS provides a formal, though very inefficient, programming language. VT.
a system for verifying theorems in FS. is implemented in a "programming envir¬
onment" initially assumed to be LFS10. VT consists of a pair of sets, < VA, III >.
the verified assertions and rules of inference known to the system. After show¬
ing how natural numbers, tuples and lists can be represented in set theory, LFS
is used to formalize the various concepts of FS's proof theory analogously to
the way primitive recursive arithmetic is used to formalize number theory in
(Godel, 1931). Proofs are represented as linear lists of formulas, and the end
result of this Godelization of FS is the LFS predicate PROVE( "</>". tr) encoding
the assertion that 7t is (the representation of) a proof of the sentence </>. The
following predicate may be defined in FS but not LFS. and encodes theoremhood:
THM(X) = 3V'.PR0VE(Xr) (6.4)
"(Davis V Schwartz. 1977) is not precise in this and it appears that anything sub-
sinning number theory is sufficient.
10The FS-LFS relationship is not, essential but convenient due t.o the common language
and completeness result (6.3).
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Proofhood in VT of course involves extra-logical references to VA and RI. These
are encoded in LFS by the predicates:
SOME.VA(X) = (X = W) V ■ • • V (A' = a0m") (6.5)
SOMEJII(A') = $,(X)V---V$„(Ar) (6.6)
The rules of inference of R.I are formulas. $(A'). of LFS having exactly one free
variable. The sentence <j> of FS may be inferred by $ from the sentences <f>i...., <j>k
if <£(["<^i'!,..., "</>*,", "</>"]) true. This, being in LFS and therefore decidable,
ensures proof-checking in VT is effective. (It also allows SOMEJRI to mention the
directly rather than encode them as in SOME.VA.) In VT's initial state, VA
will be empty and RI will contain rules corresponding to the axioms of FS and the
inference rules of the predicate calculus.
Various modes are prescribed in which VT may be used. These include modes for
checking proofs and adding definitions of functions and relations, but it is mode
4, "rule insertion", which is of interest to us. To add a rule of inference <1 to RI
one must first provide a correctness assertion a of the form
VA".$(X) -» (Vj.l < j < Len(X) - THM(A'(.?))) -> THM(A(Len(AT))) (6.7)
where Len(AT) is the length of the the list X and X(j) is its jth member. As well as
a one must provide a proof ir which VT checks satisfies PROVE("of:. rr) true.
From this it can be seen that VT's inference rules correspond quite closely to
Knoblock's partial tactics (see section 6.4) and our synthetic tactics, the applicab¬
ility predicate being implicit in <S>. The latter complicates "high-level" reasoning
slightly. Davis and Schwartz suggest an application where a new inference rule
for "natural" proofs in algebra is added but this involves a nested embedding of
the encoding of these natural proofs in the existing encoding of proofs and the
necessary switching between these.
An important difference between VT and the other systems described here is VT's
orientation towards verification (proof-checking) rather than theorem proving. Be¬
sides the problem of support in constructing the possibly very large proof terms
ir which the user must supply to the system, the members of RI can only be used
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to check proof steps rather than construct them as traditional tactics do. We
don't see this as an essential difference since one could use functions of LFS rather
than sentences to represent inference rules and revise the other notions of proof
accordingly.
From the point of view of constructivity, (6.7) requires that, the user show that
proofs of the premises can be used to build a proof of the conclusion. However,
since FS is classical and proofs are not stored along with theorems in VA. one does
not have the "proof-on-demand" capability found in Knoblock's work.
If we regard computation in LFS as metatheory, then what one has in VT is
not separately implemented object- and meta-theories but an object theory (FS)
implemented in the metatheory (like (Knoblock. 1987)). Thus, in VT the notation
l-pg <f> (we shall drop the subscript from now on) means "there is an LFS term 7r
such that PROVE)"</>', rr) true". Reflection in this setting takes the following
form. Suppose we have the goal 4' which follows from the subgoals 4>j by rule $ €
RI. From F <j>j we get F THM("</>/:) this is the lifting part and justified by the
completeness of FS w.r.t. LFS and a set-theoretic property of'FS. The completeness
of FS w.r.t. LFS also gives us F $(["^u",.... "ipj,", "<^>"]) from the assumption that
$(["^>i", "</>']) true. This, the lifted subgoals and the correctness
theorem (6.7) for $ give us, assuming the usual predicate calculus rules of inference
hold in FS, give us F THM("</>"). This step is what has previously been described
as "running the metafunction". In VT, with its proof-checking orientation, though
$ may be evaluated to check applicability, the goal </> is provided by the user at
the outset. The final, dropping, step from I- THM("<^") to F 4> is justified by
the soundness of FS w.r.t. LFS and an assumption by Davis and Schwartz of the
weak a>-consistency of FS. a weak constructive property. From this description the
distinct properties required of the system FS and of the FS-LFS link are clear. The
latter tell us what is required of the programming environment of VT. whether it
is implemented in LFS or otherwise.





which would seem to make VT inconsistent. Though this can be formalized in
VT. it cannot, for theoretical reasons, be proved there.
Davis and Schwartz highlight three properties which they see as essential in a
verification system: soundness, extensibility and stability. By extensibility they
mean the addition of new rules of inference as described above, and by stability the
preservation of soundness across such extensions. In fact, the above justification
for reflection applies only in the case that VT doesn't change state, i.e. VA and
RI do not vary. Of course, any operation apart from proof-checking does change
VT's state. (Davis k Schwartz. 1977) proves the stability of VT in a metatheorem
similar to that in (Boyer k Strother Moore, 1981): by indexing the successive
states of VT with a counter, and relativizing the justification of reflection w.r.t.
to this. E.g. one has SOME_VA,(A). PROVE,(o:. 7r). THM,(rt). etc. By induction
on t. it is shown that for all t h, <j) (i.e. there is a n s.t. PROVE,("<^>", 7r) true)
implies ho 4> (previously just b ij>). This says that any actions in VT lead only to
conservative extensions of its initial state.
The use of an implicit environment, in the form of the current theoiy as captured
by the predicates SOME_VA(JV) and SOME_RI(A"), is very much like Boyer and
Moore's system (see section 6.2) and has the same advantages and disadvant¬
ages. These predicates, of course, change as the state of VT changes, and this
poses some problems of non-monotonicity. Their exact status is not made clear
in (Davis k Schwartz, 1977). Inclusion as definitions in the normal sense in VT
leads to clearly non-conservative behaviour. Some "guarding mechanism", as em¬
ployed by Boyer and Moore who use meta-axioms and meta-definitions. or similar
is required.
Unlike the other systems mentioned in this chapter, Davis and Schwartz give an
outline for a quantitative measure of the "speed-up" provided by a reflection mech¬
anism. This is in terms of the reduction of the difficulty of a theorem, defined as
the length of the shortest input which will cause VT to accept it. It is conjectured
that "the availability of these extension principles will reduce the difficulty of large
classes ofsentenc.es by very large amounts." Although no formal demonstration of
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this conjecture is provided. Davis and Schwartz point to some empirical evidence
including the algebra rule mentioned above.
The clearest indication of the non-practicability of VT is the way set theory is
used as a programming language; this is used to show the theoretical possib¬
ility of doing something rather than provide an efficient means. To meet this
criticism (Davis & Schwartz, 1977) suggests how a more directly executable pro¬
gramming language might be bootstrapped into the programming environment.
This is to proceed by formalizing an abstract machine in LFS, then exhibiting a
program for evaluating a subset of LFS which is proved correct w.r.t. the formal¬
ization. This, presumably, may then take the place of native LFS evaluation for
this subset. Note the resemblance of this to the use of compiled metafunctions
in (Boyer & Strother Moore. 1981). It is envisaged that more extensive subsets of
LFS will be handled by successive programs, creating a bootstrap effect.
6.6.1 Summary
(Davis & Schwartz, 1977) clearly presents itself as a theoretically-oriented sugges¬
tion for implementing extensibility. In particular, its use of set theory to elegantly
unify formal system and programming language militate against practical use.
Despite this, and though the system. VT. it discusses is a proof checker, many of
the ideas have appeared in later, practical, work. It's use of applicability predicates
has, indirectly, influenced our work. There is no mention of methods for proving




For reasons of self-containment we briefly describe the concepts and terminology
of (Miller, 1991) and (Liang. 1992) in relation to our section 4.8. The algorithm
we have used is based on that in (Nipkow. 1991) and listed in appendix F.
Higher-order patterns (h.o.p.'s) are a subset of terms of the A-calculus. A A-term
t. in /J-normal form is a h.o.p. if: every free occurrence of a variable F in t. is in a
subterm (F ... a„) where a, are //-equivalent to distinct bound variables.
The restriction on free variables in h.o.p.'s means that as they become instantiated
only a very simple form of /3-reduction renaming or fin-reduction is possible.
This results in a greatly simplified unification problem for h.o.p.'s. Miller shows
that h.o.p. unification is decidable and yields a most general unifier. (Qian. 1992)
improves this by providing an algorithm linear in time and space. In contrast,
general unification of simply-typed A-terms of order 2 and higher is undecidable.
The h.o.p. unification algorithm makes no use of types. As we have used it in
section 4.8 our terms could be simply-typed at the level of syntax, i.e. saturation
and arities. but this is not done.
(Liang, 1992) showed how h.o.p.'s could be used to annotate terms with wave
fronts and holes by including a wave function at the object level. For example,
the annotated term f(x) would become the term (wave / x). This approach
has the drawbacks of moving meta-level annotation to the object level and. as a
consequence, requiring wave to be polymorphically typed. We have instead used
wave as a meta-level annotation of OYSTER's abstract syntax where neither problem
exists. We have shown how to express potential wave-fronts in h.o.p.'s by placing
higher-order variables in wave holes.
Our work necessitated the use of some form of annotation for higher-order terms,
and in practice it was found that h.o.p.'s sufficed. Unfortunately, this is not the
case for proof planning in general, for example (Madden e.1. al 1993) where a less
tractable class of unification is required.
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6.8 Conclusions
The main difference we see bet",ween previous work and ours is the kind of tactics
we are interested in. and, more importantly, that we are attempting to (at least
partially) automate the process of their synthesis. Howe provides tactics which
are able to take object-level equational theorems and produce corresponding meta-
level rewrites. He also gives powerful type-checking tactics which are usually suf¬
ficient to prove the correctness of rewrites built using Paulson style tacticals. In
contrast, we are interested in synthesizing tactics from their meta-level specific¬
ations. These different objectives result in different mechanisms. For example,
to enable sophisticated type checking Howe makes such things as monotonicity
an intrinsic part of many definitions, whereas this would greatly complicate the
presentation one would give to Clam. By using Clam to plan synthesis proofs
we do not need such object-level guidance and are willing to accept the one-shot
expense of clumsier proofs.
Most of the work in Clam has concentrated on using the wave annotation to guide
methods. Hence, in attempting to synthesize corresponding tactics, we extend the
usual notion of term to include this extra annotation and are principally interested
in tactics which make use of or manipulate such annotation. Neither of these
aspects, meta-annotation and synthesis, is explored in the work cited.
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Chapter 7
Conclusions and Further Work
7.1 Recap
We were originally motivated to use the CLAM proof planner and the proof plan
paradigm to attempt to automate, at least partly, the task of synthesizing tactics
to fit CLAM method specifications. The wider ramifications of success in this
programme were laid out in chapter 1.
We feel that this goal has to a great extent been achieved. In order to do this we
had to make several design choices:
It was first necessary to decide how we could capture the properties of a tactic
with sufficient precision so that the specification given by a method made
sense. Treating tactics as simply a special class of program this entailed
choosing one suitable program specification formalism, from among the many
available, which was best suited to this purpose.
We chose to use the constructive type theory OYSTER. But even after this choice
the behaviour of tactics seemed complicated beyond the reach of present-day
program synthesis techniques.
To make the problem tractable we narrowed down what it means to be a tac¬
tic. taking note of the existing systems (Howe. 1988a: Knoblock. 1987) and
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(Boyer & Strother Moore. 1981). and arriving at the notion of a tactic as a
partial rewrite function.
Since tactics must, do more than mere syntax manipulation we required a cor¬
rectness criterion to ensure no unsoundness could arise. Such a criterion is
provided by a reflection mechanism. A simplified version of Howe's mechan¬
ism was successfully implemented in OYSTER.
Howe's full mechanism would have introduced too much unnecessary technical
obfuscation into synthesis proofs. It was instead decided to restrict our
attention to rewriting a small subset of terms of type pnat.
By simulating the predicates appearing in methods as OYSTERobject-level predic¬
ates the necessary amount of representation of CLAM at the meta-level was
in place to allow synthesis problems to be tackled.
We then had to decide what amounted to a synthesis in this formalism. Following
the example of (Knoblock & Constable. 1986) our correctness theorems took
the form:
Vi : metaterm.preconds(i) —> 3o : metaterm.effectsf i, o) A i ~ o
where preconds' truth entailed the success of the tactic. This semantics is
almost identical to the informal semantics of the CZAMmethods themselves.
We also stipulate that the preconds should be decidable where possible. This
gives us useful properties for the extract and is essential to compiling a
pseudo tactic.
After conducting several example proofs it became clear that CLAM lacked some
of the machinery necessary to enable a successful proof. Principal among
these we context-sensitive rewriting and highei-order rippling. We found
existing recursion analysis only required slight modifications to make it suf¬
ficient for our needs.
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A means of compiling Prolog programs from decidability proofs was developed.
This is not presently well developed hut promises the solution to the original
problem: tactics which are guaranteed to work.
7.2 Further work
Several clear problems arose during the course of this work. We list them here
with suggested directions for further work.
More general tactics
As pointed out in several places, the form of tactic we synthesize in this thesis
is of a very limited nature. It is limited to rewriting sub terms of type pnat.
(Howe, 1988a) and (Knoblock, 1987) suggest two possible solutions of which the
former seems more immediately realistic. We would, if we could reflect sequents
and objects of higher type, be able to synthesize a much more useful class of tactic.
These include weak and strong fertilization, first-order rewrites of general type,
and wave. There would at last be some real bootstrapping of CLAM tactics.
Efficiency
The means of tactic specification throughout this thesis was intended to be per¬
spicuous rather than efficient. Methods are known to eliminate the unwanted
non-computational components from proof extracts, e.g. subset types in place of
existential types. It would be interesting to see how far the ideas in this thesis
could be redone using the subset type.
Another means to improve efficiency would be the addition of a primitivemetaterm
type to OYSTER. This would allow cleaner extracts and more efficient recursion.
Alternatively Nordstrom's acc type could be used (Nordstrom. 1988).
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Compound tactics
We have chosen only to verify compound tactics. Large specifications must still
be synthesized from the ground up as an atomic tactic. This would seem to
put low limit on complexity of tactic we can synthesize. A means of decomposing
large tactics into simpler synthesis problems and composing the results holds more
promise as methods grown in complexity.
Pseudo tactics
There is a large amount of room for improvement in the process of compilation to
Prolog. Anti-floundering ordering of literals, mode specific programs and elimin¬
ation of unnecessary term structure will lead to better proof planning.
7.2.1 A kernel meta-language
Examination of the literature on program specification (see chapter 2) showed
the clear development of a school of thought which believes that much can be
gained by simplifying the specification language as far as possible. The idea,
exemplified in (Sannella& Wirsing, 1983). is that a kernel language containing
the bare essentials for specification should be given, and that this should be made
palatable to the human user by constructing a higher-level interface language in
terms of the kernel. The latter could come in different "flavours" according to its
intended use.
We believe that a similar approach would be fruitful in designing a meta-language
for CIAM. A large number of predicates have been accumulated during its lifetime,
many differing only slightly in function. Rationalization of these in terms of a small
kernel language would make the system more uniform and comprehensible to the
user, an well as providing the usual benefits of modular software. The kernel
language could, for example, be based on an abstract and unified data type for
annotated terms, and contain a small number of syntax property and "surgery"
operations. It would also be interesting to re-examine the work of this thesis using
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such a kernel specification language instead of representing each CIAM predicate
individually. Research in this direction has begun with an abstract definition of
annotated terms.
7.2.2 A quotation type
As noted by Howe (see section 6.3), and experienced also with our reflection mech¬
anism. the process of lifting and lowering consumes large amounts of time and
space when metaterms are formalized in the usual way in type theory. Boyer
and Moore (see section 6.2), however, show that an efficient implementation is
possible by including a purposely designed quoting structure at the implement¬
ation level. Attempts have already been made in this direction ((Allen, 1990;
Knoblock & Constable, 1986)) but these are based on syntactic reflection and are
somewhat unwieldy. We believe that the introduction of a type analogous to
Boyer and Moore's use of the QUOTE would have the following benefits. First, a
large part of the library necessary for Howe's mechanism would be obviated, al¬
lowing metafunctions to be developed more easily and with less overhead. Second,
reflection would be made time and space efficient and could thus be used as an
integral part of the system, as in NQTHM.
As a type theoretic reconstruction of Boyer and Moore's implementation we sug¬
gest a type. quotation(A). having the following rules:
H» A in Ui
intro at Ui
H >> quotation(A) in Ul
H » i in 1
intro
H» quote(t) in quotation(A)
????
elim x
H. x : quotation(j4). H' >> G
H» t. in A
reduce
H» dequote(quote(f)) = t. in A???????
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7.3 Summary
We have shown that simple tactic synthesis is both possible and well with in the
capabilities of the CLAM theorem prover. We have made this possible by extending
the rewriting ability of CIAM and its notion of wave rule. We have shown that
the C'1AM proof plan is also suited to carrying out decidability proofs and have
demonstrated a primitive means of compiling the results to faster pseudo-tactics.
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A.l The OS^eR theorem prover
When we wish to emphasize that; the text we are discussing is computer-generated
we will use the typewriter font. OUSTER proofs are displayed as in figure A 1.
This has several parts, ''example" is the name of the proof. The remaining pieces
of the first line indicate respectively that [1] is the position of this node in the
proof tree, the proof is partial, and that the current aut.otact.ic is idtac. The next
two lines display the goal sequent for the node: a numbered list of hypotheses (in
this case only 1). the OYSTER turnstile "==>", and the conclusion. Line 4 indicates
the inference rule used to refine the node, and the remainder displays the two
resulting subgoals.
Tlie correspondence between OYSTeR's syntax and the traditional symbols of math¬
ematics are given in table A 1. For the definitive account of OYSTER see (Horn. 1988).
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example: [1] partial autotactic(idtac)
1. x:pnat
==> y:pnat=>z:pnat=>x+ (y+z)=x+y+z in pnat
by elim(x)
[1] incomplete




z:pnat=>vO+ (y+z)=vO+y+z in pnat)
==> y:pnat=>
z:pnat=>s(vO)+ (y+z)=s(vO)+y+z in pnat
Figure A-l: Oyster proof format
oyster traditional description
pnat N Peano natural numbers
atom character strings
T list lists over T
s=t in T = equality of a and t in type T
void X absurdity/empty type
P # Q PAQ conjunction/product
P \ Q Pv Q disjmiction/disjoint sum
P => Q P-+Q implication/function space
x :T#P 3x : T.P existential quantification/dependent product
x:T=>P vx : T.P universal quantification/dependent function space
rec(z,T) simple recursive type
u(i) universe of level i
H==>G HY-g (object-level) sequent turnstile
Table A-l:
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A.2 The CI^M proof planner
In this section we give an overview of the CLAM proof planning system
(vanHarmelen et. al, 1993), the nature of the tactics we intend to synthesize and
an idea of how we can apply the results in a theorem proving environment. This
seems an appropriate point at which to do so since the exercise lias a distinct
circularity about it: the objects we will synthesize, tactics, are part of the sys¬
tem. CLAM. we use to perform the synthesis. This results in the "bootstrapping"
capability of the CLAM system, another aspect of meta-level reasoning.
A.2.1 Proof planning
At any point in a proof the choice of which inference rule to apply next may be
very large, possibly infinite. Since interesting theorems typically require many sep¬
arate proof steps for completion, this problem of combinatorial explosion makes it
impossible in practice to successfully employ a brute-force strategy when searching
for a proof. Present-day automatic theorem provers attempt to circumvent this
problem in various ways. One group, which can be loosely termed uniform proof
procedures, retain the search for proofs but using a small number of very primitive
rules. The resulting search space is further restricted by limiting the applicability
of these rules, typically with simple syntactic conditions. Examples of such sys¬
tems are the resolution theorem provers making use of search restrictions such as
SLD. set-of-support, model elimination, locking, and special rules such as para-
modulation to handle the explosive use of equality reasoning (Chang & Lee, 1973:
Loveland, 1978; Wos et al. 1984). The intention is that these systems are com¬
plete, and the above search strategies are justified (on paper) by meta-level results
showing this. Note, however, that this use of the meta-level is hard-wired into the
system, in the form of a fixed proof procedure, and gives the user no opportunity
to specialise or improve the system for use in a particular domain.
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A second group of theorem provers. which might loosely he termed tactic-based,
aims to overcome this problem. Proofs, as always, are justified ultimately by
primitive inference rules, but the user rarely uses the system at this level.
Just as humans usually carry out proofs by first "strategically" breaking a problem
up into conceptually manageable pieces, then solving each of these with well-honed
and more specialised "tactical" reasoning methods, so tactic-based systems allow
users to write programs tactics which are suited to solving small, specific,
high-level tasks.
Tactics are intended to be used in a modular fashion, like a library of subroutines is
used in writing a program. The analogue of the programming language construct
is the tactical. Tacticals provide the modularity by allowing one to fit tactics
together in a well-understood way to form super-tactics. [See section 2.2 for details
of tactic implementation.] In this way. one can build ever higher-level tactics,
capable, for example, of implementing the uniform proof procedures described
above. Obviously, with this burgeoning of new possibilities for inference, brute-
force search is even more hopeless than previously. Thus, tactic-based systems are
invariably interactive and rely on an external source to supply a strategy able to
suitably compose tactics to perform a complete proof. This source can either be
human or another computer program. CLAM is an example of the latter.
CIAM is a proof planner. Whilst the concept is quite general, the version used
here sits on top of the OUSTER proof system, a Prolog re-implementation of NuPRL
(Horn. 1988; Constable e.t al. 1986). CLAM employs a user-defined list of high-
level tactics, putting them together to form a plan to putatively perform a complete
proof. In order to guide its search for such a plan the user supplies tactics in the
form of methods tactics plus an accompanying meta-level specification. CLAM
searches for a proof purely at the meta-level using these specifications and returns
the result of composing the appropriate tactics. The efficacy of this approach
has been demonstrated in (van Harmelen, 1989: Bundy et al 1988). The current
CLAM distribution has a library of methods and snbmethods (methods which may
be called by other methods but are not themselves used at the top level) suited to
performing inductive proofs in the OYSTER system, particularly those relating to
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the verification and synthesis of programs. A high-level "story". ind_strat. can
be told for induction proofs. A simplified version of this, where only induction





Such a unifying plan outline or strategy is called a proof plan. One can see from
this example that just as tacticals allow one to structure the building of complex
tactics, so complex methods can be built using me.thodicaLi. THEN and the list
constructor are used to form the top-level ind_strat from the induction method,
which analyses the goal and suggests a suitable induction schema, and the methods
base_case and step_case (see below) which are specialised for their respective
subgoals. It is a proof plan for synthesizing tactics that is the objective of this
work.
As will be seen in the sequel, induction plays an important part in program syn¬
thesis since it is the proof rule which introduces, via the Curry-Howard isomorph¬
ism (q.v.), recursion in the extracted program: there is an exact mapping (duality)
between the induction schema we use and the form of recursion in the resulting
program. Induction is the sole means we have of reasoning, in a non-general way.
about the infinite sets of objects (such as numbers, lists and terms) we use as
data in programs. Resolution theorem provers, suited to pure first-order predicate
logic, are notoriously poor at performing inductive proofs. They are hindered by
the impossibility of expressing induction schemas in first-order logic, the loss of
structure which results from putting theory and conjecture into clausal form, and
the unsuitability of the strategies typically employed to guide search. The latter
are usually global in nature, applying equally to all clauses of a theory and. as
mentioned above, uniform. It is this low-level uniformity of proof rule, where the
same guidelines are applied during disparate parts of a proof, and the consequent
inability to make use of higher-level strategic knowledge, which makes resolution-
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based theorem provers unsuitable for the task of induction proofs. Proof planning
is intended to avoid this object-level, non-strategic search. The current CLAM lib¬
rary uses a meta-level wave, annotation and a technique known as rippling to guide
its search for induction proofs. This is often good enough to eliminate search (or
rather backtracking) altogether. We give an illustration of this using the theorem
of the associativity of plus. This asserts that
I- Vx : pnat.Vi/ : pnat.Vz : pnat.x + (y + z) = (x + y) + z
If we perform primitive induction on x we have to prove two subgoals, a non-
recursive base case and a recursive step case:
I- Viy : pnat.Vz : pnat.O + (y + z) = (0 + y) + z
and
V?;: pnat.Vz : pnat.x + (y + z) = (r. + y) + z
1- Vy : pnat.Vz : pnat. s(x) + (y + z) = ( s(x) ■+ y) + z
Notice that we have annotated how the induction conclusion differs from the
induction hypothesis in the step case. We use the wave notation front!hole)
to indicate that the expression differs from one we wish to match it against by
the wave-front the structure inside the box but not underlined. The desired
expression, the skeleton, can be recovered by deleting all structure inside a box
apart from that which is underlined (the wave-hole). This is the form of annotation
used by CLAM methods. The objective in the step case subgoal is to manipulate
the conclusion, for instance by rewriting, until it matches the induction hypothesis.
If we rewrite the conclusion using the definition of + provided by equation (A.2)
we get. ignoring quantifiers, successively:
x + (t/ + z) = (x + y) + z
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The final cancellation step used the substitutive,y lemma (A.3) for the successor
function .9. We can see that by rewriting we gradually ripple, out the wave-fronts,
and eventually end up with an expression identical to the induction hypothesis
(IH). At this point we can fertilize, the goal, i.e. use the IH and close the step case
subproof. It is the necessity of rippling out the wave-front in a conclusion until we
reach a point where fertilization is possible that guides the search. The base case
can be proved simply by rewriting the goal using equation (A.l) of the definition
of + (symbolic evaluation). Thus, the base_case and step_case methods posited
above would look, respectively, something like:
REPEAT sym_eval
(REPEAT wave) THEN fertilize
where sym_eval performs one step of symbolic evaluation and Have performs one
step of rippling out.
In order to build a plan in this fashion. CLAM requires knowledge of the theory
or context in which a theorem is set. In this case this consists of the definition of
+ and the substitutivity of .9 given by the theorems:
V)/ : pnat.O + y = y in pnat
Vx, y : pnat s(x) ■ V




Note that we have again added annotation. This is part of the analysis performed
by CLAM as the definitions are loaded although + is defined as an OYSTER
term. CL*M expects in addition a set of theorems describing its evaluation to be
present. Rewrite rules in this form are called wave rules since they allow us to see
immediately how annotations are changed by the rewriting. Since we use these
theorems to perform rewriting we display them as oriented rules, so that rewriting
goes in the opposite direction to implication arrows when used at positive positions.
E.g. the last of the above theorems would be written as
s(x) = .9(1/) in pnat :=> x = y in pnat (A.4)
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Recursion analysis (Stevens, 1989), a rational reconstruction and extension of the
method used in the Boyer and Moore theorem prover (Boyer & Moore, 1979), is
a technique which, using the loaded wave rules and a data base of inductions
schemas, attempts to find an induction appropriate to the goal. This is imple¬
mented as part of the induction method mentioned above. Recursion analysis
involves examining the functions occurring in a goal, in particular at their recurs¬
ive argument positions. Each variable which is universally quantified outermost
(including appearing as a declaration in the hypothesis) is tested to see if rippling
out can take place using one of the loaded induction schemas, and given a corres¬
ponding score. Candidate inductions are then tried on a best-first basis according
to these scores, backtracking on failure.
Since we are concerned with planning synthesis proofs, we need an additional
annotation, that of potential waves. In synthesis proofs we will usually need to
perform induction on existentially quantified goals. The problem with this is that
we do not know in advance the value the eventual witness will take: it may or
may not contain a wave w.r.t. the IB. To allow for this uncertainty we mark all
occurrences of the existential variable as potential waves using a broken box (see
below). We make use of this annotation when rippling existentially quantified
goals. Suppose we have as goal:
h V/: pnat list, a: pnat.3t : pnat list.t = append)/, a :: nil) in pnat list
After performing induction on I, we are left with the step case:
Va : pnat.St : pnat list..r = append(f. a:: nil) in pnat list
1- V<7. : pnat.3x : pnat list.lt! = append) h::t. a:: nil) in pnat list
The broken box marks the potential wave front. The RHS can be rippled out
using the definition of append, but rippling is then seemingly blocked.
....a: pnat h 3t : pnat list.lt j = h.:: append)/., a :: nil)
However, we can use the wave rule
in pnat list
|« :: v | = |it :: z\ in pnat list :=> v = z in pnat list (A.5)
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the substitut.ivity lemma for the 2nd argument of the list constructor, to perform
an existential ripple. Since the variables of the wave rule are universally quantified
and x in the goal existentially quantified, it is sound and heuristically promising
to rewrite the goal to
... t-3u : pnat.w: pnat list.fu :: v j = h :: append(t, a :: nil) in pnat list
and turn the potential into a real wave front which can be rippled out by the wave
rule, instantiating u with h. In this case the result is the immediately fertilizable
goal:
... h 3u : pnat list.[u]= append)/,, a :: nil) in pnat list
In our synthesis proofs we shall also need two further adornments. We term a
position in the goal which is occupied by a universally quantified variable in the
hypothesis a sink and denote it by P( [/J). The idea is that if all terms in the sinks
are the same then we can instantiate the hypothesis to match the conclusion at
theses positions. Thus, a sink can swallow terms and gives rise to the important
heuristic of rippling in towards one.
All the definitions above suppose the existence of only one induction hypothesis.
But there may he nested inductions or inductions where the step case gives rise to
several hypotheses. We therefore need to label both wave holes and sinks according
to the hypothesis which generate them. So called multi-hole wave fronts and rules
will be seen used in chapter 4.
A CIAM planner takes as input a goal and attempts to build a terminating plan,
i.e. one which should result in a proof with no open leaves. A method (see below)
is applicable if its input slot matches the goal and if its pre-conditions hold. If this
is the case its effects are calculated and the output subgoals returned. The planner
can then attempt to solve these recursively. Note that the input and output slots
do not have to be strictly object level terms. By including in them meta-level
annotation such as waves, methods are aide to communicate at the meta-level.
By using proof plans to limit the overall strategy which a planner can attempt
to build (like ind_strat above), the search space can he strictly circumscribed to
areas which are likely to be successful.
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The above is a greatly simplified description of the current CLAMsystem: it
has a large repertoire of methods and submethods for performing such things
as case-splits, prepositional reasoning and generalisation, and the way in which
rippling is performed is now considerably more sophisticated (Bundy e.t al 1990b;
Bnndy e.t al 1993; Ireland, 1992; Yoshida e.t al 1994). However, CLAM is limited
only by the library ofmethods supplied: one is free to use one's own meta-language
for talking about proofs, one more appropriate for the particular domain of en¬
quiry.
The notion of waves described here is a very general idea, a formalised notion of
term-level analogy. For this reason we should expect to be able to carry out a large
part of our synthesis work using the existing CLAM method library and extensions
thereof. Sometimes, however, it is more reasonable, as in the case of reasoning
about decidability or failure, to write methods specialised to deal with these. The
resulting method library for tactic synthesis is described in detail in chapter 4.
A.2.2 Methods
It was mentioned above that a CLAM method consists of a tactic plus its specific¬
ation in a metalanguage of the user's choice. To be more concrete, methods are








It has also been described how the CLAM planners make use ofmethods as pseudo-
tacticx. • i.e. use them to accurately simulate at the meta-level the behaviour of
object-level tactics. Besides this procedural interpretation, we can also give meth¬
ods a declarative reading: there is a method called Name with arguments Args:
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the goal is unified with Inpuu.
to Effects should also be successful ami ... „,itions is successful then a call
Output: running Tactic on a real goal corresponding to ^v,oals are unified with
and result in the subgoals described by Output. ' ■« successful
An example is provided by one of the clauses comprising a simplified wave method:












This method, which is iterated to exhaustion in step_case. performs a single
ripple using any applicable wave rule in CLAM's data base. It can be paraphrased
as: this method applies if we can remove all the universal quantifies from the
goal (G) to leave a matrix (Matrix), find a wave-rule (L:=>R), and a position
(Pos) which unifies with the latter's LHS. If the LHS is replaced with the now-
instantiated R.HS. and the resulting matrix (NewMatrix) is requantified, there is a
single remaining subgoal (H==>NewG). The identically named tactic should perform
the corresponding object level subproof.
The aim of this work is, given the specification part of a method (the four middle
slots), to synthesize a tactic satisfying the specification in the above sense. For
the reasons given in the first half of this chapter we have chosen to do this, not
in the native Prolog of CLAM. but using the main target logic of CLAM. OYSTER.
The representation we use to carry this out is described fully in the chapter 3.
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We represent the functions and predicates of the CLAM method language using
type theoretic analogues and describe them with appropriate theorems and wave
rules as was done above for plus. In this way we develop a theory of tactics. We
do not. however, attempt a full reconstruction of tactics. This would be extremely
complex, involving notions of proof trees, applicability of inference rules, binding
operators, etc. as in (Knoblock k Constable, 1986). and we would have little hope
of automating a significant portion of the synthesis proofs within it. We choose
another route, detailed in the next chapter, of concentrating solely on rewrite
taeq... --HV feel this has the advantages of:
Simplicity There is exactly goal and one "subgoal for all tactics, viz. the
term before an<l .--fter rewriting.
Usefulness Many of the interest fires methods of CLAM consist solely of rewriting,
eg. rippling.
Portability If we had chosen to model the OYSTER logic closely this would have
made our synthesis methods and synthetic tactics very specific, whereas most
logics have a notion of equality /equivalence and substitution.
rpl:""" is an existing system (Howe. 1988a), a simplified version of
which we present in the next chapter, which aliows us to use the synthetic
tactics directly in the OYSTER logic.
Proof theory Our proofs of correctness of the synthetic tactic eventually "ground
out" as equality goals in the OYSTER object logic. Thus we can use the
existing CLAM tools for significant parts of proof.
Of course, there are the drawbacks that we cannot synthesize directly tactics which
return multiple-subgoals and that we only attempt to rewrite first-oider terms of
type pnat. We suggest in section ?? how we could in principle redo our programme
using a mechanism more like Howe's.
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Recalling the Cnrry-Howard isomorphism described previously, we need, in order
to synthesize a tactic appropriate to a method, to prove a goal of the form:
b Vf : jnput.pre_conditions(i) —» 3o : output.ef fects(i. o) Ai~o
Here, as well as our representation of the method's specification we include a
correctness goal i ~ o. This is necessary to justify the use of the synthesis proof
by the reflection mechanism of chapter 3 and essentially says that i and o have
the same meaning. The extract from a proof of this kind will have the form
Xi.Xp. < o. _ > and is obviously not what one would normally think of as a
tactic. We propose two ways to use such an extract: via the reflection mechanism
described in chapter 3: and via an informal translation of the extract to a Prolog
program (chapter 7: optional).
A.2.3 Summary
We have chosen to synthesize tactics in a deductive system. We choose to use the
flexible approach to program construction provided by the OYSTER type theory,
and to directly synthesize tactics via OYSTER's built-in Curry-Howard extraction
mechanism. We can use the synthetic tactic either directly, via a reflection mech¬
anism, or indirectly via translation to Prolog. Synthesis is identified with theorem
proving in the class of V3 goals, where for simplicity's sake we consider only re¬
write tactics. We automate synthesis using the CLAM proof planner, providing
extensions to the method repertoire to deal specifically with this problem domain.
By these means we are able to tell a high-level, strategic stoiy. i.e. provide a proof
plan, for tactic synthesis.
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A.3 Clam glossary
The definitive reference is (vanHarraelen et. al, 1993).
annotated term A term of the object level (q.v.) logic annotated with meta
level (q.v.) information, e.g. wave fronts, wave holes and sinks (q.v.).
base case See induction.
cancellation rule These are wave rules (q.v.) derived from substitntivity lem¬
mas which have the effect of removing wave fronts altogether. E.g. the
cancellation rule derived from the substitutivity lemma
coloured rippling When complicated induction schemas (q.v.) are used there
may be several induction hypotheses in a step case (q.v.). To distinguish
which parts of the induction conclusion (q.v.) correspond to which induc¬
tion hypothesis, the various wave-fronts are given indexes (called colours).
The rippling process (q.v.) is thus given extra information towards guiding
wavefronts to positions allowing fertilization (q.v.). See also (Yoshida. 1993:
Yoshida e.t al 1994).
computational induction Induction (q.v.) based on the recursion scheme of
a total function. In the case of simple functions this may be constructor
induction, but in general it is destructor induction. C.f. structural induction.
conditional wave rule A wave rule of the form
where C is a condition consisting of a conjunction of atoms or negated atoms.




constructor induction Induction (q.v.) based on a schema (q.v.) which results
in step cases where the induction conclusion differs from the hypothesis(es)
by the addition of constructor symbols. The induction hypotheses are in¬
stances of the original conclusion. C.f. destructor induction.
creational wave rule A wave ride (q.v.) which has the effect of introducing
wave fronts where there were none before. Typically this is done using a
constructor-destructor pair. If c and d are such a pair then from the equation
Vz : T.d(c(x)) = x in T
we get the creational wave rule
Vz : T.x d(c(x))
Creational wave rules are used in particular in cross-fertilization (q.v.).
cross wave rule See creational wave rule.
definition A library logical object (def) containing the definition of an object
level term. To define a function called fun. this takes the form
fun(x_l,...,x_n) <==> term
where x_l, . . . ,x_n are the formal arguments and term is an object level
term whose free variables are amongst x_l,...,x_n. When a definition
for fun is loaded (q.v.). equations (q.v.) with names of the form funN are
loaded automatically and are expected to provide an unfolded definition of
fun based on its recursion scheme.
destructor induction Induction (q.v.) based on a schema (q.v.) which results
in step cases where the induction conclusion is an instance of the original
conclusion, and the induction hypot.hesis(es) differs from this by the addi¬
tion of destructor symbols. This is a more general than constructor induction
(q.v.) since arbitrary well-founded measures may be used, with functions de¬
creasing in them as destructors. Constructor induction may be transformed
into destructor induction by rippling across (q.v.).
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effects One of the slots of a method (q.v.); synonymous with post-conditions
(q.v.).
equation A library logical object (eqn) used to store proofs of equations describ¬
ing the recursion scheme of a defined function. See also definition.
erasure The erasure of an annotated term is that term with all annotation re¬
moved. e.g. the erasure of ,?(r) + y is s(x.) + y. An erasure is always an
object level term.
fertilization Fertilization is the point in the step case of an inductive proof at
which the induction hypothesis (q.v.) is used. Fertilization can be classified
as either strong or weak (q.v.).
hard wave front A wave front (q.v.) which is not soft (q.v.).
hints A mechanism whereby assistance in the form of declarative search restric¬
tions may be given to CLAM before or during planning. Typically this is
done when CL^M fails to find a plan, or never terminates, using one of
the standard planners (q.v.). For a detailed reference see (Negrete. 1992;
vanHarmelen et al, 1993).
induction We encapsulate mathematical induction over inductively defined data
types as rules of inference or schemas derived from these rules. E.g. primitive
induction over the type of Peano natural numbers (pnat) is expressed by the
following OYSTER rule:
H b V\ti/t] LL.x : pnat. V b V\s(x)/x\
elim(onjx))
Li. x : pnat b V
There are similar rules for types such as integers and lists. The non-recursive
premisses are called the base. cases. and the recursive premisses the step
cases. In this example the first premiss is a base case and the second a
step case. In step cases the instances of the original conclusion appearing
in the hypothesis list are called induction hypotheses, that appearing in the
conclusion the induction conclusion.
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induction conclusion See induction.
induction hypothesis See induction.
induction schema See induction.
joining (of wave fronts) "The opposite of splitting (q.v.).
lemma A logical library object (verb+lemma+) used to store auxiliary proofs
required by top level theorems (q.v.).
loading (a definition, wave rule etc.) CIAM has a library mechanism which
allows the saving and loading of various types of logical object: theorems,
lemmas, equations, definitions, schemas, (sub)methods and hints. When a
definition is loaded its corresponding equations are parsed in order to extract
all possible wave rules and ordinary rewrite rules derivable from them, and
these are cached to allow efficient look up during planning. CIAM can also
be directed to parse theorems and lemmas and cache the derived rules. See
also needs file.
longitudinal wave rule A wave rule (q.v.) in which a wave front (q.v.) is
moved, either inward or outward, along a path in the term. C.f. transverse
wave rules. This is usually done with the aim of later removing the wave
front and strong fertilizing (q.v.), or moving it sufficiently to allow weak
fertilization to take place.
meta level The level at which inference is carried out in CZAM. This term
may refer to annotation, methods, planning, the running of pre- and post¬
conditions, etc.
method The meta level (q.v.) specification of a tactic. This consists of six parts
or slots: a" name, an input (goal), an output (list of subgoals). a list of
preconditions, a list of post-conditions, and a tactic name. It is intended
that the named tactic satisfy the specification.
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methodical A connective for combining (snb)method(s) (q.v.) to form new a
(sub)method; the method analogue of tacticais. Examples are composition
(then/2), alternation (or/2) and iteration (iterate/5).
middle-out reasoning A technique where meta level (q.v.) variables appear in
plans, allowing instantiation as a later stage of planning when more inform¬
ation about the form of the proof is available. These variables may include
induction schemas and existential witnesses. See also (Bnndy fit al. 1989a).
monochromatic rippling Traditional, single-colour rippling.
monotonicity CIAM maintains a hand-coded record of whether certain func¬
tions' arguments are monotonic or anti-monotonic w.r.t. to given orderings,
or neither.
multi-hole rippling See coloured rippling.
"needs" file In order for planning to go through completely automatically, CLAM
sometimes requires the loading of rules in addition to those loaded (by con¬
vention) with definitions. These extra rules are detailed in a file called
needs .pi on a logical object-by-logical object basis.
object level The formal level at which proofs are carried out. At present this
is the theorem proving environment OYSTER, a sequent-style presentation of
intuitionist type theory (see (Horn, 1988) or section A.l).
plan execution Each method (q.v.) when called instantiates its tactic slot with
the name of a suitable tactic (q.v.).
plan A tactic, produced by a planner (q.v.). These tactics act as very-high-level
descriptions of a proof.
planner A meta level program which attempts to find a plan capable of solving
the goal. There are different planners corresponding to the different search
techniques employed in the planning (q.v.). Currently there are depth-first,
breadth-first, iterative-deepening and best-first planners available in CIAM.
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planning The search process where a method (q.v.) is selected from those avail¬
able and its applicability to the current goal tested by running its pre¬
conditions (q.v.). If these succeed, the post-conditions (q.v.) are run to
generate the subgoal(s). If there are no subgoals planning has succeeded;
otherwise planning is carried out recursively for all subgoals.
polarity The conventional proof- theoretic definition of polarity (see e.g. (Girard. 1987)).
If rewriting at a positive position in a goal, implications are used right-to-left.
At negative positions the direction is reversed. See also wave. rule.
post-conditions A declarative description of the output slot of an applicable
method. In practice, the post-conditions are used entirely procedurally to
build the subgoal(s), hence the synonym effect.':.
potential wave front (synonym of soft wave front) A meta level annotation
(q.v.) indicating where a wave front (q.v.) may be introduced due to the
presence of an existentially quantified variable the existential variable
may be partially instantiated to a wave front surrounding a new. existen¬
tially quantified wave hole. This is important since it can motivate otherwise
invisible inductions. E.g. in the goal
... h 3y : pnat.;)/; = s(x)
y may be instantiated to .■>(?/) giving
... h 3)/ : pnat
in pnat
aCll/i) s(x) in pnat
Traditionally potential waves are annotated as Ip-wavej.
pre-conditions The meta level (q.v.) conditions, usually w.r.t. the input (q.v.).
which must hold for a given method to be applicable.
primitive induction Induction (q.v.) based on a primitive inference rule of the
object level (q.v.).
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proof plan A high-level, specialised strategy (method (q.v.)) for solving a partic¬
ular type of problem, usually built from smaller (sub)methods. An example
is the ind_strat/l method specialised for inductive proofs.
recursion analysis (now known as ripple analysis) Definitions and additional
lemmas, and the resulting wave rules, describe the forms of recursion em¬
ployed in the functions present in a goal. Candidate variables on which to
perform induction can be deduced from the effective quantification prefix of
the goal. By attempting to ripple out (q.v.) putative wave fronts indicated
by the wave rules applying to functions in the goal, and scoring each ac¬
cording to a number of heuristic criteria, inductions schemas which have a
higher likelihood of success can be chosen. This is recursion analysis. See
also (Bundy et al, 1989b).
reduction rule A rule which removes a constant expression or is a wave-rule
where the wave-front is a type constructor, and used in during symbolic,
evaluation (q.v.).
ripple analysis Synonym of recursion analysis.
rippling The process of rewriting an annotated goal using wave rules (q.v.). In
order that this process terminate wave fronts are restricted in their move¬
ments: outward movement (via longitudinal wave rules (q.v.)) is allowed
initially, possibly followed by one change of direction (via a transverse wave
rule (q.v.)) and inward movement (again using longitudinal rules). The first
phase is known as rippling out and may allow fertilization to take place.
The second phase is called rippling in and takes place if fertilization was
impossible or only partially successful at the end of the first phase. Rippling
in is restricted to cases where a sink (q.v.) lies below the wave front.
rippling in See rippling.
rippling out See rippling.
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sink Sinks correspond to universally quantified variables in the induction hypo¬
thesis (q.v.). Since such variables can be instantiated to any suitably typed
term sinks are capable of "swallowing" wave fronts (q.v.). Since a universal
variable may occur more than once in an IH care must be taken that sinks
corresponding to the same variable are instantiated with the same term.
Traditionally sinks are annotated as |sinkj.
skeleton The term which is the result of removing all the wave fronts from an
annotated term (q.v.).
soft wave front Synonym of potential wave front.
splitting (of wave fronts) A wave front consisting of two or more construct¬
ors can be split up into several smaller, composed wave fronts. E.g. the
compound wave front c(d(x)) can be split, to give
mantically identical, the distinct annotations must be taken into account
during syntactic operations such as rippling. C.f. joining.
step case See induction.
strong fertilization The case of fertilization (q.v.) in which the whole or part
of the induction conclusion matches the whole of the induction hypothesis,
allowing it to be rewritten simply to true. C.f. weak fertilization.
structural induction Induction based on the structure of the data type. For
freely generated data types this will be constructor induction (e.g. Peano
natural numbers, lists). Otherwise, destructor-style induction will usually
be required.
submethod A subme.t.hod is a method (q.v.) which cannot be used at the top
level of planning but which may be called by other methods and submethods.
symbolic evaluation The use of traditional (non-annotated) rewrite rules. Typ¬
ically these are theorems describing the non-recursive cases of a definition.
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tactic A program written in a meta level (q.v.) language which carries out object
level (q.v.) proofs. See section 2.2 for a more detailed description.
tactical A higher-order function for combining tactics into new tactics. See sec¬
tion 2.2 for a more detailed description.
theorem A library logical object (thm) used to store top level proofs. C.f. lemmas
and equations.
transverse wave rule A wave rule (q.v.) in which a wave front (q.v.) is moved
between positions which do not share a common path in the term. C.f.
longitudinal wave rules. These are usually applied in order to loose the wave
front in a sink (q.v.) by later rippling in (q.v.).
wave direction A wave front can be in the process of being rippled out (q.v.)
or rippled in (q.v.). Since this information is needed for the termination of
rippling it is added as an extra piece of annotation. Outward-moving fronts
are indicated front,fholel . inward-moving as front(hoje)
wave front Part of an annotated term (q.v.) which it is desirable to move or
remove. This usually corresponds to the difference or "extra syntax" between
an induction conclusion and hypothesis (q.v.). A wave front is part of the
erasure (q.v.) but not the skeleton (q.v.). Traditionally wave fronts and
holes are annotated as front(hoje) . C.f. wave hole.
wave hole Part of an annotated term (q.v.) which it is desirable to keep. This
is usually part of an induction conclusion (q.v.) which has a corresponding
part in the induction hypothesis (q.v.). A wave hole is part of both the
erasure and the skeleton (q.v.). C.f. wave front.
wave parsing The process carried out as definitions, theorems and lemmas are
loaded into CIAM and checked for having the form of a wave rule. If so. an
efficient representation of the rule is cached.
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wave rule A formula expressing a relation (typically equality or logic implica¬
tion) between two terms which has been parsed and annotated to show the
movement of wave fronts, wave holes and sinks (q.v.). If the relation between
terms is logical implication (—») the rule is called implicative. Wave rules are
usually written backwards to show the effect of using them as rewrite rules
at positions of positive polarity (q.v.). E.g. equation (A.3) would be written
as wave rule (A.4). See also conditional wave rule.
weak fertilization The case of fertilization (q.v.) where the induction hypothesis
is an equation or implication only one side ofwhich matches a subterm of the
induction conclusion. The induction hypothesis is then used as a rewrite in




Predicate calculus in as%R
H»C H.x: C» G H,H'»G
seq(C. newlxl) thin(x)
H» G H. x : C. H » G
■ hyp(x) X-elim(x)
H. x : A. H' » A H.x : void. H' » G
H» A H» B
H » A#B
H. x : A#B. H'.u: A. v. B » G
■ A-intro
H.x : A#B. H' » G




H. x : A —> B. H' » A H.x: A ^ B. H'. y:B»G
H.x : A —> B. H' » G
-elim(x.new[y])
H » A H » B
V-intro(left) V-intro(right)
H » A\B H » A\B
H. x : A\B, H',u:A»G H.x: A\B, H'. v : B» G






H, y.Vx: T.P. H'. z : P\a/x] » G
- V-elini(y,on(a),new[z])
H, y.Vx: T.P, H' » G
H» P\a/x\
3-int;ro(a)
H » 3x : T.P
H. y.3x: T.P. H', v : P[u/x]» G






This proves the lemma showing the limited number of intuitionistically distinct
formulas containing only one propositional variable and that only positively (or
negatively). I.e. that this subclass of the Heyting algebra (which is not a sub-
algebra) is finite.
Suppose T is a propositional formula containing only the propositional variable B
and that this occurs only positively (resp. negatively). Then T is intuitionistically
equivalent to one of
T _L B n-,5
(resp.
T X ->B
'Throughout, _L, T, and abbreviate resp, void, void —* void, and T —♦ void.
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Proof is by induction over formulas. Because of the connective —where B occurs
positively (resp. negatively) iff it occurs positively (resp. negatively) in the sue-
ceedent and negatively (resp. positively) in the antecedent, our induction needs to
contain simultaneously the positive and negative cases.
Base case: T is atomic
The only possibilities are that F is one of the following: T, X, or B.
Step case: T is compound
In the cases of the connectives A and V the equivalences provided by the following
tables suffice:
A T X B
T T X B -r-iB
X X X X X
B B X B B
-I-IB -.B X B -i-iB





B T B B -i-IB
->-.B T nnB B
A T X -iB
T T X -iB
X XXX
-iB -iB X —iB
V T X -iB
T T T T
X T X -iB
-iB T -iB —iB
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In the case of the connective —> we have that B occurs positively (resp. negatively)
in £ —> T iff B occurs positively (resp. negatively) in £ and negatively (resp.
positively) in T. These possibilities are covered by the following two tables:
- T X B -i-IB
T r X B
X T T T T
->B T JJ to -1-1B B
-> T X -iB
T T X -iB
X T T T
B T -.B -iB
-1-1B T -iB -iB
Q.E.D.
C.2 Lemma 2
This proves the simple lemma that our deduction system of appendix B can be
reduced to one where the hyp rule applies only to atomic formulas.
Proof is by induction on the formula used in the hyp rule, showing that we can
replace an instance of a non-atomic hyp with a subproof all of whose hyp's are
strictly simpler.
Suppose we have an instance of the hyp rule of the form
hyp(x)
Performing induction on A we have the following cases.
A = B#C'
We replace the instance with
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-hyp(u) -hyp(v)
..., u : A, v : B» A ... ,u : A,v : B» B
A-intro




We replace the instance with
■ hyp(y) -hyp(z)
A» A .. .,y : A.z : B» B
-eliralx.new z|)
I\ z : (.4 —> B), T'. y : A» B
> -introfnewly])
r, i : (A - B). r'» A -> B
A = B\C
We replace the instance with
■ hyp(n) hyp(v)
.. .11 : A» A . ... v : B» B
■ V-intro(left) V-intro(right)




Here the instance is
; : hyp(y)
T. y : Vz : T.B. V» Mz : T.B
where B'\r./z\=„B. This is replaced by
hyp(v)
... ,v : Slit/zl >> B'ln/zl
V-elim(y,on(u),new[v])
T.y : Vz : T.B, T >> B'\ulz\
: V-intro(new[ul)
T. y : Vz : T.B. T' >> Vz : T.B'
Note that the new hyp use is justifies since B\n/x]=nB'\u/z\.
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A = 3x : T.B
Here the instance is
r.y : 3z : T.B.V» 3z : T.B'





..v : B\u/r\» 3z : T.B'
- 3-elini(y,new[n,v])
r. y : 3x : T.B. T'» 3z : T.B'
Note that the new hyp use is justifies since B\u/x\=nB'\u/z\.
C.2.1 Notes
We could refine the proof further to ensure that only prepositional variables are
used in hyp rules by replacing instances of hyp(void) with _L-elim.
In dealing with the two quantifier cases we have noted that the hyp rule only
requires the fertilizer and fertilizee to be identical upto ^-convertibility, and we
showed that the manipulation of bound variables occurring in these cases preserves
that property. This should have been done for the other cases considered, but since
no bound variables are affected it was not mentioned.
The process described above is compatible with cut-elimination and our revised
proof system S' since we can obtain a cut-free proof in S' with only atomic hyp's
by carrying out (in S') first cut-elimination and then the process described above
(i.e. no cuts are introduced).
229
C.3 Lemma 3: WRONG
We define a proof system S' similar to our original system S and show that they
are equivalent.
Our proof system S is defined in appendix B (\ref{pred-calc-app}) of the thesis.











T. T', v : V\n/x] » G
- 3-elim (y,new[u,v])
r. y : 3.x : T.V. T' » G
We show that S and S1 are equivalent, i.e. that a sequent can be proved in one iff
it can be proved in the other, by giving derived rules for each system in the other.
Since the two systems differ only in the elimination rules described above these
are the only ones we will show.
First, assume we are working in the system S. Then the above rules can be derived
simply by thinning. All derivations have the same basic shape as that for —» -elim':
r.r'».4 V.V'.yB»G
■ thin(x) • ■ ihin(x)
T,x-.(A^B),F» A T, x : (A —> B), T'.y : B» G
— -elim(x.new[yl)
r. x: (a - B). r'» g
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Equally, we can do the converse using cuts. All derivations have the same basic j\
shape as that for —♦ -elim:
r, r', x : (A - B)» A
r,TJ,w:(A-> B)»-A - B
hyp(w)
r. r', w : (A —* B). x : (A —* B),» A
thin(w)'
r,r',i«: (A -> B) »A
T,x: (A -» B
r,V/(.
Note that three cuts were introduced here. The derivation is complicated by the
need to preserve variable names amongst the declarations. If this requirement, can
be overlooked then only ong-GHtTs-required.
We have proved elsewhere cut-elimination theorems for both S and S' which, with
the above derivations, allows 11s to-Infer the existence of transformations from
(arbitrary) proofs in one system to cut-free proofs in the other.
C.3.1 Notes
We have been careful over the use of declaration names in the proofs above since
these are important in a constructive logic. If one assumes that derivations in
S or S' are part of a larger, general OYSTER proof then one must take care over
how the thinning rule and the new elimination rules are represented since other
hypotheses may be affected. One should consider our presentations of predicate
logic in OYSTER merely as abbreviations of standard proofs with thinning etc.
implemented by some form of meta-level elision.
We have concentrated on the —> -elim' in the above proof, though other elimination
rules as indicated are changed in S1. However, it appears that we only ever need
the change to the —> -elim rule in the proofs which apply this lemma.
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C.4 Lemma 4: WRONG
Here we prove a technical lemma necessary for a case in the main correctness proof
(lemma 9).
If
r,C\K] -> V,C\A] » V j
\J
where, in addition the assumptions made in lemma 9, we also have that V is
atomic and does not occur in T. C\K\ or C\A], then
r.C(X]» C\K]
C.4.1 Proof
Proof is by induction on the proof of the initial sequent. By lemma 3 we may
assume that this is a cut-free proof in S'. Since V is atomic there can be no intro
rules on any main path to the root (i.e. a path which only passes through the
major premisses of any elimination rule applications). By a simple induction it
can be shown that every sequent on a main path (before a possible —> -elim' on
C[K] —> V) has the form
A,C\K\ V,C\A) » V
where P >> A and A
If there were no —> -elim' on C\K] —> V then we would have an infinite branch
in the proof: contradiction. Therefore, at some point we have an —> -elim' on
C\K\ V. i.e.
■ 7T
A,C\A]»C[K] A. C[j4], V» V . ,
> -elim
A.C\K] -> V.C\A] » V
From 7t we have A,C[A] » C\K\ and. since T >> A. r.C[T] >> C\K\ as desired.
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C.5 Lemma 5: cut-elimination theorem for S
WRONG
The proof systems S and S' for representing intuitionistic. first-order medicate
logic in NuPRL are described in appendix B of the thesis\Aref{pred-calc-app}
The proof given here is based on that in (J.-Y. Girard & Taylor. 1989). Since the
formulation used in our system S has "persistent" hypotheses, i.e. they are not
removed by elimination rules, and differs in other ways from the standard Gent.zen
presentation we have formulated the cut-reduction lemma as follows.
First we must define a notion of one hypothesis list being included within another.
Since the definition of a valid hypothesis list in NuPRL is complicated enough
as it is, we define inclusion as: for two valid hypothesis lists P and A. we say P
is included in A (P C A) iff there is a sequence of applications of the thin rule
leading from T >> void to A >> void. Such a sequence of thins will be displayed
as:
Note that we regard the various permutations of a hypothesis list as identical as
long as they are valid (some perms maybe be invalid because of bound variable
scoping). We do. however, require that bound variable names be preserved since
these may be important in a constructive proof.
Now we can state the cut-reduction lemma: let T >> C and T'. x : C » Q be
sequents with proofs 7r and 7r' and such that their degrees d(7r). d(V) < d, and
where P. P' C A. Then there is a proof 57 of the sequent A >> Q with degree < d.
and lenn eries. We give here a brief proof of theditrelimination




The proof is by induction on the sum of the heights of the two proofs, h(ir) +h(ir').
Suppose 7r and it' have the forms:
j !








There are several subcases.
7r is an axiom
I.e. we have
■ hyp(y)*{lr»c
where y : C € T. Since, therefore, y : C € A we can replace every reference in V
to x with one to y giving us tt'. For W we then have
r,y : C » Q
A »g
7r is an axiom
I.e. we have
{r'. x : I: c» g





As (J.-Y. Girard & Taylor, 1989) notes, by giving preference to the first course
when both tt and tt' are axioms we arbitrarily privilege 7r (unless, of course, C = g
and x s y).
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r is a structural rule





We apply the IH to 7ri and ir to get. a proofU ofA >> Q. since Tf C T => T* C A.
r' is a structural rule








T'.x : C» G




In the second case we apply the IH to 7T and it\ to get a proofs? of a >> Q. since
r* c r ==> r* c a.
r is a logical rule other than a right one of the principal formula C
I.e. r is of the form:
( : "h :7r™
7T<Pi >>c ... rm »c
i r» c
Applying the IH to tand 7r' we get:
I- on • u/nlAi » g ... Am » gA »Q
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r' is a logical rule other than a left one of the principal formula x : C
I.e. r' is of the form:
Note: it wouldn't matter in system S if iJ did affect x : C since this would remain
among the hyp list, of the premisses anyway, unlike in system S'.
Both r and r' are logical rules s.t. r is a right logical rule of C and r' is
a left logical rule for r. : C
We deal here only with the cases that differ from our standard system S: other¬
wise exactly the same treatment can be given. There are the following subcases
depending 011 the topmost connector of C.
; 7r'i ; 7r'„
/\t\,x-.C»G ... r'n,x:C»i6
. T',x:C»g
Applying the IH to it and 7r', we get:
C = £ KT
r» e r»r




T >> £ T', u : £. v : T >> Q
r » 7 A, v : T» £ A.« : £, v : T» Q
seq(f)











r', I: £ -* t» 6
-elim
r' >> £ V.y : £» T
A»£ A.y:£»T T\z:T»G
—seq(£)







lr» j~! v 2
t IT', ?ij : T\ » Q F', u-> \ T<±» G
Tr. x : T\ V To» G
t»t, T'.ui-ri»g
V-elim
A >> Ti A. k, : Ti » g
a» g
*1(T)





r» 3x : T.B




T » B\a/x\ r': v : B'\a/y} » G




Note that we have allowed here for ^-convertibility between B and B'\r./y\, and
that the substitution applied to the subproof 7r'i leaves the root sequent unchanged
apart from where indicated by virtue of the eigen-condition on u.
C.6 Lemma 6: form of context
We show that the context of a formula T can be put in a form which is linear in
size and membership of which can be checked in linear time (w.r.t. the size of J-).
The context of a formula is a set of sets of formulas. When fully enumerated the
context, is exponentially in size w.r.t. that of the formula. However, for a formula
T containing no repeated propositional variables (which is the kind we consider),
it can be shown that
context)!?7) =< A. B >
where we define
< A. B >— {A U x\x 6 B}
and s.t.
AC.yjB = 0 (C.l)
B is pairwise disjoint (C.2)
In other words, each propositional variable appearing in a context appears either
in every subset (those in A) or in exactly one (i.e. in one member of B). We also
show a means of calculating the pair < A. B > in time linear w.r.t. the size of T.
C.6.1 Proof
Recall first that the function context is defined in the thesis as:
context)]-]) = {0}
context(C[-]#Z>) = {{!>}} ® context(C[-]) + symmetric case
context(C]-]|X1) = context(C[-]) + symmetric case
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context(C —> V[\) — {{C}} ® context(£>[-])
context(C[-] —> Z>) = context(C[-]) where V is atomic
context(C[-] —» P#Q) = context(C[-] —> V) U context(C[-] —» Q)
context(C[-] —» V\Q) = context(C[-])
context(C[-] —i> V —» Q) = {jf}} ® context(C[-] —» Q)
where
A ® B = {x U y\x. e A A y € B}
We now give a computationally oriented definition (context1)2:
context'([•]) = (0, {0})
context'(C\-]#V) = ({V} U A. B) where context1 (C[-]) = (A B)
+ symmetric case
context1 (C[-]|X>) = context1 (C[•]) 4- symmetric case
context1 (C —> T>\-\) = ({C} U A. B) where context1 (!>[■]) = (A. B)
context1 (C[-] —> T>) — context1 (C[-J) where T> is atomic
context1 (C\-\ —> 2-"#<2) = (Ai U Ao, B\ U Bo) where
context1 (C[-J —> V) = (Ai, B\) and
context1 (C[-j —> Q) = (Ao.Bo)
context1 (C[-] —» V\Q) = context1 (C[-])
context1 (C[-] —» V —> Q) = ({V} U A. B) where context '(£[•] —< Q) — (A. B)
First we show the equivalence of these two definitions, i.e. that
context1 (iF) — (A. B) ==S> contextfF") =< A. B >
Proof is by induction using the computational order used in both definitions.




We have < 0.(0} >= {0} as required, with conditions (C.l) and (C.2) both
satisified.
n\ = cmv
By IH we may suppose that
context(C[-]) =< A. B >
where (A, B) = context '((?[•]). Thus, it remains to show that
< {£>} U A. B >= {{£>}}® < A. B >
But this is immediate from the definitions of ® and <•,•>. Condition (C.2)
is inherited from the IH, while condition (C.l) follows from the fact that the
propositional variables of T>. and therefore V itself, do not appear in C\-\. [It
seems too obvious to require proof here that all members of U-B are subformulas
ofC[.].[
The symmetric case is proved similarly.
m = c[-i \v
We have the result required directly from the IH. Similarly for the symmetric case.
m = c - v[)
The proof is identical to that in section C.6.1.
T\-] = C[-] —» V where V is atomic
The proof is identical to that of section C.6.1.
m =C[ ] - r#Q
Let; us suppose that; context'(C[-] —» V) = (A\.B\) and context'(C[-] —♦ Q) =
(Ao. Bo). Then by IH we have context(C[-] —> V) =< Ai, B\ > and context(C[-] —>
Q) =< Ao. Bo >. and must show that
< A\. B\ > U <C Ao. Bo >=< Ai U Ao. B\ U Bo >
We do this by first showing that Bi = Bo. In fact, if context '(£[■]) = (A'. B')
for some A' and B'. then for any formula 72. context '(£[•] —» 72) = (A". B') for
some A". Proof, which we omit here, is by induction on 72.
Hence, we have Bj = Bo = B' for which condition (C.2) follows from the IH.
And since the IHs now give us Ai D \J B' — 0 and Ao ft \JB' = 0. condition (C.l)
immediately follows.
r\.}=C\.\^V\Q
The proof is identical to that of section C.6.1.
T[)=C\-}-oV Q
The proof is identical to that section C.6.1.
C.6.2 Computation and complexity
The above proof provides an algorithm for caclulating the pair (A, B). From the
computation order it can be seen that this algorithm has time complexity
where sf-B) is the size of the input formula. From conditions (C.l) and (C.2) we
can see that the output pair contains at most one occurrence of non-overlapping
subformulas of T. and thus that the algorithm also has space complexity 0(s(B")).
Now that we have shown that a context can be written in the form < A. B >
we also have a way to check membership in time Oisif)). To check whether
C € contextf^J-]). where context' (/"[•]) = (A, B). we :
1. Check whether C 6 A: if so, the answer is in the affirmative.
2. Check whether C 6 D for each D G B: if so. the answer is in the affirmative,
otherwise the negative.
C.7 Lemma 7
This is a technical lemma used in other lemmas.
Let V be any formula in which no propositional variable is repeated, and F any
valid hypothesis list s.t. all the free vars of V are declared there. Then, if none of
the propositional vars of T> occur positively in F and T is consistent,
ry>D
C.7.1 Proof
Proof is by induction over a supposed proof of F >> V.
hyp rule
This presupposes that V G T and therefore that at least one prop. var. of T> occurs






Since the IH applies to T' if it applies to T. we have
FV>P
by IH. and. therefore, a contradiction.
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C.7.2 _L-elim rule
This supposition contradicts the hypothesis that T is consistent.
C.7.3 A-intro
We have:
r » Vi r >> v2
r» t>i#t>2










r» Vi -> v.
The IH can be applied to T,V\ » V2. because of the condition on V. to yield
a contradiction. We additionally require that T. V\ be consistent. This follows
simply from the interpolation theorem applied to T.Vi >> void.
C.7.6 A-elim rule
The IH applies equally to the premises after an A-elim rule has been applied, so
that we get a contradiction in the usual way.
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C.7.7 V-elim rule
The IH applies equally to either of the premisses after an V-elim rule has been
applied, so that we get a contradiction in the usual way.
C.7.8 —>~elim rule
We have:
r..4-B»,4 T.A-+ B.B »V
» -elim
T.A -> B » V
We may apply the IH to the right-hand premise for the same reasons as in section
C.T.5 to yield a contradiction.
Q.E.D.
C.8 Lemma 8
This lemma deals with the case of disjunction in the main correctness theorem.
If
r.C\K] » C\A]\V
and the usual syntactic conditions apply to this sequent then
T.C\K) »C\A]
Note that we may assume that the original formula has had boolean simplification
applied so that void only occurs in subformulas of the form V —» void. i.e.
negation. In paritcular, no subformula equivalent to true can occur.
C.8.1 Proof
Proof is by induction over the proof of IhCJAT] >> C[.4]|Z>. We consider all paths
going only through the RHS premise of —»-elim rules and upto the first application
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of V-intro (each such branch mush have at least one such point, otherwise there is
no possibility of applying the hyp rule to close the branch because of the conditions
on V). Let us call these nodes A,- >> C[j4]|2?.
There are two cases. If the V-int.ro for node A, >> is a right int.ro then
we have A, » V. but this is impossible by lemma 7. Hence we must have left









we get a proof of T >> C\A\.
C.9 Lemma 10
This is a technical lemma concerned with the —» case of the main correctness
theorem.
If
V -> Q.V,C\K\ —» V» V
where T> is atomic and the usual syntactic conditions apply, then
T.C\K] —> V» V
C.9.1 Proof
Proof is by induction over the proof of the first sequent,
hyp rule
From the syntactic conditions it is impossible that V a T.
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thin rule
There are two cases. If T> —» Q is the thinned formula then we may use the proof
of the premise as the proof of our goal. Otherwise we may apply the IH to the
premise and the thin rule to the resulting proof.
X-elim rule
We must have X € T. so that the X-elim rule can also be used to prove our goal,
intro rules
Since V is atomic there are no intro rules to consider.
A-elim rule
We have
V -> Q, T. A#B. C\K\ -> V. A. B » D
A-elim
V Q. T', A#B. C\K] ->V»V
where F = F'. A#B. We may apply the IH to the premise and apply the A-elim





The proof in this case is analogous to that in the preceding section.
—>-elim rule
There are two cases to consider here. First, if the eliminated formula is V —> Q
then we have:
V —> Q, T,C\K\ -» t>» V
> -elim
V - Q.T.C\K] -+V»V
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We may apply the IH to the (identical) premise to yield our goal directly.
In the second case the eliminate formula is a member of T. In this case we may ap¬




Iterating the above lemma to remove formulas of the form V —» Q from I\ and
applying the interpolation theorem we get the corollary that:
T.C[K\ -*V»V
where V is atomic and the usual syntactic conditions apply, implies
r» v
C.10 Lemma 11
This lemma shows that adding axioms at the sequent level is equivalent to adding
them at the inference rule level.
Let 15 be a formula and T a valid hypothesis list. s.t. all the free vars of S are
declared in I\ Now suppose we augment the proof system >> by augmenting it







If, is clear fhaf any proof in >> may be carried out unchanged in >>+5 so that,











Extract : rec(z. (atom|atom)|((atom#z)|(atom#(z#z))))
metaterm == term_of (metaterm)
tvar(u) == inl(inl(w))
tcon(c) == inl(inr(c))
tuna(/. a) == inr(inl(< f.a >))
tbin(/. a. b) —= inr(inr(< f.< a,b»))
metascheme : complete
h \fplii : metaterm —» Ul.
(Vj; : atom./;W(tvar(?;))) —>
(Vc : atom./)/i.i(tcon(r))) —<
(V/ : atom.Va : metaterm.p/u(o,) —» j)/w(tuna(/. a))) —»













Ex Li act : atom —> pnat —> pnat —» pnat
: complete









b metaterm —> env —» f_env —» pnat





zero.env == term_of (zero_env)
zero_f_env : complete
b f.env
Extract :< A_0, < A_A_(1 A_A_.A_0 >>
zero_f_env == term_of(zero_f_env)
atom_decidable : complete
b Vra : atom.Vfc : atom.o. = 6 in atom V (->a = b in atom)
extend : complete
b atom —> pnat —» env —> env
Extract : At.An.Ac.Ar/.(At0.decide(?)0;_n; _e(a)))(...)
extendft, n. e) " term.of (extend)(i;)(n)(e)
extend_con : complete
b atom —> pnat —> f.env —» f_env
Extract : A<;.An.A/.spread(/; vO. vl. < Aa.(Aw3.decide(t3: _n; _?;0(a)))(...), til >)
extend_con(c, n, f) == term_of(extend_con)(c)(n)(/)
extend_una : complete
b atom —» (pnat —> pnat) —» f_env —> f_env
Extract : A/.Afc.Ae.spread(e; vO, vl.spread(vl; v3, v4. < vO,... >))
extend.una(f.k.e) —— term_of(extend_una)(/)(/.:)(e)
extend.bin : complete
b atom —> (pnat —> pnat —> pnat) —» f_env —» f_env




Extract :< Aa.decide(term_of(atonudecidable)(o,)( "0"); _0; _.0).... >
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basic == term_of(basic_f _env)
list_to_env : complete
b (atom#pnat) list —» env
Extract : AZ.Aa.list_ind(i; 0; h, n.spread(/i: jjO, j;1 ))
list_to_env(l) == term_of (list_to_env)(/)
rewrite : complete
b U1
Extract : metaterm —> metaterm
rewrite == term_of (rewrite)
simp : complete
b f_env —» U1
Extract : A/.
{z : rewrite|Vm : metaterm.Ve : emi.eval(m. e. f) = eval(z(rn),e. f) in pnat}
simp(/) == term_of (simp)(/)
unroll_meta : complete
b Vm : metaterm.
m in ((atom|atom)|((atom#metaterm)|(atom#(metaterm#metaterm))))
unroll_meta2 : complete
b Va : metaterm.Vft : metaterm.a = b in metaterm —>
a = b in ((atom|atom)|((atom#metaterm)|(atom#(metaterm#metaterm))))
roll_meta : complete




(3/ : atom.a = tvar(/)inmetaterm)V
(3/ : atom.a = tcon(/) in metaterm)V
(3/ : atom.3x : metaterm.a = tuna(/, x) in metaterm)V
(3/ : atom.3x : metaterm.3?/ : metaterm.a = tbin(/. x. y) in metaterm)
metaterm_decidable : complete
b Va : metaterm.Vfr : metaterm.a — b in metaterm V (-in: = b in metaterm)
reflect : complete
b V/ : f_env.Vs : simp(/).Vt : pnat.Vm : metaterm.Ve : env.
t = eval(m, e, /) in pnat —» t = eval(s(m), e, f) in pnat
basic.parts : complete
b 3c : con_env.3« : una_env.3i> : bin_env.basic =< c. < u. b» in f_env
left_destruct : complete
b Va : Ul.Vfe : Ul.Vx : a.Vi; : a.inl(z) = inl(jy) in (a V b) —» x = y in a
right_destruct : complete
b Va : Ul.Vfr : Ul.Vx : h.Vj/ : ft.inr(x) = inr(?/) in (a V 6) —> x = y in b
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union_contra : complete
h Va : Ul.Vft : Ul.Vi : a.Vy : b.->inl(x) = inr(i/) in (a V b)
union_contra_bis : complete
I- Vo,: Ul.Vft : Ul.Vi : a.V?/ : ft.-dnr(y) = inl(i) in (a V b)
pair_destruct : complete
I- Vo,: Ul.Vft : Ul.Vi/.: a.\/v : a.\/x : b.Vy : b.
< u, x >=< v. y > in (a A b) —> (u = v in a A x = y in ft)
var_wff : complete
h Vv : atom.tvar)?;) in metaterm
con.wff : complete
h Vc : atom.tcon(c) in metaterm
una_wff : complete
I- V/ : atom.V<7, : metaterm.tuna(/. a) in metaterm
bin_wff : complete
(- V/ : atom.Vo, : metaterm.Vft : metaterm.tbin(/. a, ft) in metaterm
partial : complete
h U1 —» U1




h Vt : U1.V.T : f.ok(z) in ?(f)
failwith(r) == inr(r)
failwith.wff : complete
t- Vt: Ul.Va : atom.failwith(a) in ?(t)
fail == failwith(" ~ ")
decidable : complete
h U1 —> U1
Extract : Ap.(pV (~7>))




/* context calculation routines */


















* calculate the context for a position in a term. Switch is an
* implementational detail. Note: contexts and positions are in
* reverse order.
*/
context ( [21 Rest] ,C=>A,ConIu.ConUut .Switch, Pol) : - '/. implication
split_prod(ConIn,C,NewCon),
context(Rest,A,NewCon.ConQut,Switch,Pol).
context ( [1 iRest] , A=>C,ConIn,ConOut .Switch,Pol) : - '/. special






































































Higher-order wave rule source
/* code for higher-order pattern unification.
* See Miller and Nipkow.
*/
/* because we are using \\ and @ rather than lambda and of we need to




substituted(Var\\Pred, Insts, SubFrees, Bound, AvarWSpred)
! , substituted(Pred,[(Var-Avar)IInsts] ,[Avar ISubFrees],Bound,Spred).
substituted(Var\\Pred, Insts, SubFrees, Bound, VarWSpred)




:-op(250,yfx,'fi ' ) . */,meta application













































write('unify: non bound var and distinct argument'),
fail
).















































is_pattern(LArgs , Vars, [] ) , '/.check is a pattern
destruct(R,Vars,RHead,RArgs),
ground (RHead) , '/.rigid RHS
\+((member(RHead,Vars) ,\+member(RHead,LArgs))) , '/.ditto
























































/* eta-expand L or R until they both have the same number of top-level













































/* predicates for conversion */



















'/.the constructive versions of the above, i.e. mode(+, + ,-).
abs ([] ,Body, Body) .
abs([XIVars],Body,(X\\A)) : -
abs(Vars,Body,A).








/* testing some higher-order wave rules */
/* Note: to avoid variable capture on the righthand side we don't
* allow logical vars to appear in the scope of an explicit lambda
* binding. All this restriction can be messy all RHS's are normalised
* after unification.
*/
ho_wave(wave ® F 0 (wave 0 G 0 X), /.join
wave 0 ((f\\(g\\(x\\f ® (g ® x)))) ® F ® G) ® X
).
/*
ho_wave(plus ® (wave ® (x\\s ® (D ® x)) 0 U) ® V,
wave @ s @ (plus ® (wave 0 D 0 U) 0 V)
).
ho_wave(even ® (wave 0 (x\\s @ (s ® (D @ x))) 0 U),
even 0 (wave 0 D 0 U)
).
ho_wave(eq 0 (wave 0 (x\\s @ (D1 ® x)) 0 U) °/.s cancellation
® (wave 0 (x\\s ® (D2 @ x)) 0 V),
eq 0 (wave 0 D1 0 U) 0 (wave 0 D2 0 V)
).
ho_wave(member ® X ® (wave 0 (x\\cons ® H 0 (D 0 x)) 0 T),
wave 0 ((y\\(x\\ \ 0 y 0 x)) 0 (eq 0 X 0 H)) 0
(member 0X0 (wave 0 D @ T))
).
ho_wave(all 0 T 0 (xWwave 0 (z\\ \ 0 (D 0 z) 0 Q) 0 (P 0 x)),
wave 0 ((q\\x\\ \ 0 x 0 q) 0 Q) '/.note P 0 x
0 (all 0 T 0 ((d\\p\\x\\wave 0 d 0 (p @ x)) ® D 0 P))
).
ho_wave(map ® F 0 (wave 0 (x\\cons 0 H 0 (D 0 x)) 0 T),
wave 0 ((y\\(x\\cons 0 y @ x)) @ (app 0 F 0 H))
0 (map 0 F 0 (wave 0 D 0 T))
).
ho_wave(append 0 (wave 0 (x\\cons 0 H 0 (D 0 x)) 0 T) 0 B,
wave 0 ((y\\(x\\cons 0 y 0 x)) 0 II)
0 (append 0 (wave 0 D 0 T) 0 B)
).
ho_wave(eq 0 (wave 0 (xWcons 0 H 0 (C 0 x)) 0 A) '/.cons cancellation
0 (wave 0 (xWcons 0 H 0 (D 0 x)) 0 B),
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eq 0 (wave 0 C ® A) 0 (wave ® D 0 B)
).
ho_wave(app 0 (wave 0 (x\\comp 8 F 8 (D 0 x)) 0 G) 0 X,
wave 0 ((y\\(x\\y 0 x)) 0 (app 0 F)) 0 (app 0 (wave 0 D 0 G) 0 X)
).
ho_wave(app 0 (wave 0 (xWcomp 0 (D of x) 0 G) 0 F) 0 X, '/.sideways?
app 0 (wave 0 D 0 F) 0 (wave 0 ((y\\x\\app 0 y 0 x) 0 G) 0 X)
).
"/.multi-hole rules: see bbn 723
ho_wave(len 0 (wave2 0 (x\\y\\append 0 (C0x®y) 0 (D0x®y)) 0 LI 0 L2),
wave2 0 (x\\y\\plus 0 x 0 y)
0 (len 0 (wave2 8 C (! LI <a L2))
\
0 (len 0 (wave2 0 D ®! LI <a L2))
) '
ho_wave(eq 0 (wave2 0 (xWyWplus 0! (C10x0y) 0 (D10x0y)) 0 Ul 0 VI)
0 (wave2 0 (xWyWplus 0! (C2(Px®y) 0 (D20x@y)) 0 U2 0 V2) ,
wave2 0 (x\\y\\ # 0 x 0 y)
0 (eq 0 (wave2 0 CI 0 Ul <a vi) © (wave2 0 C2 0 U2 0 V2))
0 (eq 0 (wave2 0 D1 0 Ul (a vi) ® (wave2 0 D2 0 U2 0 V2))
) •
ho_wave(eq 0 (wave2 0 (xWyWplus 0 (C10x®y) 0 (D10x®y)) 0 Ul 0 VI)
0 (wave2 0 (xWyWplus 0 (C20x0y) 0 (D2@x0y)) 0 V2 0 U2),
wave2 0 (x\\y\\ # 0 x 0 y)
0 (eq 0 (wave2 0 CI 0 Ul «a vi) ® (wave2 0 D2 0 V2 0 U2))
0 (eq 0 (wave2 0 D1 0 Ul ta vi) ® (wave2 0 C2 0 V2 0 U2))
).
*/
ho_wave(eq 0 (wave2 0 (xWyWplus 0 (CI 0 x) 0 (D1 0 y)) 0 Ul 0 VI)
0 (wave2 0 (xWyWplus 0 (C2 0 x) 0 (D2 0 y)) 0 U2 0 V2),
wave2 0 (x\\y\\ # 0 x ® y)
0 (eq 0 (wave 0 CI 0 Ul) 0 (wave 0 C2 0 U2))
0 (eq 0 (wave 0 D1 0 VI) 0 (wave 0 D2 0 V2))
).
ho_wave(eq 0 (wave2 0 (xWyWplus 0 (CI 0 x) 0 (D1 0 y)) 0 Ul 0 VI)
0 (wave2 0 (xWyWplus 0 (C2 0 y) 0 (D2 0 x)) 0 V2 0 U2),
wave2 0 (x\\y\\ # 0 x 0 y)
0 (eq 0 (wave 0 CI 0 Ul) 0 (wave 0 D2 0 V2))




ho_wave(all 0 T 0 (x\\wave 0 (z\\ # 0 P 0 (D 0 z)) 0 (Q 0 x)),
wave 0 ((p\\z\\ # 0 p 0 z) 0 P)
0 (all 0 T 0 ((d\\q\\x\\wave 0 d 0 (q 0 x)) 0 D 0 Q))
).
ho_wave(wave 0 (x\\all 0 T 0 (z\\D 0 *)) 0 Q, '/.quantifier elimination
wave 0 D 0 Q
263
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/* trial examples */
tterm(plus © (wave © C © x)
© (wave © D © y),
[C.D] ) .
tterm2(eq © (plus © (wave © C © x) ©(wave © D © y))
© (wave © E © z) ,
[C, D, E]
).
tterm3(eq © (wave © s © x) © (wave © s © y),
[]
).
tterm4(f © (wave © C © x) © (wave © D © y),
[C, D]
).
tterm5(even © (wave © C © x), [C]) .
tterm6(even © (plus © (wave © C © x) © (wave © D © y)),
[C,D]
).
tterm7(plus © (wave © (x\\s © (s S (C fi x))) © x)
© (wave © D © y) ,
[C.D]
).
tterm8(plus © (wave © (x\\s © (s © x)) © x) © y,
[]
).




ttermlO(eq 8 (plus ® (wave ® C 8 x)
8 (plus 8 (wave 8 D ® y) 8 (wave 8 E 8 z)))
8 (plus 8 (plus 8 (wave 8 C 8 x) 8 (wave 8 D 8 y))
8 (wave 8 E 8 z)),
[C, D, E]
).
ttermll(member 8x8 (wave 8 D 8 1),[D]).
tterml2(all 8 pnat 8 (xWwave 8 (z\\ \ 8 z 8 q) 8 p), []) .
tterml3(all 8 pnat 8 (xWwave 8 (z\\ \ 8 z 8 q) 8 (p 8 x)),[]).
tterml4(eq 8 (map 8 f 8 (append 8 (wave 8 C 8 x) 8 (wave 8 D 8 y)))
8 (append 8 (map 8 f 8 (wave 8 C 8 x))
8 (map 8 f 8 (wave 8 D 8 y))),
[C,D]
).
tterml5(eq 8 (map 8 (comp 8 (wave 8 C 8 f) 8 (wave 8 D 8 g))
8 (wave 8 E 8 1))
8 (map 8 (wave 8 C 8 f)
8 (map 8 (wave 8 D 8 g) 8 (wave 8 E 8 1))),
[C, D, E]
).
tterml6(comp 8 (wave 8 C 8 f) 8 (wave 8 D 8 g) 8 x,[C,D]).
tterml7(eq 8 (len 8 (wave2 8 (x\\y\\append 8 x 8 y) 8 a 8 b))
8 (len 8 (wave2 8 (x\\y\\append ®y8x)8a®b)),
[]
).
tterml8(len 8 (wave2 8 (xWyWappend 8 x 8 y) 8 a 8 b),
[]
).
tterml9(eq 8 (wave2 8 (x\\y\\plus 8 x 8 y) 8 a 8 b)
8 (wave2 8 (x\\y\\plus 8 y 8 x) 8 a 8 b),
[]
).
tterm20(eq 8 (wave2 8 (xWyWplus 8 y 8 x) 8 b 8 a)
8 (wave2 8 (xWyWplus 8 x 8 y) 8 b 8 a) ,
[]
).
tterm21(all 8 pnat 8 (xWwave 8 (z\\ # 8 p 8 (neg 8 z)) 8 (q 8 x)),
[]
).
tterm22(all 8 pnat 8 (xWwave 8 (z\\ \ 8 (neg 8 z) 8 q) 8 (p 8 x)),
□
).












~exp_at(Term,Pos, (wave @ G S Y)),
\+((eta_normal(G,GG),(var(GG);GG=(X\\X))))
)).











reverse (Args , RArgs ) ,









/* routines for conversion between object and abstract syntax */







































/* convert abstract to concrete: input should be normalised */
convert_down(Var,Var)
var(Var),!.






























/* stuff needed to update Oyster's substituted/5 and freevarinterm/2 */
'/.existing Oyster code





!, append(BoundVars, [Term], [H|T]), freevarinterm(Term, Var),
\+ member(Var, BoundVars).
freevarinterm((_:Tl#_), Var) freevarinterm(Tl,Var).
freevarinterm((V:_#T2), Var) !, freevarinterm(T2,Var), \+ Var = V.
freevarinterm((_:T1=>_), Var) freevarinterm(Tl,Var).
freevarinterm((V:_=>T2), Var) !, freevarinterm(T2,Var), \+ Var = V.
freevarinterm(({_:Tl\_}), Var) freevarinterm(Tl,Var).




freevarinterm(lambda(V,T), Var) !, freevarinterm(T, Var), \+ V = Var.
freevarinterm(Var,Var) ttvar(Var).
freevarinterm(Tm, Var)




substituted/Term, _ , _ , Bound, Term) member(Term,Bound),!.
substituted(Term, Insts, _ , Bound, Instd)
member((Term - Instd), Insts), !, \+ member(Term, Bound).
substituted(su(Term,New,Old),Insts,Subtrees,Bound ,SS) : -




substituted({Var:Type\Pred}, Insts, SubFrees, Bound, {Avar:Stype\Spred})
member(Var, SubFrees),
substituted(Type, Insts, SubFrees, Bound, Stype),
modify(Var, Avar), \+ member(Avar, SubFrees), !,
substituted(Pred, [(Var-Avar)IInsts], [AvarISubFrees], Bound, Spred)
substituted({Var:Type\Pred}, Insts, SubFrees, Bound, {Var:Stype\Spred})
substituted(Type, Insts, SubFrees, Bound, Stype),
substituted(Pred, Insts, SubFrees, [VarlBound], Spred).
substituted((Var:Type#Pred) , Insts, SubFrees, Bound, (Avar:Stype#Spred))
member(Var, SubFrees),
substituted(Type, Insts, SubFrees, Bound, Stype),
modify(Var, Avar), \+ member(Avar, SubFrees),
i
substituted(Pred, [(Var-Avar)IInsts] , [AvarISubFrees], Bound, Spred)
substituted((Var:Type#Pred) , Insts, SubFrees, Bound, (Var:Stype#Spred))
substituted(Type, Insts, SubFrees, Bound, Stype),
substituted(Pred, Insts, SubFrees, [VarlBound], Spred).
substituted/(Var:Type=>Pred), Insts .SubFrees.Bound,(Avar:Stype=>Spred)):-
member(Var, SubFrees),!,
substituted/Type, Insts, SubFrees, Bound, Stype),
modify(Var, Avar), \+ member/Avar, SubFrees),!,
substituted(Pred, [(Var-Avar)IInsts] , [AvarISubFrees], Bound, Spred)
substituted((Var:Type=>Pred),Insts .SubFrees.Bound,(Var :Stype=>Spred))
!,substituted(Type, Insts, SubFrees, Bound, Stype),
substituted(Pred, Insts, SubFrees, [VarlBound], Spred).
'/.new piece
substituted(Var\\Pred, Insts, SubFrees, Bound, AvarWSpred) :-
member(Var, SubFrees), modify(Var, Avar), \+ member/Avar, SubFrees),
i
substituted(Pred, [(Var-Avar)IInsts] , [Avar ISubFrees], Bound, Spred)
substituted(Var\\Pred, Insts, SubFrees, Bound, VarWSpred) :-
substituted(Pred, Insts, SubFrees, [VarlBound], Spred).
'/.existing Oyster code
substituted(lambda/Var,Pred), Insts .SubFrees,Bound,lambda(Avar,Spred)):-
member(Var, SubFrees), modify(Var, Avar), \+ member/Avar, SubFrees),
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substituted(Pred, [(Var-Avar)IInsts], [AvarISubFrees], Bound, Spred).
substituted(lambda(Var,Pred),Insts,SubFrees.Bound,lambda(Var,Spred)):-
substituted(Pred, Insts, SubFrees, [VarlBound], Spred).
substituted(rec(Var,Pred), Insts, SubFrees, Bound, rec(Avar.Spred)) :-
member(Var, SubFrees), modify(Var, Avar), \+ member(Avar, SubFrees),
i
substituted(Pred, [(Var-Avar)IInsts], [AvarISubFrees] , Bound, Spred).
substituted(rec(Var,Pred) , Insts, SubFrees, Bound, rec(Var,Spred)) :-
substitutedCPred, Insts, "SubFrees, [VarlBound], Spred).
substituted([",Binding] , Insts, SubFrees, Bound, [~.SBinding]) :-
!, substituted(Binding, Insts, SubFrees, Bound, SBinding).
substituted(["I Binding] , Insts, SubFrees, Bound, ["ISBinding]) :-
!, substituted(Binding, Insts, SubFrees, Bound, SBinding).





substituted(Pred, [(Var-Avar)IInsts], [AvarISubFrees], Bound, Spred).
substituted([Var,Pred] , Insts, SubFrees, Bound, [Var,Spred])
!, substituted(Pred, Insts, SubFrees, [VarlBound], Spred).
substituted([VarI Bind] , Insts, SubFrees, Bound, [AvarISBind])
member(Var, SubFrees), modify(Var, Avar), \+ member(Avar, SubFrees),
I
substituted(Bind, [(Var-Avar)IInsts], [AvarISubFrees], Bound, SBind).
substituted([VarI Bind] , Insts, SubFrees, Bound, [VarlSBind]) :-
!, substituted(Bind, Insts, SubFrees, [VarlBound], SBind).
substituted(Term, _, Term) :- atomic(Term), !.
substituted(Term, Insts, SubFrees, Bound, STerm) :-
\+ var(Term),
Term =.. [FunctIArgs],
\+member(Funct, [su, atom, term_of\\', lambda, rec, ~] ) , '/.note '\\
i
t
substitutedlist(Args, Insts, SubFrees, Bound, SArgs),
STerm =.. [FunctISArgs].
substituted(Term, Insts, SubFrees, Bound, STerm) :-
\+ var(STerm),
STerm =.. [SFunctISArgs],
\+member(SFunct, [su, atom, term_of\\', lambda, rec, ~] ) , '/.note '\\






































Ai.tvar(u) i—» Xpos. x. n, hyp. < n. _ >
tcon(it) t-> Xpos. x. n, hyp. < n. _ >
tuna(/, a), hi t—» Xpos. nil »-> Xx. n. hyp. < n. _ >
h :: t. A3 i—* Xx. n. hyp. < tuna(/, p2(hltxnj), _ >
tbin(/, a. h), hi. A2 i-» Apos.nil i-» Ax.n.hyp.
h. = 0 >->< tbin(/, p2(Altm_), h). _ >
h — 1 i—*< tbin(/, a. p2(h2txn.)), _ >
<5(po.s = nil in posn) AND
= tvar(t) in metaterm) AND
A(def_eqn(3;. ft))
S(pos = nil in posn) AND
A(.r = tcon(n) in metaterm) AND
<5(def_eqn(x, n))
nil Xx. n. A(tuna(/. a) = x) AND
A(def_eqn(:r, n))
h :: t, A3 i—> Xx, n.S(h. = 0 in pnat) AND
(Aim) AND
A(def_eqn(x, n))
tbin(/, a, h), hi. A2 i-» Apos.nil >-> Xx, n. A(tbin(/, a. h) = x in metaterm) AND
A(def_eqn(i, n))
h :: t„ A3 i-» Xx,n.(S(h = 0 in pnat) AND
(Aim)) OR































































































































































































































































































































































tvar(u) ~ tvar(v) «-» u = v in atom
tcon(u) ~ tcon(?;) <-> u = v in atom
tuna(/, a) tuna(r/. c) <- I f = a in atom") Aa~c
tbin(/.,62) tbin(g, Cj.dj) (f = a in atomi A a ~ A b ~ d.-,
exp_at(i : metaterm.pos : posn. sub : metaterm)
... succeeds if sub is the subterm at, position pos in i.
exp_at(tvar(u), pos.x) <-» pos = nil in posn A x = tvar(w) in metaterm
exp_at(tcon(i;), pos.x) <-» pos — nil in posn A x = tcon(w) in metaterm
exp_at(tuna(/, a), nil, x) <-> x = tuna(/, a.) in metaterm
x) 'exp_at( tuna(/.a) h: U (h = 0 in pnat) A exp_at(o,, t, x)
exp_at(tbin(/, a, b), nil, x) <-» x = tbin(/. a. b) in metaterm
exp_at( tbin(/, n1. b2) h' -1]2 ,x) *-*
(h = 0 in pnat A exp_at(a. 1) ) V (/;. = 1 in pnat A exp_at(6.x))0
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*
replace(« : metaterm. pos : posn. s : metaterm. n : metaterm)
... succeeds if n is l.he result of replacing the subterm at position pos in ?' with s.
replace(tvar(u),po,9, s, n) <-» pos = nil in posn A s = n in metaterm
replace(tcon(7;),/)o,s, s, n) *-* pos = nil in posn A s = n in metaterm
replace! tuna(/. a)-. "ill s, n) <-» s = n in metaterm
replace(tuna(/, a), h.: :t, s. tvarfi;)) e-» void
replace(tuna(/, a), h,: :t. s. tcon(v)) <-» void
. s.replace! tuna(f. a) h: :t tuna(.r/.c) )
/ = <7 in atom A/) = 0 in pnat A replace(a, t. s. c)
replace(tuna(/. a), h: : f. s. tbin(r/, c. d)) <-» void
replace(tbin(/. a. b). nil, s, n) «-» s — n in metaterm
replace(tbin(/. a, b). h: :t. s. tvar(7j)) «-» void
replace(tbin(/, a, b), h: :t.s, tcon(u)) <-» void
replace(tbin(/, a, b), h: :t, s, tuna(r;, c)) <-» void
replace! tbin, h: :t12 ,s, tbin(fl,Cj,d^) )
f = f/ in atom A ((/i = 0 in pnat A b — d in metaterm A replace(a, t, s, c) )V
(/i, = l in pnat A a = c in metaterm A replace(b, t, s, d)J)
wave_rule(Z. r)
def_eqn(/, r)
VZ. r : metaterm.wave_rule(Z, r) —» Z ■
VZ, r : metaterm.<5(wave_rule(Z, }■))
VZ, r : metaterm.def _eqn(Z, r) —» Z
VZ. r : metaterm.b(def_eqn(Z. r))
276
